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LESSONS FROM THE WORLD BANK’S EXPERIENCE 
OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOANS (SALs):
A CASE STUDY OF THAILAND
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the chronology of the structural adjustments in Thailand 
in the early 1980s with the focus on the World Bank’s first and second 
structural adjustment loans (SAL I and SAL II). It also presents the findings 
from (1) interviewing key government officials and businessmen to see what 
factors affected the degree of success or failure of implementing SAL measures 
and (2) regression analysis to measure the impact on the Thai economy of the SAL 
measures that were implemented. Our main finding is that the success of the 
implementation of SAL measures depends on the strong commitment of the Thai 
government to restructure the economy when facing the downturn of the world 
economy. However, an evaluation of the impacts of the SAL measures, that were 
implemented, on the economy were difficult to quantify. The regression and 
simulation results indicate that (1) the measures of import and export tariff 
reductions increase both exports and imports of goods and services but their net 
impact is a reduction in the current account deficit and (2) the measure of 
raising the overall average tax rate has a trivial impact on real gross domestic 
products.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective of the Project
The main objective of this project is to evaluate the 
World Bank’s first and second structural adjustment loans 
(SALs) made to Thailand in 1982 and 1983 respectively. To 
meet this objective, at least two key questions have to be 
answered. First, why were some measures attached to SALs to 
Thailand implemented? Why were some not? Second, what were 
the impact on the Thai economy of those measures that were 
implemented?
To answer the first question, we hypothesize that the 
likelihood of implementing the measures depends on (1) 
whether the measures or their elements were new or had been 
tried in previous years, (2) whether those measures would 
have been i m p l e m e n t e d  with or without SALs, (3) what 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  the W orld Bank made to the s t ructural 
adjustment in Thailand, and (4) other political and economic 
factors.
The second question focuses on the impact of broadly 
defined SALs measures on the Thailand’s aggregate economic 
variables such as real gross domestic products, export and 
import values, current account deficits, and government 
def icits.
A previous study, International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (1986), has a similar objective. Although 
it has been used internally at the World Bank, its findings 
are cited in this paper when appropriate as the permission 
to do so has been obtained by our sponsor. This permission 
also applies to other studies published by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank).
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1.2 Organization of the Paper
This paper is divided into five chapters. This chapter 
or Chapter I gives an introduction and an overview of 
macroeconomic performance (see Section 1.3 below). Chapter
II presents a historical summary of structural adjustment 
loans in Thailand starting from policy recommendations made 
by the World Bank in 1980 to selected SAL issues. Chapter
III is devoted to presenting details of findings from the 
interview method. Chapter IV details the modelling method 
and its empirical results with some simulations. Actually, 
Chapters III and IV are loosely dependent and, therefore, 
they can be read in any order without loss of continuity. 
The paper ends with a summary and gives lessons from the SAL 
experience in Chapter V. Appendix A supplements Chapter II 
by giving a summary review of recommendations, measures and 
implementation related to structural adjustment loans. 
Appendice B, C and D supplement Chapter III by describing in 
detail the interview methodology, summarizing interviews’ 
responses, and presenting data on petroleum product prices 
and utility charges respectively. Appendix E supplements 
C h a pter IV by prese n t i n g  data used in the r e g r e s s i o n  
analysis. Appendix F provides some background and functions 
of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB) and the Board of Investment (BOI) and, finally, 
Appendix G documents selected conditions in the structural 
adjustment loan agreements. We report Appendice F and G 
here for the reader who is not familiar with both government 
organizations and conditions in SALs.
1.3 An Overview of Macroeconomic Performance
This section describes the Thai m a c r o e c o n o m i c  
environment before, during and after the implementation of 
SALs measures so that the reader can understand needs for 
structural adjustments and their aftermath. Table 1.1 
reports selected macroeconomic variables for 1970 to 1987. 
Table 1.2 presents growth rates and shares of exports 
classified by selected sector for 1979 to 1987 and Table 1.3
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gives growth rates of selected items of principal exports 
for 1970 to 1987.
1970-1978: A Period of Strong Economy
The Thai economy was relatively strong for 1970-1978 
despite experiencing adverse effects resulting from the 
first oil shock in 1973 and 1974. Its current account 
deficit, international reserves, external debt and central 
g o v e r n m e n t  budget deficit were in the m a n a g e a b l e  and 
acceptable range.
The growth rate of real gross national products (GNP) 
for 1970-1978 averaged 7.1% per year, well above the annual 
average of 6.2% for 1970-1987. The first oil shock in 1973- 
1974 had some adverse effects on the economy as it directly 
raised energy costs of industrial sector and import bills of 
the nation. The inflation rate measured by GNP deflator 
rose from an average of 2.9% per year for 1970-1972 to an 
average of 14.3% for 1973-1975 and, consequently, the inter­
bank lending rate, a measure of the short-term interest 
rate, also rose from an average of 8.8% per year for 1970- 
1972 to an average of 10.4% for 1973-1975. The growth rate 
of imports of goods and services for 1973-1975 averaged 
30.3% per year, a substantial .jump from an average of 7.0% 
per year for 1970-1972. See Table 1.1.
Fortunately, prices of farm products, ma.jor Thai 
exports, in the world market also rose sharply in 1973 and
1974. As shown in Table 1.3, an average growth rate of 
principal exports of farm products —  rice, rubber, maize, 
tapioca products, and sugar -- ranged from 38% to 89% per 
year. This results in (1) a relatively high growth rate of 
23.9% per year of exports of goods and services for 1973-
1975, (2) a low 1.7% of current account deficit to GNP 
ratio, and (3) comfortable international reserves covering 
more than six t imes of an average monthly import bill for 
19(3-1975. Consequent!.', in average ratio to GNP of
outstanding public external debt, that includes government 
obligations of guaranteeing state enterprises’ loans, was 
trivially 3.9% per year with a low debt service ratio, a 
ratio of principal repayment plus interest payments to 
export earnings, of 11.2% for 1973-1975.
With respect to the fiscal conditions, a ratio of 
central government budget deficits to GNP averaged 3.9% per 
year for 1970-1978, a relatively high ratio when compared to 
an average of 3.5% per year for 1970-1987. However, the
c e n tral g o v e r n m e n t  outst a n d i n g  debt to GNP ratio was 
relatively low at 19.3% for the same period.
1979-1981: A Period of Weak Economy
Unlike the first oil shock, the world farm prices
during the second oil shock in 1979-1980 were unfavorable, 
which results in an average growth rate for 1979-1981 of
real GNP of 5.3% per year. This growth rate is relatively 
low when comparing to the average of 6.2% per year for 1970-
1987. See Table 1.1. The major adverse effect of the 
second oil shock is a high current account deficit and low 
international reserves. The ratio of current account 
deficit to GNP rose from an average of 4.2% for 1976-1978 to
an average of 7.1% for 1979-1981 when the growth rate of
imports was higher than that of exports. As the current 
account deficit rose, international reserves dropped from
the coverage of an average of 5.3 months of imports for
1976-1978 to 3.8 months for 1979-1981.
The second oil shock also raised the inflation rate 
from an average of 6.7% per year for 1976-1978 to an average 
of 9.7% per year for 1979-1981 and raised the inter-bank 
lending rate from an average of 9.7% per year to 15.2% per 
year for the same period.
With a slower than average growth rate of real GNP and
a rise in international interest rates, public external debt
and government debt deteriorated. The public external debt 
to GNP ratio more than doubled from an average of 6.0% for 
1976-1978 to an average of 12.5% for 1979-1981 with a higher 
debt service ratio rising from 12.7% to 14.7% for the same 
period. The central government debt to GNP ratio rose from 
an average of 18.2% for 1976-1978 to an average of 21.5% for 
1979-1981. This rising government debt to GNP ratio is the 
result of government expenditures, on average, growing 
faster than government revenue since 1975.
Given the above adverse effects especially those of 
rising current account deficits, falling international 
reserves, and increasing government debt, there was an 
increasing pressure on the Thai government to restructure 
the economy. Consequently, the government formulated a 
structural adjustment program and contacted the World Bank 
for the structural adjustment loans.
1982-1984: A Period of Worldwide Recessions and Structural
Adjustment
Worldwide recessions and high interest rates since 1981 
caused by the second oil shock substantially slowed down the 
growth rate of Thailand’s exports and imports but raised the 
real interest rate. The structural adjustment program, 
supplemented by the World B a n k ’s structural adjustment 
loans, hardly had a significant effect on the economy in the 
short run since it aimed at m e dium and l ong-term 
adjustments. In fact, many of p r o g r a m s  such as tax 
deductions could further deteriorate the budget deficit 
situation in the short run.
Since the world economy was r e l a t i v e l y  weak, the 
average growth rate of exports was substantially low at 6.4% 
per year for 1982-1984; its comparable growth rate was 18.4% 
per year for 1970-1987. Similarly, the growth rate of 
imports averaged 4.9% per year for 1982-1984, compared with 
the average growth rate of 17.0% per year for 1970-1987.
The factor that complicated a low growth rate of export 
earnings comes from the fact that the Bank of Thai land 
practically fixed the baht against the US dollar. As the US 
dollar appreciated, when evaluated against other major 
curre n c i e s ,  in 1983, so did the baht. Consequently, 
Thailand’s competitiveness in the world market deteriorated 
and this also contributed to a low growth rate of export 
earnings. The Bank of Thailand, instead of devaluing the 
baht against the US dollar, chose to limit the domestic 
credit at 18% per year in order to slow down imports whilst 
the baht, devaluation was speculated. The credit limit 
measure had a widely adverse effect on the whole economy 
beyond the import sector as many businesses went bankrupt. 
In November, 1984, the Bank of Thailand eventually devalued 
the baht by 14.8% against the US dollar and then pegged it 
to a basket of major trading partners’ currencies instead of 
the US dollar. The devaluation has consequently restored 
the Thailand’s competitiveness in the world market. It 
should be noted that the baht devaluation measure was not 
part of the conditions in the structural adjustment loans 
although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) played an 
important role on encouraging the Bank of Thailand to 
devalue its currency against the US dollar. See related 
discussion in Sections 2.2 and 2.7 of Chapter II below.
The 1982-1984 period was also the period of high real 
interest rates as the average inflation rate was kept as low 
as 2.4% per year but the average nominal interest rate, 
influenced by high interest rates in the world market, was 
at 12.6% per year. This resulted in the real interest rate 
averaging 10.2% per year, compared to an average of 4.4% per 
year for 1970-1987. The high real interest rate obviously 
deterred private investment and raised interest costs for 
the government financing through debt issuing.
Given the low growth rate of exports and imports, the 
average ratio of current account deficit to GNP was still
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high at 5.0% for 1982-1984 with an alarming deduction in 
international reserves which could approximately cover only 
three times of monthly imports of goods and services. The 
structural adjustment loans I and II totalling US$325.5 
million (US$150 million for SAL I and US$175.5 million for 
SAL II) were also used to raise international reserves. The 
SALs amount was approximately 12.4% of the average annual 
international reserves for 1982-1984.
Similarly, the central g o v e r n m e n t ’s budget deficit 
worsened as its ratio to GNP widened to an average of 3.7% 
per year for 1982-1984 from an average of 3.1% per year for 
1979-1981. A worldwide recession in 1982-1984, which slowed 
down Thai exports and, consequently, imports, also slowed 
down the government revenue. Couple SAL measures were 
designed to cope with this budget deficit. For example, a 
ceiling of annual public borrowing was imposed. However, 
other SAL measures such as a tax-rate cut or tax structure 
improvement might further reduce government revenue in the 
short-run and, therefore, complicated the budget deficit 
problem. To this end, the w o r l d  B a n k ’s struc t u r a l  
adjustment loans helped to relieve the short-term budget 
tension as they provided short-term liquidity for structural 
adjustments. See Chapter II for more details on SAL 
measures.
1985-1987: A Period of Slow Recovery
A recovery of the world economy for 1985-1987 coupled 
with a baht devaluation against US dollar in late 1984 
helped boost the Thai exports to an average growth rate of 
18.0% per year. However, the growth rate of its imports 
kept low at an average of 12.0% per year. These growth 
rates substantially improved the current account situation 
as its deficit ratio to GNP dropped to 1.6% per year for 
1985-1987. Consequently, international reserves, measured 
in terms of number of months they covered imports, rose to
4.2 months.
A recovery of the world economy was followed by a 
decline in real prices of crude oil in the world market and 
nominal interest rates. These declines reduced energy costs 
and interest costs of financing g o v e r n m e n t  debt. In 
addition, the central government also imposed a cap on the 
g r owth rate of the number of its personnel , which 
substantially lowered the growth rate of its expenditure to 
an average of 5.3% per year for 1985-1987 and resulted in an 
average of 2.6% ratio of budget deficit to GNP.
One of the World Bank’s major concerns with respect to 
SAL measures was to boost exports. Various instruments such 
as step-by-step reductions in export duties for rice and 
rubber, major Thai exports, were part of SAL measures. 
Unfortunately, the world market for agricultural products 
for the period of SAL launch of 1982-1984 and its aftermath 
of 1985-1987 was unfavorable, therefore, the average growth 
rate of agricultural exports was only 3.0% per year for 
1982-1984 and 2.3% per year for 1985-1987 (see Table 1.2). 
The average growth rate of rice export was even worse as it 
grew at an average rate of 1.2% per year for 1982-1984 but 
shrinked with an average negative growth rate of 3.7% per 
year for 1985-1987 (see Table 1.3). Unlike the agricultural 
exports, the manufacturing exports were exceptional as they 
grew at an average rate of 35.5% per year for 1985-1987, 
compared to an average rate of 12.2% per year for the SAL 
p e r i o d  of 1982-1984 (see Table 1.2). However, this 
o u t s t a n d i n g  growth rate of m a n u f a c t u r i n g  exports was 
probably the outcome of worldwide economic recovery, the 
baht devaluation in late 1984, and the SAL measures. The 
leading export items of manufacturing products were textile, 
i n t e g r a t e d  circuits and precious stones with their 
corresponding growth rates of 37.0%, 28.7% and 24.6% per
year for 1985-1987 (see Table 1.3).
Finally, t o u rism has become the leading foreign
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exchange earner for Thailand since 1982 (see Table 1.2). In 
fact, the worldwide recovery and the baht devaluation helped 
raise the growth rate of tourism export from an average of 
8.4% per year for 1982-1984 to an average of 22.6% per year 
for 1985-1987 with an exceptional year in 1987 (a high 
growth rate of 34%) when 1987 was designated as the Visit 
Thailand Year.
The turnaround of the external balance and government 
budget situation for 1985-1987 was the results of worldwide 
recovery, the SAL measures (see Chapter II for details) and 
other government policies (such as the baht devaluation and 
IMF standby a g r e e m e n t ) . Therefore, it is r e l a t i v e l y  
difficult to evaluate the success or failure of the SAL 
measures. In any case, attempts have been made in this 
study using the interview and econometric approaches whose 
findings are presented respectively in Chapters III and IV.
Table 1.1 
Selected Macroeconomic Variables 
1970-1987
1970-87 1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981 1982-1984 1985-1987! 1987 J
! Date Average Average Average Average Average Average Average \
! Important Events 1st oil 2nd oil SAL I
shock shock SAL II
!Gross National Products (GNP)
! 1. Growth Rate of Real GNP (in %) 6.2 4.2 6.5 9.6 5.3 6.3 4.8 : 7.0 |
|GDP Share at current Factor
!Cost (in X )
! 2. Agriculture 25.4 27.9 30.4 28.2 25.7 21.5 18.6 ! 18.1 :
| 3. Manufacturing 18.2 14.9 16.8 17.8 19.3 19.6 20.8 ! 21.3 !
i 4. Services 13.2 12.6 11.6 11.9 13.1 14.4 15.3 ; 15.3 :
!Inflation and Interest Rate (X )
! 5. Inflation Rate (GNP Deflator) 6.6 2.9 14.3 6.7 9.7 2.4 3.5 ! 6.5 [
i 6. Inter-Bank Lending Rate 11.0 8.8 10.4 9.7 15.2 12.6 9.3 i 6.5 ;
! 7. Real Interest Rate 4.4 5.9 -3.9 3.0 5.5 10.2 5.8 : 0.0 i
! (=line 6-line 5)
!International Transactions
! 8. Current Account/GNP (in %) -3.6 -2.1 -1.7 -4.2 -7.1 -5.0 -1.6 : -1.4 :
! 9. Growth Rate of Exports of Goods 18.4 18.5 23.9 20.4 23.4 6.4 18.0 | 22.4 ;
! and Services (in %)
|10. Growth Rate Imports of Goods 17.0 7 . 0 30.3 19.3 25 . 3 4.9 12.0 ! 32.5 !
! and Service (in %)
ill. Ratio of International Reserves 5.2 7.9 6.7 5.3 3.8 3. 1 4.2 : 4.6 ;
! to Imports of Goods and
! Services (in number of months)
iExchange Rates
!12. Baht/USS 22.02 20.91 20.45 20.38 20.86 23. 14 26.36 1 25.74 !
|13. Baht/100 Yens 9.22 6.24 7.20 8.00 9.32 9.69 14.S3 : 17.71 :
1 0
Table 1.1 (continuted) 
Selected Macroeconomic Variables 
1970-1987
11 1970-87 1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981 1982-1984 1985-1987[ 1987 [
! Date Average Average Average Average Average Average Average [ 
_ _ 1
! Important Events 1st oil 2nd oil SAL I •I
11
1
shock shock SAL II 11
1
[External Debt 
11 ~
11
11
11
[14. Public External Debt/CNP (in X ) 12.0 4.5 3.9 6.0 12.5 18.6
11
26.6 [ 27.7 [
[15. Debt Service Ratio (in X )
11
15.2 14.4 11.2 12.7 14.7 18.6 19.7 [
1t
16.9 [
1•
[Central Government (in X )  
11 ~
11
•
11
11
[16. Budget Deficits (-)/CNP -3.5 -4.3 -3.8 -3.5 -3.1 -3.7
11
-2.6 [ -0.7 [
[17. Debt/GNP 24 . 0 21.7 17.9 18.2 21.5 27.8 37.1 [ 37.6 [
[18. Growth Rate of Revenue 15.5 7.0 23.1 18.7 19.8 10.2 11.1 [ 19.2 [
[19. Growth Rate of Expenditures
11
13. 9 9.0 16.9 19.6 20.0 10.9 5.3 [
11
3.6 [
Notes: Data on inter-bank lending rate (line 6), international reserves (line 11),exchange rates (lines 12 and
13), public external debt that includes government obligations (line 14), and central government 
variables (lines 16-19) are from Bank of Thailand. Monthly Bulletin, various issues. Data on debt 
service ratio were directly obtained from Bank of Thailand. Data on (ex-post) real interest rate are from 
inter-bank lending rate (line 6) minus inflation rate (line 5). The rest of the data were constructed from 
data in National Economic and Social Development Board, National Income of Thailand, New Series 1970-1987.
Exports Classified by Selected Sector 
1979-1987
Table 1.2
(in percent)
1979-1987 1979-1981 1982-1984 1935-1987 1987 J
! Date Average Average Average Average
! Important Events 2nd oil SAL I
shock SAL II
[ Growth Rate
! All Exports of Goods and Services 15.9 23.4 6.4 18.0 22.4 |
! Agriculture 8.9 21. 4 3.0 2.3 4.9 |
| Manufacturing 26.0 30.4 12. 2 35.5 48.0 [
! Tourism 22.0 35.1 3.4 22.6 34.0 |
i Share
! Agriculture 34.6 40.2 36. 7 26.9 23.5 !
| Manufacturing 35.6 28.0 33. 7 45.2 53.0 !
I Tourism 12. 2 10.6 12.3 13.3 14.1 !
Notes: Data on all exports of goods and services are from Table 1.1-
Data on other variables were calculated from data in Bank of Thailand, 
Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Table 1.3
Growth Rates of Selected Items of Principal Exports 
1970-1987
(in percent)
1• J 1970-87 1970-1972 1973-1975 1976-1978 1979-1981 1982-1984 1985-1987! 1987 !
! Date 
1
! Average Average Average Average Average Average Average | 
1
11
1
! Important Events
1
11 1st oil 2nd oil SAL I 11 1I
1«
1
11 shock shock SAL II 1(
1
11
1
t1
J Rice
1
11
i 21.4 34.1 37.6 26.8 36.6 1.2
11
-3.7 J
•1
ii.8 ;
! Rubber ! 19 -8.5 41.6 33.0 13.9 7.4 17.2 ; 35.9 ;
! Maize ! 10 3.7 47.0 -4.6 25.2 7.1 -20.5 ! -57.6 !
! Tapioca Products ! 20.7 13.1 45.0 35.8 17.3 2.0 8.6 ! 8.3 !
J Prawns ! 25.7 2 4 53.1 22.1 16.6 10.8 27.2 ! 30.9 ;
! Tin ! 9.5 1.5 15.7 48.1 10.2 -15.5 -5.9 ! -24.3 j
! Sugar ! 59.5 268. 6 89.0 -5.9 68. 2 -11.2 18.0 ; 17.9 ;
! Precious Stones 1 32.3 70.8 30.1 31.3 38.1 11.9 24.6 ! 41.7 [
! *Integrated circuits | **28.2 49.1 6.7 28.7 ; 18.4 J
! *Textile Products
1I
! **25.2
11
22.7 15.8 37.0 J
11
55.3 ;
11
Notes: * Not classified by Bank of Thailand as one of principal exports until 1977.
** Average of 1979-1987.
Data were computed from data in Bank of Thailand, Monthly Bulletin, various issues. 
Items that were classified by Bank of Thailand as principal exports before 1977 but 
excluded afterwards are jute&kenaf, tobacco leaves, mung beans, fluorite, sorghum, 
cement and teak.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOANS
IN THAILAND
2 . 1 Ob.)ective and Organization of the Chapter
This chapter was written for the reader who is not 
familiar with the histo r i c a l  aspects and details of 
s t ructural adjustments in Thailand. The players in 
structural adjustment besides the Thai government were the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Let 
us begin with a discussion on roles of IMF in Thailand in 
the early 1980s in Section 2.2.
Section 2.3 of this chapter provides some background of 
the World Bank mission in Thailand in 1980, which resulted
in a study recommending various policies for structural 
adjustments. Based on these recommendations and the Fifth 
National Economic and Social Development Plan, the Thai 
government took various measures towards the structural 
adjustments. These measures discussed in Section 2.4 were 
c o n s i d e r e d  by the W orld Bank as the down payment for 
applying for the loans. The proposed measures in SAL I and 
SAL II are discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 respectively.
When one discusses about structural adjustments in 
Thailand in the early 1980s, he/she cannot leave out the
discussion on a cooperation of the World Bank and IMF in 
SALs, which is contained in Section 2.7. The chapter
c ontinues with the World B a n k ’s a s s e s s m e n t  and an
investigation of the current status of the implementation of 
SAL measures in Section 2.8. The chapter finally ends with 
selected SAL issues. Information in Appendix A supplement 
arguments in this chapter.
2.2 Roles of International Monetary Fund in Thailand in the 
Early 1980s
After being affected by adverse external shocks in
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1979-1980, Thailand experienced rapidly increasing current 
account deficits as discussed in Section 1.3 of Chapter I. 
Besides the structural adjustment loans from the World Bank, 
T h a i l a n d  also i n i t i a t e d  discu s s i o n s  with IMF on an 
appropriate policy response.
The IMF’s involvement during 1981-1983 included ( 1 ) 
purchases under the Compensatory Financing Facility of SDR 
186 million, (2) the buffer stock financing facility of SDR 
58 million and, most importantly, (3) a two-year standby 
arrangement of SDR 814.5 million. See International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (1986, p. 90).
The two-year standby arrangement was approved in June 
1981 with the general objectives of restructuring demand, 
reducing the public savings-investment gap, and limiting the 
growth of foreign indebtedness. The arrangement included 
undertakings on monetary and credit policy, fiscal policy, 
and external debt. However, as d i s c u s s e d  in the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1983, 
p. 31), the central government revenue shortfall in FY82 led 
to an increase in the budgetary deficit, which, in turn, 
caused a nonobservance of the subceiling on net credit to 
the government of Thailand. In the circumstances, the 
initial t w o - y e a r  standby arrangement was replaced in 
November 1982 by a new 14-month standby in an amount of SDR 
272 million (at that point 100% of quota) which subsequently 
increased to SDR 386.6 million under the 1983 general 
review.
The p r o g r a m s  of the two-year standby a r r a n g e m e n t  
included performance criteria relating to credit expansion 
(including credit to the government), external borrowing, 
and customary practices in the exchange and payments system. 
Particular attention was paid to interest and exchange rate 
policies. Other technical assistances were in the Revenue, 
Customs and Excise departments of the Ministry of Finance
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and an assistance to the Bank of Thailand was in improving 
financial statistics and computer services.
2.3 The World Bank’s Policy Recommendations in 1980
A mission from the World Bank visited 'Thailand in 
February/March 1980. The m i s s i o n ’s objectives were to 
review the economic situation in Thailand with government 
agencies and to discuss the policies and programs that would 
be necessary to alleviate emerging economic problems and to 
improve Thailand’s longer term prospects for sustaining high 
rates of growth and reducing poverty. The mission was 
greatly assisted in their analysis and data gathering by the 
staffs of the Bank of Thailand, Ministry of Finance, and 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and 
by many other officials of the Thai Government. Meanwhile, 
the Thai government was reviewing T h a i l a n d ’s emerging 
economic problems in detail as part of the process of 
preparing the Fifth National Economic and Social Development 
Plan.
The mission resulted in a report, International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (1980A). This report’s 
analysis of the emerging economic imbalances in Thailand 
also i n c o r p o r a t e d  results of I nternational Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1980B, 1980C, 1980D, 1978).
A review of economic situation in the 1960s and 1970s 
and policy recommendations made by the World Bank presented 
below in this section are from International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1980A). However, this does 
not mean that the review and policy recommendations were 
entirely those of the World Bank since, as discussed above, 
the mission preparing this report had exchanged data, 
information and ideas with the Thai counterpart.
High aggregate growth rates, price stability and major 
strides in reducing the incidence of poverty in the 1960s
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and early 1970s in Thailand were accomplished by expanding 
land under cultivation, by p r o v i d i n g  economic 
infrastructure, by encouraging the private sector to expand 
production without introducing severe price distortions and 
controls, and by opening the economy to external trade 
without heavy dependence on foreign capital. In the latter 
half of the 1970s dominated by declining land availability 
and adverse external factors such as the second oil shock 
and declining terms of trade, Thailand still maintained high 
growth rates; however, growth was a c c o m p a n i e d  by 
accelerating inflation, growing dependence on foreign 
borrowing, large budgetary deficits, and probably less 
success in furthering poverty alleviation.
Besides the adverse external factors, the high deficits 
in the current account and government budget were also the 
result of internal problems within the economy, including 
failure to fully adjust energy prices, price distortions, 
and excessive liquidity creation. The Thai government 
initiated some corrective measures but the deficits seemed 
continue growing into the 1980s since the outlook for the 
world economy, based on the World Bank’s analysis, did not 
offer prospects for sustained improvement in the 1980s and 
the initiated measures were not significant enough to reduce 
deficits. Therefore, the Thai e c o n o m y  had to make 
fundamental adjustments to accommodate itself to this 
changed environment, to rectify the domestic imbalances that 
had development over 1976-1980, and to restore the balanced 
growth pattern that had led to the impressive rate of 
poverty alleviation of the 1960s and 1970s.
The report continues on page v to say that "if the 
(Thai) Government were to commit itself to a comprehensive 
adjustment program to be implemented over a period of, say, 
five years and if this program were p e r c e i v e d  to be 
sufficient to effect the adjustment, then it should be 
possible to mobilize the necessary foreign resources to
17
finance the deficits that would occur during the adjustment 
period. The (World) Bank would certainly be able to support 
T h a i l a n d  in seeking that a d d i t i o n a l  financing (i.e. 
structural adjustment loans). In these circumstances, a 
reasonable rate of growth could be maintained and the 
deficit reduced gradually for the rest of the decade. 
Words in the brackets were added by the authors.
The report, then, discusses five areas of crucial 
importance where policy measures should be implemented as 
part of a comprehensive program to minimize the risk that 
the growth process would be seriously disrupted. These five 
areas are:
(1) Resource mobilization, particularly in the public 
sectors,
(2) Monetary policy, including measures to maintain 
high rates of private saving and to manage external debt and 
the capital account,
(3) Energy policy and conservation, with particular 
attention to pricing,
(4) Industrial policy and m e a s u r e s  to p r o m o t e  
industrial exports, and
(5) Agricultural policy and measures to maintain high 
rates of growth of agricultural production and exports.
Specific policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  in each area are 
presented in Table A.l of Appendix A. It will be seen in 
the next two sections that these policy recommendations 
except those on monetary policy were partly used as a basis 
to form specific measures of the first and second structural 
adjustment loans.
2.4 The Down Payment or Actions Taken
As discussed in Section 1.3 of Chapter I, the Thai 
economy for 1979-1981 was severely affected by the second 
oil shock, which resulted in the average ratio of current
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account deficit to GNP jumping from 1.7% during the lirst 
oil shock in 1973- 1975 to 7 . 1% during the second oil shock 
in 1979-1981 (see Table 1.1). This high ratio of current 
account deficit, based on the Thai government’s calculations 
as well as those of the World Bank, could not be sustained 
in the long run and, without specific actions to cope with 
it, the Thai economy could have ended up with being one of 
the h i g h e s t  ratio of external debt to GNP and, then, 
suffered its consequences.
In order to avoid the scenario as mentioned above, the 
Thai government decided in the Fall of 1980 to opt for a 
course of action which seeked to improve Thailand’s external 
balance largely through medium-term structural adjustments 
to the economy (see Letter of Development Policy, dated 
February 4, 1982—  ^ and Wibulswasdi (1987)). Some actions
had already taken place in that direction (see below) . 
Others was taken, based on a policy framework outlined in 
the T h a i l a n d ’s Fifth National Econo m i c  and Social 
Development Plan for fiscal years (FY) 1982-1986—  ^ and the
World B a n k ’s policy recommendations as summarized in the 
previous section. As discussed in the first LDP, many 
measures, proposed by the Thai government for the first 
structural adjustment loan, cited the Fifth Plan and the 
World Bank’s Policy recommendations as their guidelines.
It should be clear that the Thai government in 1980 had 
a strong intention to restructure its economy even before 
submitting its first LDP for the first structural adjustment 
loan. Two obvious evidences are (1) the policy framework of 
structural adjustments outlined in the Fifth Plan and (2) 
actions taken in the direction of structural adjustments
—  ^ The first LDP, henceforth.
O /— 7 The fiscal year for Thailand starts in October and ends 
in September of the following calendar year. For example FY 
1982 covers October 1981 - September 1982.
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even before submitting the first LDP. Firstly, the Fifth 
Plan drafted before 1982 had its primary objective of 
poverty alleviation but also gave substantial attention to 
the reduction in existing fiscal and financial imbalances 
and to improvements in the operation of the economy through
(1) increased efficiency in the allocation and use of 
r esources and (2) r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of the incentive 
structure. It is extremely crucial for the working of the 
Thai government that any policy, that involves cooperations 
among various government agencies or departments like 
structural adjustment policies, will have a better chance of 
being implemented if it is written as part of the National 
Economic and Social Development Plan.
Secondly, many actions had been taken towards 
structural adjustments before the Thai government submitted 
its first LDP of February 4, 1982. Those actions were cited
in the first LDP and also tabulated in Table A.2 of Appendix 
A of this paper. The actions ranged from those in specific 
sectors of agriculture, industry, and energy to those in the 
fiscal policy and institutional development areas. Several 
actions involved study preparations or initiations; such as 
the land use study, public s e m i n a r s  on industrial 
development, industrial subsector study on the electrical 
goods, and a study on the Board of Investment’s system of 
investment incentives and its functions. Many actions 
involved committee establishment and legislation; such as a 
p e r m a n e n t  h i g h - l e v e l  i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l  committee on 
industrial development, a new export tax drawback act, an 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of the Export D e v e l o p m e n t  Fund, and a 
permanent high-level National Economic Policy Steering 
Committee. The other actions involved tax changes and baht 
devaluation. Selected details are discussed below.
Substantial progress had been made in the agricultural 
sector as the government lowered or eliminated export taxes 
or restrictions on Thailand’s major agricultural exports
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(rice, rubber, maize, cassava and sugar) and started the 
land certification and reclassification programs. In 
industrial sector, most of the actions were committee 
establishment and study initiation. However, an important 
measure to promote the Thai export was a devaluation of the 
baht by approximately 10% against the US dollar in 1981, 
given the large appreciation of the US dollar against other 
major currencies.
Substantial progress had also been made in the energy 
sector when the government substantially raised power 
tariffs and petroleum prices by April 1981 to remove all 
subsidies. Also sec Appendix D. In addition, natural gas 
in the Gulf of Thailand available since September 1981 
helped reduce the dependence on imported oil.
Finally, most actions taken in the areas of fiscal 
p o l i c y  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  were c o m m i t t e e  
establishment, study initiation, and general descriptions of 
the plan with no specific measures. Two exceptions were 
that (1) the Thai government had the Standby Agreement with 
IMF for the short-term fiscal stabilization measures over a 
two-year period starting in May 1981 (see details in Section
2.2 above) and (2) the Revenue Department had set up five 
Area Tax O f f i c e s  in Bangkok to improve the tax 
administration .
The above actions taken before the Thai government’s 
submission of its first LDP were considered by the World 
Bank as a down payment for applying for the first structural 
adjustment loan and, as discussed in the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (1986), one of the key 
factors making T h a i l a n d  one of the success story in 
structural adjustments. The discussions in Chapter III also 
confirm this point.
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2.5 Proposed Measures in SAL I
The major c o n cern of the Thai g o v e r n m e n t  when 
requesting the World Bank to extend the first structural 
adjustment loan (SAL I) as discussed in the first LDP of 
February 4, 1982 was rising current account deficits. The
p o l i c y  packages, proposed in the first LDP, aimed at 
g r a d u a l l y  reducing the current a c c o u n t  deficit as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), specifically to 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  2.5% of GDP in 1986, through improved 
incentives, incre a s e d  efficiency, and reduced fiscal 
imbalances. The measures or actions planned for SAL I were
discussed in the first LDP and also tabulated in Table A. 3
of Appendix A of this paper. Not so surprisingly, the
planned actions for SAL I were a continuation of the above 
measures or actions taken in the sectors of agriculture, 
industry and energy and the policy areas of fiscal policy 
and institutional development.
Two more measures in the agricultural sector were added 
to the actions already taken, i.e. , the deregulation of 
livestock marketing and the fertilizer marketing study. 
Many measures in the industrial sector were new since most 
measures in this area that were already taken were committee 
establishment and study initiation. These new measures were 
broad-based improvements in the organization and operations 
of the Customs Department, e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of export 
processing zones and more bonded warehouses, general tariff 
reform, ad hoc a r r a n g e m e n t s  for large scale project 
evaluation, and new studies. Unlike measures in the above 
two sectors, those in the energy sector focussed on studies 
and plans which were then drawn upon findings in those 
studies.
Although many measures in the area of institutional 
development and development of a medium-term fiscal strategy 
as proposed in the first LDP were not specific, those in the 
tax policy were specific, for example, measu r e s  of
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restructuring of personal and corporate income taxes.
It is interesting to see that, as the structural 
adjustments in Thailand developed over time, the detailed 
measures had shifted from the sectors of agriculture and 
energy before submitting the first LDP (see Table A.2 of 
A p p e n d i x  A) and, then, had e x p a n d e d  to the sector of 
industry and the area of tax policy when submitting the 
first LDP. As will be seen in the Section 2.6, the focus 
finally moved to public sector management when submitting 
the second Letter of Development Policy (the second LDP, 
henceforth).
One final remark regarding the first LDP is that, since 
the proposed measures in SAL I involved many governmental 
departments, a good coordination among them was extremely 
crucial. Therefore, the Thai government, ensuring 
s y s t e m a t i c  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of the p r o p o s e d  m e a s u r e s , 
instituted a high-level Economic Structural Adjustment 
Committee, one of whose functions was to undertake regular 
reviews of progress achi eved in cooperation with the World 
Bank.
2.6 Proposed Measures in SAL II
Originally, the Thai government had hoped to rely on 
exports to alleviate the external deficits and to provide 
the main driving force in the manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors as well as to create employment as one can see from 
the objective and measures proposed in the first LDP. 
However, in late 1982, the Thai government saw that the hope 
s e e m e d  s u b s i d e d  as the world economy w o r s e n e d  and 
protectionist tendencies increased with an expectation of 
only a moderate recovery in 1983. Therefore, the Thai 
government shifted its focus from relying on exports to 
relying more on the use of prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies and structural adjustment measures in order to keep 
the external d e f i c i t  at a s u s t a i n a b l e  level without
2 3
seriously hurting growth in income and employment. I’his 
policy shift was obviously shown in the measures proposed in 
the second LDP of March 7, 1983, which put more emphasis on 
public sector management.
It is generally believed that huge government budget 
deficit can cause substantial current account deficit as the 
former deficit partly bring in more capital inflow from 
abroad, which results in the surplus of the capital account 
and the deficit in the current account. Therefore, any 
measure, that can reduce government expenditures or raise 
government revenue and eventually bring down government 
deficit, can also reduce the current account deficit.
The shift in the focus to the public sector management 
in SAL II also shared the above belief. As one can see from 
the measures proposed in the second LDP and, in this paper, 
tabulated in Table A.4 of Appendix A, those on public sector 
management ranging from fiscal strategy, medium-term fiscal 
reform, tax administration, state enterprises and foreign 
debt were far more detailed than measures in other areas or 
sectors in SAL II and the fiscal policy area itself in SAL
I. The most striking and, probably, most effective measure 
in bringing down budget and current account deficits was the 
reduction in the ceiling of annual public borrowing from 
abroad by approximately 14% —  from US$2,400 million to 
US$2,060 million. This "public" borrowing included the 
b o r r o w i n g  by not only the central government, local 
governments, but also state enterprises. In the past, the 
investment program proposed by any public unit was subject 
to only provided sectoral ceilings but, with this aggregate 
ceiling, all investment programs combined had to be subject 
to the overall ceiling. In practice, the NESDB, government 
agencies and public enterprises, with assistance from the 
World Bank, performed a major investment program review. In 
fact, this public borrowing ceiling is similar in spirit to 
the US Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
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1985, known commonly as Gramm-Rudman-Ho 1 lings (see the
Economic Report of the President ( 1986) ) .
The majority of measures in other policy areas or
sectors (see Table A.4 of Appendix A) were a continuation of
the measures proposed in SAL I . Some new measures proposed 
in SAL II were an initiation of studies in various areas. 
New SAL II measures worth mentioning were a measure to 
explore the feasibility of export credit and guarantee 
schemes in the industrial sector; a reduction in fuel price 
d i f f e rential, energy c o n s e r v a t i o n  measures and an 
establishment of the Energy Conservation Center of Thailand 
(ECCT) in the energy sector; and the land bank study and 
w ater resource d e v e l o p m e n t  and m a n a g e m e n t  in the 
agricultural sector.
The adver s e l y  affec t e d  e n v i r o n m e n t s  in the world 
economy in the early 1980s not only shifted the focus of the 
Thai government’s structural adjustment effort towards 
public sector management but also changed two measures 
proposed in SAL I. First, the target for FY 1986 of central 
government revenue/GDP ratio was dropped from 18% to 16% 
and, second, for FY 1983, the Thai government imposed a one- 
year import duty surcharge of 10% of existing duties and the 
Ministry of Finance was authorized to temporarily increase 
export duties. However, the second changed measure in FY 
1983, as discussed in the second LDP, was perceived as a 
temporary intervention to raise government revenue and 
reduce external deficits.
2.7 The World Bank/IMF Cooperation in SALs
The World Bank and the IMF staff have g e n e r a l l y  
coordinated their activities closely through frequent 
consultations on matters of joint interest. In the context 
of SALs, as discu s s e d  in I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1983, p. 31), the World Bank 
did not covered any of the areas in which the IMF was
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active, except for fiscal strategy and policy.
The division of work in fiscal policy area followed the 
comparative advantage of the two institutions: the IMF
handled short-term macro management and budgetary issues and 
strengthened the administrative arrangements for resource 
mobilization and the World Bank concentrated on medium-term 
and structural issues, including efficient utilization of 
public revenues and incorporation of an appropriate fiscal 
strategy in the planning framework of the country.
This close collaboration helped achieve complementarity 
between SALs and standby programs, even on specific targets. 
For instance, as d i s c u s s e d  in I nternational Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1986, p. 31), the November 
1984 devaluation of the Baht against the US dollar in which 
IMF was instrumental. This devaluation has turned out to be 
a helping hand to SAL measures in promoting exports.
2.8 World Bank *s Assessment and Current Status of Implementation 
of SAL Measures
Sections 2.5 and 2.6 summarize proposed measures in 
SALs I and II respectively. Some measures were implemented 
as a down payment before the Thai Government and the World 
Bank reached a formal loan agreement SAL I in 1982, some 
were implemented in 1982, some in 1983 when SAL II was 
finalized. The World Bank’s mission was sent to Thailand in 
1984 to prepare for the program completion report: Thailand
- first and second structural adjustment loan. The report 
summarizes the status of implementation of SAL measures as 
of July 1984, which is tabulated in Annex 2 on pp. 97-103 of 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (1986) 
and also reproduced in this paper in Table A. 5 of Appendix 
A.
The objective of this section is to give an overall 
p i c t u r e  of the proposed measures, the World B a n k ’s
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assessment of their implementation as of July 1984 and their 
current status (as of February 1989). Table 2.1 contains a 
summary of the above overall picture where the first column 
lists the originally proposed SAL conditions in the first 
LDP of February 4, 1982 and the second LDP of March 7, 1983
(their detailed conditions are also reproduced in Tables A.3 
and A.4 of Appendix A). The second column presents a brief 
summary of the World Bank’s assessment as of July 1984. The 
third column provides our additional comments based on 
i n f o r m a t i o n  in the i n terviews (see Chapter III) and 
documents and the last column presents new developments of 
the implementation of SAL measures up to February 1989. New 
developments are from the interviews and Sahasakul (1987). 
Below are the highlights of Table 2.1.
A land use policy and a reduction and/or an elimination 
of export restrictions on major farm products are two key 
measures of the agricultural sector. The World B a n k ’s 
assessment as of July 1984 was that substantial progress had 
been made in land certification and classification, export 
duties for rice and rubber had been lowered and other 
restrictions on the export of maize, rice, and partly, sugar 
had been lifted. However, we comment that the progress on 
land certification and reclassification have been slow when 
the SAL counterpart funds used for these purposes ran out. 
The new development in this area is that the land bank study 
was completed and the government has been considering an 
establishment of a land bank in the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (which is a state enterprise). 
The progress on the r e d u c t i o n / e l i m i n a t i o n  of export 
restrictions on farm products has continued after SAL II as 
duties and premiums on rice exports have dropped to zero 
percent and a reserve requirement for rice exports has been 
abolished. Consequently, total export duties dropped from 
2,619 million baht in 1983 to 806 million baht in 1986.—^
— / Data are from Bank of Thailand, Monthly B u l l e t i n , 
various issues.
27
In the industrial sector, two key policies were an 
export, promotion and a reform of the protective structure on 
which the World B a n k ’s assessment as of July 1984 were 
successful. In our view, we agreed with the World Bank that 
the export promotion policy has been considered successful 
with a result that an average growth rate of manufacturing 
exports soared to 35.5% per year for 1985-1987 from 12.2% 
per year for 1982-1984 although part of this impressive 
result comes from the baht devaluation in November 1984 and 
a recovery of the w o r l d  economy. U n l i k e  the export 
promotion policy, we judge that a reform of the protective 
structure is far from being a success. The SAL condition on 
this reform is to modify the import tariff rates so that the 
rates ranged from 5 to 60% with few exceptions but, in our 
opinion, the import tariff rates have failed to meet the 
proposed range. Various recommendations, from subsector 
studies, on selected industries have been hardly implemented
with an exception on electrical goods.
A reduction of the large price differential between 
gasoline and diesel fuel and energy conservation were the 
main measures in the energy sector. The World B a n k ’s 
judgement as of July 1984 was that they had been in 
progress, moving along the SAL measures. In fact, the 
prices on gasoline and diesel fuel had not been changed from 
December 1, 1983 to February 21, 1986, about two years and
three months apart. During this period, the world price of 
crude oil dropped substantially. The prices of gasoline and 
diesel fuel have been adjusted downward couple times since 
February 21, 1986 and, on November 25, 1988 when the most
recent change of the prices at the time of this writing 
(April 1989) took place, the price differential between 
gasoline and diesel fuel was narrowed. A price ratio of
premium gasoline to high-speed diesel dropped from 1.82 on 
December 2, 1981 to 1.75 on December 1, 1983, to 1.52 on
February 21, 1986 and, finally, to 1.39 on November 25,
1988 (see Table D.l of Appendix D). Unlike the price
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d i f f e r e n t i a l  adjustments, the progress of the energy 
conservation measures since the World Bank’s assessment in 
1984 has been negligible mainly because a substantial 
d e c l i n e  in the world crude oil prices since 1983 has 
relieved the pressure on energy conservation.
Public sector management was the major policy area in 
SALs especially SAL II. It involved many measures in the 
sub-areas of consolidated public sector finances, tax/revenue 
policy, tax administration, expenditure policy, state 
enterprises (SEs) financing and management, extra-budgetary 
funds, and external debt management. All these measures 
aimed at reducing government expenditure, raising government 
revenue and reducing government budget deficits and external 
borrowing. The World Bank’s judgement on the progress of 
these measures was generally favorable except for the 
measures on SEs financing and management in which the 
government had failed to raise tariff for most SEs during 
the SAL period of 1982-1984. We generally agreed with the 
above judgement although we would like to add that (1) the 
tariff increases for many SEs were eventually implemented 
after the time of the World Bank assessment in 1984 when the 
political obstacles subsided and the Thai economy improved; 
for example, tariff on water supply and bus fare were 
substantially raised in 1985 (see more details in Chapter 
III) and (2) the measure of setting the target of the 1986 
central government revenue/GDP ratio at 18% in SAL I and 
then dropped to 16% in SAL II was not reached in 1986 but it 
has eventually been reached since 1987 (see Table 2.2 and 
Section 2.9). In our view, the most successful measure in 
keeping the government finance in control was the ceiling on 
public external borrowing as discussed in some detail in 
Section 2.6 above.
Finally, the measures in the policy area of 
institutional development targeted at the co-ordination 
among core government units and an establishment of the
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Tabic 2.1 
A Suaury of Implementation 
of SAL Conditions
Original SAL Conditions Lsvsl of Implementation as Aasssssd by Comments Haw O*»«lopa«nti up to February 1939
World tank as of July 1984
ACRICULTURI
Land us* policy : land certification 
and rsclassification in forest reserve 
areas; land ban* study.
Marketing and Pricing policy : 
reduction and/or elialnation of export 
restrictions on aajor far* products; 
laproveaent in the rice price support 
progr&a; deregulation of livestock 
marketing; fertilizer marketing study.
Water resource development and 
management : studies, staff and 
institutional support
INDUSTRY
Export promotion : broad based 
iaproveaents in organization of the 
Custoas Departaent and in procedures 
for implementing the import taz 
drawback Act; establishaent of export 
processing tones and adding five 
bonded warehouses; decision on the 
financing and operations of the Export 
Development Fund; a feasibility study 
to set up the export credit and 
guarantee schemes.
Reform of the Protective Structure t 
tariff rates would be modified so 
that all imports would be subject 
to the ratio ranging from 5* to SOY 
with few exception; subsector studies; 
implementation of appropriate 
non-tariff reform policies in the 
subsectors under review.
Investment incentives : plan for the 
reform of'the board of Investment's 
activities; a study of the economic 
and fiscal consequences of the present 
and proposed Incentives.
Large scale projects : ad hoc 
arrangements would be made for 
reviewing whether large scale projects 
net the criterion of economic 
viability.
Land csrtlflcates had already been 
issued to one-third of s million farm 
faalliss; surveys for ths purpose of 
land rsclassificatlon had been completed 
or were under way in almost two million 
ha of prs-rsaerved forest but procedures 
for approval of claaslfIcatlon 
recommendations wers proving too 
cuberaome; the feasibility study of s 
land bank was dus for complation in 
November 1934.
Export duties for rics and rubber had 
been lowered and other restrictions on 
the export of maize, rice, and, partly, 
sugar had been lifted; the costly and 
ineffective rice pries support program 
was substantially sliminated; 
authorization of private slaughter 
housee for beef and hogs, primarily for 
export purposes; s fertilizer marketing 
study nearing completion.
Cabinet established the National Water 
Resource Board to oversee the management 
and development of water resources.
The export rebate end duty drawback 
syetema were overhauled; an attempt was 
made to move towards duty-free status 
for export production in s few selected 
aress; sn Export Development Fund was 
established in 1932, followed in 1983 by 
the creation of sn Export Devslopment 
Committee; number of bonded warehouses 
was expanded end the Export Service 
Centers were upgraded; ■ feasibility 
study of an export credit guarantee was 
completed in 1964.
The general tariff reform undertaken In 
the SAL context was successful; a 
somewhat scaled-down program of 
subaector studies has bean under way 
sines 1982 (electrical goods study 
finalized in 1982, automotive industry 
study completed and reviewed in 1983, 
chemicals and plastics study was nearing 
completion).
In early 1983 ths Government issued 
policy guidelines for investment 
promotion and for tax privileges as an 
explicit framework for Board of 
Investment's activities; a study of the 
fiscal implication of investment 
Incentives was scheduled for completion 
within 1984.
A study on the evaluation of large-scale 
projects was completed in mid-1984 and 
s series of seminars have been held to 
review it.
Land certification and reclassification 
have been alow ones ths SAL counterpart 
funds used for these purposes ran out.
Total export duties dropped from 2,619 
million baht in 1983 to 806 million 
baht in 1986 lor 2.22 of total taxes 
of central government in 1983 to 0.62 
In 1986)
Average growth rate of manufacturing 
exports was 12.22 per year for 1982-1984 
but rose to 35.52 per year for 1985-1957 
partly because of the export promotion 
policy but partly because of the baht 
devaluation and recovery of the world 
economy.
The 1986 import tariff rates ranged 
from zero! to 3002; recommendation of 
reducing import tariff rates on 
electrical goods was implemented but 
recommendation of reducing local content 
and protection on automotive industry 
wag not; recommendations in other 
studies were not considered.
Trom 1333-1955, land csrtificatas wers 
issued to 379,900 faro families; the 
government has been considering sn 
establishment of s land bank In the Bank 
for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives.
Duties and preeiuma on rice exports 
have dropped to zero percent since 
September 25. 1935 and January 31, 1936 
respectively; a reserve requirement for 
rlcs exports was abolished on May 12, 
1982; there was a consideration of 
establishing the National Fertilizer 
Corporation.
Subsector studies on electrical goods, 
automotive industry, chmmlcala, plastic 
products, ceramics, iron and steel 
products, machinery and other equipment 
and textile have been completed.
There has been sn attempt to revise 
various investment incentives as part 
of a taz reform package; the study on 
ths fiscal implication of investamnt 
incantivas and promotion afficiancy via 
completed in 1984.
A committee has been set up to evaluate 
large-acale projects. However, there 
was only ons meeting held since then.
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Table 2.L (Continued)
Original SAL Conditions Level of lmplementat ion aa Aaaesned by CoMtnta New Have a up to r*bruary 1989
World Bank an of July 1984
ENERGY
Pricing : a study of ths rslstlvs 
pries structurs of p»trolm» products; 
spproprists stspn to gradually 
moderate ths large pries diffsrsntlal 
bstwssn gasoline and dlsaal fusl.
Ths ranaa of rstali prlcsa for ths 
various pstrolsuia fusls has bssn 
narrowsd and ths Oil fund has had a 
surplus alncs lats 1983; a coaiprshsns 1 vs 
energy pricing study was completed In 
lata 1983.
Sines lats 1983, ths petroleum product 
prlcss had bssn hardly changed until 
Fabruary 21, 1986 when tha rang# of 
rstall prlcss for gasollns and dlsssl 
was narrowsd. Also nots that thsrs has 
bssn a substantial dscllns in ths world 
cruds oil prlcss sines 1983.
A substantial dscllns in ths world cruds 
oil pricss alncs 1983 has relieved ths 
prsssurs on snsrgy conssrvatIon. As a 
conssqusnt , ths ECCT has not bssn so 
activs aa originally plannsd.
Ths rangs of rstall prlcss for gasollns 
and dlsssl has bssn subasqusntly 
narrowsd. For example, a pries ratio 
of premium gasolins to hlgh-spssd disssl 
droppsd froa 1.82 on December 2, 1981 
to 1.39 on November 25, 1988 with 
ssvsral downward adjustments In pries 
diffsrsntlal In bstwssn.
Establlahment of ths Matlonal Energy 
policy Offics, rssponslbls for snsrgy 
policy planning, In ths Offics of ths 
Prlas Minister.
Conservation : a study on snsrgy
conssrvatIon; formulation of pollclsa 
and lapleaentlng asasurss on rsduction 
In snsrgy consuaptlon; sstabllshmsnt 
of ths Ensrgy Connsrvatlon Csntsr of 
Thailand (ECCT); transport snsrgy 
conasrvation studlss.
Strategy foraulatlon ; studies on ths 
energy aastsr plan, gas utilization, 
doaestic nonconventlonal energy, and 
ensrgy conservation; foraulation and 
lapleaentatIon of ths energy strategy 
based on findings in ths studlss; 
strengtenlng of the Matlonal Energy 
Authority (NEA)'a ability In aedium- 
tera energy strategy.
A study of incentives for snsrgy 
conasrvation In industry was gating 
under way; ths ECCT waa fonaally 
established by Cabinet in aid-1984; 
an action plan for energy conasrvation 
in tha transport sector waa approved 
in principle by Cabinet in 1983.
Two separate studlss have been completed
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
Consolidated public sector finances : 
medium-term projection for the 
financial operations of public 
enterprises, extra-budgetary funds and 
local government would be Integrated 
Into an overall financial strategy for 
the entire public sector; broadening 
and intensifying the role of the 
Fiscal Policy Office (FPO) of the 
Ministry Finance as a central fiscal 
planning unit.
Tnx/revenue policy : the target of 
FY1996 central government revenue/GDP 
ratio was 18% in SAL I but dropped to 
16% in SAL II; restructuring of 
personnel and corporate income taxes; 
simplification of business taxes and 
excise duties; enactment of selected 
revisions of the revenue code, customs 
laws and the new consolidated excise 
tax law; a feasibility study of 
Introducing value-added tax; 
development of an action program to 
strengthen local finances.
Tax administration ; set up of area 
tax offices in Bangkok; decentraliza­
tion of operational functions of the 
Revenue Department's head quarters to 
the area tax office; reorganization 
of the Revenue, Customs and Excise 
Depatments; rationalization of import/ 
export forms and documents; creation 
of a tax training institute;
"'Ttabl 1 shment of a tax rulings 
committee.
Expenditure policy : improvement of 
the methods to project central 
government outlays.
An Integrated fiscal plan was first 
prepared in 1982/83 and HESDB has 
updated development expenditure program 
and financing plan since then on a 
routine basis; proposal incorporated 
all major elements of fiscal planning 
for the entire public sector with FPO as 
a central role in leading coordination 
effort.
Robust revenue projection model 
developed for multi-year revenue 
planning and annual budgeting purposes; 
annual tax packages introduced in 1981, 
1982 and 1983 increased the central 
government revenue/CDP ratio from 13% 
in PY81 to 15% in FT84; a change to ad 
valorem rates for various excise taxes; 
an adjustment in tax rates on business 
tax to reduce cascading effects; 
extensive adjustments In export and 
import duties; numerous studies and 
measures carried out to strengthen 
local government revenue.
Central government expenditure growth 
for items other than debt service was 
signtficnnt!y reduced; two studies were 
carried out to provide guidance for 
further improvements of comprehension 
public expendlture programming.
The target ratio of the central 
government revenue to CDP of 16% was not 
reached in FY1986.
The target ratio of the central 
government revenue to CDP of 16% hae 
been reached since 1987.
There has been a plan to Implement a 
value-added tax in 1990 which will 
replace most of the existing businsss 
tax; local property tax has been 
implemented, i.e. a land transfer 
through inheritance Is exempted from 
being taxed but the transfer ia taxad 
once the land la sold.
Establishment of District tax offices 
in Bangkok and reorganization of 
the Revenue Department headquarters’ 
functions; various operational reform of 
Revenue, Customs and Excise Departments 
including effective separation of 
Customs Department headquarters’ 
functions from customs administration 
at port of Bangkok; study to assess 
need for centralized tax training with 
a conclusion that decentralized training 
functions developed by the three HOF 
departments provided an adequate initial 
response to training needs of MOF staff.
There hea been no separation of the 
function of the Chief Customs Office at 
the port of Bangkok from the function of 
the Director Ceneral of the Customs 
Department, however, this separation 
will soon be possible when more new 
ports outside Bangkok are commercially 
used; an establishment of the tax 
training Institute la still far from a 
reality.
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T a h 1 • 2.1 (Continued)
Original SAL Conditlona Laval of Implementation aa Aasannad by Comments Haw Developments up to February 1989
World Bank an of July 1984
Stata enterprises (SEn) financing and 
aanageaent : a claaaification of the 
SEs into commercial ly-oriented , public 
utilltlaa, loan Incurring and other 
SEs with appropriate policies attached 
to each classification (the policies 
alaed at reducing subsidy from the 
central government).
Extra-budgetary funds *. a study 
reviewing the operations and 
effectiveness of the extra-budgetary 
funds.
External debt management formulation 
of a three-year rolling plan for 
planning, evaluation nnd monitoring of 
the government'a external borrowing 
program; improvement of data base and 
analysis; Improvement of coordinating 
mechanism for external resources 
mobilization; reduction of the ceiling 
on public external borrowing from 
USE 2.4 billion to USE 2.08 billion 
per year.
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Policy analysis and coordination : 
strengthening the in-house capabili­
ties of the core agencies (primarily 
National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB), Ministry 
of Finance (MOP) and Budget Bureau) 
responsible for economic and fiscal 
policy analysis and advice; 
creation of an autonomous economic 
and social policy research Institute 
to provide research support and 
consulting services to NESDB and other 
government agencies.
Program formulation, evaluation and 
Implementation : consultants would 
assist the NESDB to design, test and 
introduce new planning nnd programming 
systems (investment programming 
system, project preparation and 
Investment appraisal system, program 
monitoring and evaluation system).
Personnel management : studies of 
the organization, management and 
compensation of the civil service; 
a formulation of staff training 
programs in all of the central 
management functions in 1983.
A program of tariff tncreasea for moat 
Sle waa not implement for 1981-Auguet 
1984 becauae of political obataclea; 
some amall manufacturing Sis ware 
liquidated or put up for sale to the 
private aector; private bus operators 
were licensed to compete with loea- 
making public bus company; corporate 
planning was Introduced for all SEa; 
financial revitalization programs for 
major loss-making SEa were being 
prepared; Bangchak oil refinery 
reorganization planned.
Study concluded that no major importance 
needs were attributed to reform of 
extra-budgetary funde at the thie point.
Comprehensive three-year rolling program 
for public foreign borrowing was 
introduced; TPO acquired computer 
pacllity for Improved public debt 
analysis and monitoring but lacked 
analytical capability to utilize them 
effectively; the original annual public 
borrowing ceiling was reduced in 1983 
from U9E2.6 billion to USE2.04 billion.
The mechanisms for policy supervision 
and implementation of the SALa program 
were significantly improved with a 
committee structure and a Joint NE3DB- 
MOF secretariat, which became effective 
in September 1983; Thailand Development 
Research Institute (TDRI) was set up 
in early 1984 as a private foundation.
A project appraisal/investment planning 
system has been developed in NESDB; 
consultants failed to produce an 
appropriate blueprint for the 
development of a monitoring and 
evaluation system; rY1984 was the first 
year of implementation of government- 
wide program budgeting: consultants' 
recommendations on provincial accounting 
system of the government were largely 
found to be unlaplementable at this 
point; establishment of new performance 
auditing division In the Office of the 
Auditor General.
Two studies of the organization/ 
management and compensation of the 
civil service were scheduled for 
completion In February 1985; A planned 
study of the staffing needs for planning 
agencies besides HESDB were not under­
taken; a ataff development/training 
program waa under way.
The 8AL counterpart funds were partly 
used to flnanca Sf deficits, which 
might have partly relieved pressure 
to rales tariffs.
The atudy was not completed yet by the 
time of the World Bank assessment in 
July 1984. See Thanapornpun 
(1988, p.64)
Tariff on water supply and bus fars 
were substant 1 a 11y raised in 1985; 
tariff on electricity waa aubatantially 
reduced in 1987 after the world oil 
price has substantially declined since 
late 1983.
The study was completed and the on-going 
funds that were no longer necessary have 
been abolished.
The annual borrowing celling was then 
reduced to USE 1 billion and recently 
in 1989 was raised to USE1.2 billion.
Coordination among key planning agencies 
in terms of mnnagement information 
system has now improved substantially.
Information in the first column is extracted from the letters of development policy of February 4, 1982 and March 7, 1983 whose proposed aeaeurea 
are also reproduced in Tables A.3 end A.4 of Appendix A of this paper. Information In the second column Is extracted from International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1988, pp. 97-103) which is reproduced in Table A.5 of Appendix A of thia paper. Comments in the third column and 
new developments in the last column are from Interviews, Sahasakul (1987) and other documents as cited in the table and text.
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independent research institute but more emphasis was on 
various studies concerning program formulation, evaluation, 
implementation and personnel management. The World Bank’s 
assessment in this area policy as of July 1984 was that, 
with respect to studies, the consultants either failed to 
produce an appropriate system or recommended impractical 
solutions. We believe that an institutional development is 
in fact a difficult, if not the most difficult, task for 
structural adjustment. The proposed measures in SAL I and 
SAL II were mostly studies but, if there were SAL III, an 
institutional development would continue.
2.9 Selected SAL Issues
There remain many issues concerning SALs in Thailand 
but we would like to consider three important ones here, 
i.e. (1) the tranching issue, (2) the consistency issue 
between various tax measures at the micro level and the 
target of the central government revenue/GDP ratio at the 
macro level, and (3) the bargaining relationship in SAL 
negotiation between the World Bank and the Thai government.
Tranching Issue
It is interesting to note that there was no tranching 
of both SAL I and SAL II and this is a special feature of 
the SAL approach in Thailand. As discussed in International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1986, p. 83), the 
reasons for the absence of tranching were, on one hand, the 
Government’s reluctance to accept a tranched SAL, in the 
belief that tranching would be seen in Thailand as an 
unacceptable degree of external intervention and would thus 
endanger the entire process of SAL operations by undermining 
the political consensus surrounding the SAL dialogue. On 
the other hand, the absence of a tranching provision was 
acceptable to the Bank in this case since Thai government 
had in the past been willing and able to honor commitments 
of the kind that would be embodied in the S A l and, 
especially, since it was thought that leverage in support of
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the structural adjustment program would be more effectively 
applied through a series of relatively small and frequent 
SALs than through larger and tranched ones. In addition, 
with a s i g n i f i c a n t  "down payment" element implicit 
in a succession of SALs, tranching was in any case an almost 
redundant mechanism.
Consistency Issue of Various Tax Measures
One of the SAL measures in the policy area of public 
sector management is to set the target of central government 
revenue/GDP ratio at 16% in FY 1986 as stated in SAL II 
which was dropped from 18% in SAL I. Besides this target at 
the macro level, SAL conditions also imposed other tax 
measures at the micro level. It is interesting to see how 
far these tax measures contributed to the macro objective of 
raising the revenue yield to 16% of GDP. However, before we 
investigate the contribution of these tax measures, a close 
look at the time series of the actual ratio of central 
government revenue to GDP may' give some clues to what
measures did contribute.
Table 2.2 prese n t s  time series ratios of central 
government revenue to GDP for 1981-1988. As shown in the 
table, the government revenue/GDP ratio for 1981-1986 was
below 16%, the target in SAL II. The ratio in 1987 was
above 16% but still below 18% which is the target in SAL I. 
However, in 1988, the ratio rose, for the first time, to
18.4%.
To see how the ratio changed over time, let us consider 
the ratio (R) whose numerator is the central government 
revenue (REV) and whose denominator is the gross domestic 
product (GDP), •
R = REV -. ( 1 )
GDP
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TABLE 2.2
Ratio of Central Government Revenue to GDP 
1981-1988
Date
Ratio of Central 
Government Revenue 
to GDP (in %)
Annual Growth Rate 
of Central Government 
Revenue
Annual Growth Rate 
of Nominal GDP
1981 14.7
1982 14.1 3.7 7.9
1983 15.8 23.7 11.0
1984 15.2 3.4 7.0
1985 15.8 8.4 4.2
1986 15.5 5.8 7.9
1987 16.6 18.9 11.5
1988 18.4 27.8 14.7
Notes: Data on central government revenue are from Bank of Thailand,
Monthly Bulletin, various issues. Those on nominal GDP are from 
National Economic and Social Development Board, National Income of 
Thailand, New Series 1970-1987. Data on nominal GDP in 1988 was 
calculated by assuming that the annual growth rate of nominal GDP 
in 1988 was 15%.
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Now, let us take a logarithm of equation (1) and then take 
total derivatives, we obtain
dR = d(REV) - d(GDP) . (2)
R REV GDP
According to eq.(2), if the revenue changes in the same 
proportion as the change of GDP, then the revenue yield to 
GDP will not change. To raise the revenue yield to GDP to 
16% from 14.7% in 1981 (see Table 2.2), the percentage 
increase in the revenue must be greater than the percentage 
increase in the GDP. Therefore, in case of SALs, we wonder 
whether the tax measures at the micro level helped raise the 
growth of government revenue at the rate which is faster 
than that of GDP. To answer this question, an in-depth 
analysis of the tax revenue is necessary.
Theoretically, tax revenue (T) can be simplified as the 
multiplication of a proportional tax rate (p) and a tax base 
(y ) or
T = p *y . (3)
Again, we take a logarithm of eq.(3) and then take total
derivatives, we obtain
dT = d p + dy. . (4)
T p y
According to eq.(4), a percentage increase in tax revenue
comes from either a percentage increase in tax rate or a
percentage increase in tax base.
In case of Thailand, tax r e v enue c o n t r i b u t e d  
approximately 80-86% of central government revenue for 1981-
1988.—  ^ Other categories of government revenue include, for
— ' Calculated from data in Bank of Thailand, Month 1 y 
Bulletin, various issues.
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example, sales and charges, contribution form government 
enterprises, and dividends. Therefore, changes in the tax 
rate (p) and tax base (y) have a substantial impact 
(approximately 80%) on government revenue.
Various tax measures in SALs, on theoretical grounds,
tend to give an ambiguously combined result on tax revenue.
For example, a reduction in export duties for rice and
rubber (dp/p < 0 in eq.(4)), which was part of SAL measures
5 /in the agricultural sector, tended to lower tax revenue— 
and, consequently, government revenue. However, the general 
tariff reform, part of SAL measures in the industrial 
sector, tended to give an ambiguous effect on tax revenue 
since tariff rates on some imported items were raised but 
those on other items were lowered. Other measures 
e s p e c i a l l y  changes in tax a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  such as an 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of D i s t r i c t  tax offices in Bangkok and 
r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  of the Revenue, Customs, and Excise 
D e p a r t m e n t s  tended to increase the effic i e n c y  of tax 
collection and, therefore, raise the tax base (dy/y > 0 in
e q .(4)).
In reality, it is difficult to pinpoint the revenue 
effect of each tax measure at the micro level on the macro 
target of central government/GDP ratio. The most difficult 
one, in our opinion, would be the empirical test of the 
revenue effect of tax administrative changes and this 
subject can be a separate study of its own. However, it is 
easier to conjecture the revenue effect of changes in tax 
rates as discussed below.
A growth rate of central government revenue of 3.7% in
— f This result generally holds for a low tax rate which, in
our judgement, is the general case of Thailand. However, 
for a high tax rate, a reduction in the tax rate may result 
in an increase in tax revenue. This relationship between 
tax revenue and a tax rate is often called a Laffer curve.
See details in, for example, Barro (1987, pp. 366-369).
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1982 as shown in Table 2.2 was lower than that of nominal 
GDP of 7.9%, which, therefore, lowered the revenue/GDP ratio 
from 14.7% in 1981 to 14.1% in 1982. The Thai government 
for revenue reasons imposed in 1983 a one-year import duty 
surcharge of 10% of the 1982 duties. This action sharply 
raised import taxes by 38.8% in 1983 and contributed to part 
of the 23.7% increase in central government revenue, which 
resulted in the revenue/GDP ratio of 15.8% in 1983. See 
T able 2.2. Other item that c o n t r i b u t e d  to a higher 
r e v e n u e / G D P  ratio in 1983 was a sharp increase of 
miscellaneous government revenue and income of 59.7%.
When the import duty surcharge was removed in 1984, the 
revenue growth rate dropped to 3.4% and the revenue/GDP 
ratio declined to 15.2%. In 1985, the growth rate of 
government revenue was 8.4% which just doubled the growth 
rate of nominal GDP and brought the revenue/GDP ratio back 
to 15.8%. However, approximately 60% of the total growth 
rate of government revenue came from an increase in the 
contribution of state enterprises and dividends.
The rapid growth of the Thai economy (GDP) in 1987 and 
1988 of 11.5% and 14.7% respectively (see Table 2.2) has 
substantially raised the size of the tax base (dy./y > 0 in
eq.(4)) bringing in more tax filers who did not have to pay 
taxes or evaded paying taxes during the slow economy. 
Examples are taxpayers of the corporate income, business, 
excise and import taxes. Moreover, in case of progressive 
tax rates like the personal income tax and export duty on 
rubber, an increase in the tax base will push the taxpayers 
to be subject to a higher tax bracket (dp/p > 0 in eq.(4))
and, therefore, it will bring in more tax revenue. In 1987, 
the annual growth rates of corporate income, business, 
excise, import and export taxes, which were considered high, 
were 13.3%, 23.4%, 23.4%, 28.6% and 61.4% respectively. In
1988, the annual growth rates of personal income, corporate
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income, business and import taxes, which were considered 
high, were 27.6%, 55.5%, 49.2% and 46.7% respectively.
Bargaining Relationship in SAL Negotiation
The last issue that we would like to address is the 
bargaining relationship in SAL negotiation between the World 
Bank and the Thai government.
Since 1981, the World Bank was in a good bargaining 
position in its negotiation in SAL I and SAL II with its 
counterpart —  the Thai government —  because, as discussed 
in Section 1.3, the Thai economy had been suffering from the 
second oil shock in 1979 with the result of current account 
deficit to GNP ratio soaring sharply and international 
reserves falling at an alarming rate. The Thai government 
in the early 1980s was not in a good position in the 
international credit market, therefore, the structural 
adjustment loans from the World Bank and other similar loans 
such as the standby agreement with the IMF were desperately 
needed for Thailand.
The good b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  of the World Bank 
continued into 1985 when the proposed third structural 
adjustment operation was partially appraised since the Thai 
economy was still in bad sharp. The growth rate of real GNP 
was only 3%, the current account deficit/GDP was 4% and the 
size of the international reserves averaged 3.6 months of 
import value in 1985. Their corresponding average figures 
for 1980-1987 were 6.2%, 3.6% and 5.2 months respectively.
Since the implementation of SAL II slipped more than 
that of SAL I, the World Bank, when negotiating SAL III, 
insisted on the continuation of the conditions that failed 
in SAL II such as a launch in new initiatives in state 
enterprise finances. Some of these proposed conditions in 
SAL III were still political unpopular and, therefore, the 
negotiation could not reach an agreement. However, the Thai
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economy has turned favorable since 1986 as the growth rate 
of real GNP grew at the annual rate of 4.3% in 1986 and 7.0% 
in 1987; the current account turned surplus, for the first 
time since 1970, in 1986 and the international reserves 
a v e r a g e d  4.5 months of import value in 1986. This 
improvement of the Thai economy had substantially raised the 
b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  of the Thai g o v e r n m e n t  in the 
negotiation with the World Bank so that, from the Thai 
government’s point of view, the third structural adjustment 
loan was no longer necessary for Thailand.
Another factor that also helps raise the bargaining 
position of the Thai government is a substantial improvement 
in the credit standing of Thailand in the international 
community rated by respectful international credit rating 
agencies. For example, the country risk score for Thailand 
rated by the Euromoney rose from 56.0 in 1982 to 69.1 in 
1983, 70.3 in 1984, 70.6 in 1985, 62.0 in 1986, 75.0 in 1987
fi /and 77.0 in 1988— (where a higher score indicates a better 
risk), a 37.5% increase in score from 1982 to 1988. As a 
result, the Thai government at present can easily assess to 
the international credit market at favorable interest costs.
— ' Data on score are from Euromoney, September 1982, pp.
71-72, October 1983, p. 338, October 1984, p. 305, October 
1985, pp. 327 and 329, S eptember 1986, pp. 364-365, 
September 1987, p. 353, and September 1988, p. 233.
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CHAPTER III 
FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS
3.1 Objective and Organization of the Chapter
The previous chapter gives a broad background of SALs 
in Thailand since 1980. However, it may leave out some 
important details and insights which will be revealed once 
one talks to g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s  involved in SAL 
n e g o t i a t i o n  and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  and to key persons in 
affected private business. This project has done such a 
talk and its findings from the interviews are presented in 
this chapter. The inter v i e w s  aimed at answering the 
following four key questions:
(1) Were the SAL measures new or had been tried in 
previous years?
(2) Would the measures have been implemented with or 
without SALs?
(3) What contribution did the World Bank make to the 
structural adjustment in Thailand? and
(4) What political and economic factors affected the 
implementation decision?
The chapter will start with a brief discussion on the 
interview methodology in Section 3.2 whose details are in 
Appendix B. Section 3.3 reports the main findings from 
i n t e r v i e w s  by focussing on a n s w e r i n g  the above four 
quest i o n s .  Appen d i x  C gives d e t a i l e d  responses of 
individual interviewee to each of the above four questions. 
However, in order to keep our interviewees’ views apart from 
their identities, we rename our interviewees starting from a 
letter A to a letter N. Actually, the interviews were 
conducted in Thai. We have tried our best to maintain the 
meaning when we translated and edited them to English.
3.2 Brief Discussion on the Methodology
We chose twelve organizations to be included in our
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sample size, nine of them are public organizations and the 
other three are private organizations. The total number of 
our interviewees are thirty-seven, many of them came in a 
group when we interviewed them. Our interviewees can be 
regrouped into 14 groups/individuals. Before any interview, 
we also informed our interviewee that each individual would 
not be cited as source of information. Consequently, as 
m e n t i o n e d  above, we rename each i n d i v i d u a l / g r o u p  of 
individuals in Appendix C.
3.3 Findings from Interviews
We s t r o n g l y  believe that our m e t h o d o l o g y  of the 
interview approach sketched in Section 3.2 and Appendix C, 
especially the policy of keeping interviewees’ identities 
and their views apart, results in a non-distorted opinion. 
The findings below are those of policymakers, technocrats, 
and businessmen. However, many findings are also supported 
by additional data and information. The findings are 
grouped according to the above, four questions as follows.
3.3.1 Whether the SAL measures were new or had been tried 
in previous years
Thirteen out of fourteen groups or individuals of our 
interviewees responded that some or most SAL measures were 
not new. The other mentioned specific SAL measure that was 
new but did not say whether other SAL measures were or were 
not. See Table C.l of Appendix C for details of their 
responses to this question. The varying responses of our 
interviewees are discussed below.
Many SALs measures were not new. Some were ongoing 
projects or programs. Others were part of an implementation 
plan waiting for government’s financial support. However, a 
few SAL measures were new. The fact that many SAL measures 
were not new is an important answer to the question of why 
SALs in T h a i l a n d  were (generally perce i v e d  to be) 
success ful.
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When Thai land experienced a low growth rate of its 
economy and a high inflation rate since the second oil shock 
in 1979, Thai policymakers had been discussing an idea to 
restructure the economy. Many measures discussed were 
designed and included in the Fifth Economic and Social 
Development Plan (FY 1982-1986). However, not all of them 
were implemented since the government budget was suffering a 
serious budget deficit. The situa t i o n  improved when 
T h a i l a n d  signed an a g r e e m e n t  with the World Bank on 
structural adjustment lending as the loans were also used to 
s u p p l e m e n t  the g o v e r n m e n t  budget (in addition to 
supplementing Thailand’s international reserves).
One of our interviewees estimated that more than 50% of 
the measures were initiated by the Thai side and were not 
new. Those measures were ongoing projects or programs or 
measu r e s  d e s i g n e d  to c o u n t e r a c t  adverse effects from 
external shocks. .For example, T h a i l a n d ’s agricultural 
production had diversified to various products besides its 
traditional ones (rice, rubber, and maize) before SALs came 
into the scene. These diversified crops, as reported in the 
Bank of Thailand’s Monthly Bulletin, are other major crops: 
tapioca roots, sugar cane, mung beans, ground nuts, 
soybeans, sesame, coconut, castor seeds, cotton, jute and 
kenaf, kapok and B a mbax fiber, and tobacco leaves. 
Similarly, Thailand’s industrial policy was geared towards 
export promotion and away from import substitution even 
before SALs implementation. As shown in Table 3.1, there 
are four manufacturing items that are included in the top 
twenty of Thai export earners in 1981, i.e. textile 
products, integrated circuits, canned pine apple, and canned 
fish. Textile products are an ideal example of a used-to-be 
import substitution item but now an export item.
Some of our interviewees viewed that many SAL measures 
were taken from those in the Fifth Economic and Social
Table 3.1 
Top Twenty Export Items in 1981
Rank Item
Amount 
(in millions 
of baht)
Share of total 
exports 
(in percent)
1. Rice 26366 13.1
2. Tourism 21456 10.6
3. Tapioca Products 16446 8.2
4. Textile Products 12570 6.2
5. Rubber 10841 5.4
6. Sugar 9572 4.8
7. Tin 9091 4.5
8. Maize 8349 4.1
9. Integrated Circuits 6193 3.1
10. Precious Stones 4486 2.2
11. Prawns 2136 1.1
12. Canned Pineapple 2039 1.01
13. Tobacco Leaves 1739 0.86
14. Mung Beans 1693 0.84
15. Wood Products 1367 0.68
16. Fresh Cuttlefish 1336 0.66
17. Jute Products 1245 0.62
18. Frozen Fowl 1187 0.59
19. Canned Fish 1109 0.55
20. Fish Meal 1014 0.50
Note: Raw data are from Bank of Thailand, Monthly Bulletin, January
1984 issue, Table III 12, p. 68.
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Development Plan. One estimate is that approximately 30-40% 
of SAL measures came from the measures in the Fifth Plan.
Other examples of ongoing measu r e s  are land 
certification and reclassification, tax privileges promoting 
export industries, and changes in excise tax rates. Details 
of each measure are discussed below.
The land certification measure was initiated by the 
cabinet’s ruling on 28 August, B.E. 2522 (or A.D. 1979). 
This measure gave the "right to farm" certificates to farmer 
families who illegally occupied reserved forests. It was 
estimated that the number of those families came to one 
million. The land certification started in 1982 and its 
finance was from the government budget. When the SAL 
negotiation began, it was included as one of the SALs 
measures with, later on, a larger budget share.
The land reclassification can be traced back to 1961 as 
it was one of the measures in the First National Economic 
and Social Development Plan. Though the export promotion 
policy cannot be traced back as far as 1961, it was 
initiated before SALs negotiation. The Thailand’s Board of 
Investment has given tax privileges to producers who 
manufacture goods for export since an enactment of the 
Investment Promotion Act in 1977.
The last example of ongoing measures before SALs is the 
excise taxes. In the past, they were levied on commodities 
at specific rates but since 1981 the Excise Department has 
added ad valorem rates to the excise tax rate schedule. The 
applicable rate depends on whichever tax rate generates the 
higher tax revenue.
The above examples are some evidence revealing that 
many SAL measures were not new. However, some can be cited 
as new measures. A restructuring of petroleum product
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pricing was a new measure with an aim of making their prices 
relatively consistent to their production cost structure. 
Another new idea that came up during the SAL negotiation was 
a close cooperation between public and private sectors in 
managing the economy. This idea however was never included 
in the SAL measures but it has been developed to the now 
well-known "Joint Public-Private Consultative Committee." 
This committee was formally set up and chaired by the Prime 
Minister with the National Economic and Social Development 
Board as its secretariat.
Although many SAL measures themselves wpre not new,
some interviewees pointed out some new aspects of the SALs. 
One said that the way of packaging and managing SAL measures 
was new. Another said that the new macroeconomic management 
techn i q u e  was g e n e r a t e d  by SALs. This new technique 
involved a good co-ordination of various government agencies 
and required a common target, a similar methodology and a 
check and balance system. Furthermore, it was also the 
first time in the history of Thailand that academics played 
an important role in influencing government policies through 
studies, seminars and conferences.
A n o ther interesting point made by one of our 
i n t e r v i e w e e s  is that both SAL measures and the Fifth 
National Economic and Social Development Board shared the 
same principle of using market mechanism since both were 
based on the studies of the World Bank. However, the 
recommendations in those studies were not totally ideas of 
the World Bank staff since they always talked to and 
consulted Thai officials. His estimate was that both the 
World Bank and Thai government probably contributed evenly 
in terms of designing the structural adjustment framework.
3.3.2 Whether the SAL measures would have been implemented 
without SALs
As discussed earlier that many SAL measures were not
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new, it is natural that a majority of those measures would 
have been implemented even without SALs. Eight groups or 
individuals (interviewees) responded to this question and 
all of them confirmed that, even without SALs, many measures 
would have been implemented. However, their responses 
somewhat varied in terms of what would have happened to the 
measures if without SALs. (See Table C.2 of Appendix C for 
details.) Some said that the coverage of measures would 
have been less. Others said some measures would have been 
delayed due to lack of an international commitment and 
funding. One of them said that the implemented measures 
would have been piecemeal if without SALs. Details of their 
comments are discussed below.
Imagine a situation in which SALs were not available 
for Thailand in the early 1980s while it experienced various 
internal and external imbalances. Thai policymakers would 
have introduced measures similar to those of SALs to cope 
with these twin imbalances. However, SALs helped in many 
respects. First, SALs created an international commitment 
among Thai Official and politicians. Many sensible measures 
in SALs that unfortunately were unpopular among politicians 
were implemented because of this international commitment. 
For example, the measure of raising retail prices of 
petroleum products was generally objected by the public and 
mass media especially newspaper. Therefore, this measure 
was unpopular among politicians as the government often 
had to resign after implementing such a unpopular measure.
Second, SALs created a l iquidity when the Thai 
government experienced a shortfall in government revenue. 
In the early 1980s, the government debt accumulated with no 
clear tendency to diminish. This increasing debt coupled 
with a shortfall in government revenue delayed some sensible 
measures that helped to restructure the economy in the long 
run but might worsen the government revenue in the short 
run. The structural adjustment loans relieved this tight
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s i tuation by providing liquidity to the government during
this transition period. Some may argue that Thailand, if
the revenue shortfall was the problem, could have borrowed
more from the international credit market. This is true but
a borrowing from the international credit market was viewed
as an inferior to SALs as at least one of our interviewees
argued that the interest rate charged by the international
credit market would have been higher than that charged by
the World Bank. This argument was true in 1982 if we use
the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR) on one-year maturity
of US dollar deposit as a guideline for the interest rate
charged by the international credit market. The LIBOR
averaged 13.69% per year-^ in 1982 which is clearly higher
2 /than the interest rate on SAL I of 11.60% per year.— In 
fact, Thailand probably had to pay at least 1-1.5% premium 
per year on LIBOR if borrowing from the international credit 
market at that time. Given this premium in mind, the above 
argument was also true in 1983 as the borrowing cost from 
the international credit market would have been close to
11.18-11.68% per year (LIBOR averaged 10.18% per year for 
one-year maturity of US dollar deposit—  ^ plus the premium of 
1-1.5% per year) but the floating interest rate charged by 
the World Bank in 1983 was 10.72% per year.—^
The same i n t erviewee argued further that, more 
importantly, the international credit market when lending 
did not impose conditions or measures similar to those of 
SALs which benefited the Thai economy. The SALs from the 
World Bank later on helped to raise Thailand’s creditability 
in the international credit market because its borrowing 
from the World Bank with conditions/measures and its success
LIBOR are from International Monetary Fund
Agreement no. 2097 T H . 
from the World Bank.
— 7 Data on
( 1987).
— I See Loan 
— f Data are
48
in implementing those conditions/measures are an evidence of 
prudently responsible government.
Third, the SALs helped in reordering the priority of
the projects. For example, the tax policy reform and the 
establishment of district tax offices in Bangkok became ones 
of the top priority under SALs.
Forth, the SALs helped to expand the ongoing programs.
For example, the scale of o p e r a t i o n s  of the land
certification and reclassification would have been much 
smaller due to lack of government funding. It was estimated 
that if without SALs only 40,000 farm families per year 
would have received land certificates. This estimated
figure is in contrast to actual figures during SALs 
implementation -- that is, 99,000 families in 1983, 116,000
in 1984 and 164,900 in 1985.
Finally, the SALs helped to systematize, organize, and 
speed the processes of designing, coordinating, and 
monitoring the measures within the same framework. Without 
SALs, the implemented measure would have been piecemeal. 
Some interviewees believed that the broad co-ordination 
across various agencies within the government be first 
initiated when Thailand signed the SAL I agreement. The 
Ministry of Finance and the National Economic and Social 
Development Board took a leading role in this broad c o ­
ordination which made sure that the seemingly unrelated 
components of SALs shared the same objective of reducing 
current account deficits and government budget deficits, 
made sure that there was a central unit monitoring the 
implementation process, and made sure that there was an 
evaluation of the implementation. It is also believed that, 
if without SALs, each government agency still would have 
implemented some of the measures without a clear overall 
direction and a broad co-ordination.
i9
N e v e r theless, some of our interviewees raised an 
interesting dilemma about SALs. On one hand, the SALs aimed 
at restructuring the economy with an emphasis on using 
market forces. On the other hand, many SAL measures did not 
use funding from SALs as they were part of the ongoing 
projects or programs; a majority of the loans were then used 
to finance state enterprises so that they were not under the 
pressure of raising their service charges. As we know, this 
delay of raising the service charges denied the basic idea 
of using market forces which is part of the SAL philosophy.
3.3.3 What c o n t r i b u t i o n  the W orld Bank made to the 
structural adjustment in Thailand
The direct and indirect contribution the World Bank 
made to the structural adjustment in Thailand was 
substantial. The responses of our interviewees as shown in 
Table C.3 of Appendix C ranged from the loans being used as 
international reserves and government budget supplement, the 
expertise of the World Bank team, an indirect influence on 
Thai p o l i ticians, a formulation of SAL measures, to 
technical assistance. Some details are presented below.
As discussed in Chapter I, the Thai economy experienced 
deficits in both current account and government budget in
1982 and thereafter. A deficit in government budget was
mainly a reflection of a saving and investment gap in the
economy as public investment exceeded net saving. The same 
gap also capsed a current account deficit which, in turn, 
reduced the nation’s international reserves. As the World 
Bank’s SAL disbursements were not necessarily associated
with the measures, Thailand used the loans to supplement its 
international reserves and to finance government deficits.
One of our interviewees added that the World Bank team 
responsible for the SALs in Thailand comprised professionals 
with high calibre and experience. Therefore, a negotiation
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between Thailand and the World Bank got smoother than 
otherwise.
The World B a n k ’s i n v o l v e m e n t  introduced an 
international commitment among Thai politicians and, as 
discussed earlier, this commitment helped to formulate 
unpopular but useful measures.
Although many groundworks on SALs were conducted by 
Thai official, the World Bank also substantially helped 
formulate the SAL measures. Two of our interviewees gave a 
rough estimate that approximately one half of the SAL 
measures were a direct contribution from the World Bank. 
Another said the contribution was less than one half. 
Examples of the World Bank suggested measures were the 
Energy Conservation Center, a downward adjustment of the 
target ratio of government revenue to GDP from 18% to 16% 
and a fiscal discipline whose emphasis is on realistic 
forecast of government revenue, government expenditure 
control and government deficit reduction.
Finally, the World Bank has contributed technical 
assistance to Thailand since the Forth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan especially the assistance in the 
area of macroeconomic analysis. With respect to the SAL 
measures, its technical assistance was moderate since many 
studies were commissioned to various domestic researchers.
3.3.4 What political and economic factors affected the 
implementation decision
Our interviewees cited various political and economic 
factors affecting the implementation decision. Table C.4 of 
Appendix C details their responses. Selected points are 
discussed below.
Many SAL measures in Thailand especially those under 
SAL I were implemented. However some measures especially
5 1
those under SAL II slipped. One of our interviewees 
estimated that the accomplishment of SAL measures was 
approximately 60% of the proposed measures. Various reasons 
explaining the implementation decision include (1) whether 
the measures were implemented without SALs, (2) whether 
there was a leading organization on the Thai side, (3) 
whether there was an international commitment, (4) whether 
the measure was politically popular, (5) whether there was a 
liquidity constraint in the government budget, and (6) 
whether an economic environment changed.
T h a i l a n d  had launc h e d  more than one half of SAL 
measures before it signed an agreement with the World Bank. 
The World Bank call this action, a down payment. Those 
measures were designed to cope with adverse effects of 
external factors. Therefore, as discussed earlier, even 
without SALs, those measures would have been implemented. 
This action of launching many SAL measures before the 
a g r e e m e n t  was reached incre a s e d  the p r o b a b i l i t y  that 
Thailand would comply with the World Bank’s conditions and 
made the negotiation between Thailand and the World Bank 
easier. [See related discussions on modelling bargaining 
process in Mosley (1986, pp. 12-20).] As a consequence, 
Thailand was the only country that tranching of the loans 
did not apply.
Structural adjustment tasks could be classified into 
two types : the tasks that Thailand had full knowledge and
understanding and those that it had not. For the first type 
of tasks, Thailand initiated its own measures and could 
i m p l e m e n t  them without spending time on studying the 
subjects. These measures were usually viewed as successful 
ones. One example was the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives’ S.T.K. (or right to farm certificates). An 
important factor contributing to their success in SAL I was 
that there was a leading o r g a n i z a t i o n  taking part in 
organizing, screening, reviewing and monitoring measures
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scattering over various implementing agencies. In the Thai 
case, the leading organization was the Ministry of Finance. 
Some of our interviewees also counted the National Economic 
and Social Development Board as a leading organization in 
SAL planning. Unlike SAL I, there was no such a leading 
organization under SAL II and this might explain why SAL II 
measures slipped more.
For the second type of tasks, Thailand began with a 
research study. Unfortunately, those studies were not 
monitored closely and not synthesized within a single 
framework. The Ministry of Finance, a leading organization 
in SAL, did not have time to follow up these studies. 
Examples of the second type of tasks were the energy policy 
and some tax issues. As a consequence, results or findings 
from the studies under SAL I were either incomplete or 
inappropriate for the new environment under SAL II. For 
example, the energy studies were initiated in 1982 when the 
world oil price was relatively high but, by the time the 
studies were completed, the world oil price had dropped 
substantially. Therefore, recommendations in those studies, 
being for the rising oil prices, obviously are inappropriate 
for the period of declining oil prices.
Another factor that helps an implementation of SALs was 
an international commitment that Thai politicians had. As 
discussed earlier, this commitment was made when Thailand 
signed an agreement with the World Bank and it was an 
indirect force to overcome political obstacles.
Some measures especially those under SAL II slipped 
b e c a u s e  of their p o l i t i c a l l y  unpopular nature among 
political party members. Examples of these measures were 
pricing policies on the petroleum products, bus fares, and 
user charges for electricity and water supply. Raising 
prices of these products and services is generally objected 
by the public and newspapers and, in some cases, those
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objections may eventually Lnstabilize or even dissolve the 
government. As a result, prices of these products and 
services in some period were kept substantially lower than 
their actual costs. The World Bank would like to change 
these pricing policy towards efficiency —  that is, pricing 
should reflect real costs of resources. Thai officials also 
agreed in principle. Although the pricing policy on these 
goods and services were hardly changed during the SAL 
implementation years in 1982-1984, it has been changed later 
o n .
With respect to the pricing of petroleum products, the 
Thai government has set up a new organization responsible 
for their pricing policy. This new organization was "The 
National Energy Policy Office" in the Office of the Prime 
Minister. With respect to the pricing of utility and bus 
fares, their prices have been raised when the Thai economy 
experienced a recovery which raised the purchasing power of 
the general public so that they could afford higher prices. 
Details of the changes in pricing of these products and 
services for 1970s and 1980s are presented in Appendix D.
However, some highlights are discussed below.
Figure 3.1 gives time series of the world price of 
crude oil in US dollar and domestic retail prices in baht of 
premium gasoline and high-speed diesel for 1977-1987. As 
the world price of crude oil rose sharply in 1979-1980 and 
peaked in 1981, the Thai government also raised domestic 
retail prices of various types of petroleum products. 
However, an increase in the domestic prices was slower than 
t>he rise in the world oil price for 1979-1981 as shown by, 
when compared with the slope of the world oil price line,
the flatter slope of two long and short dash lines
representing retail prices of premium gasoline and high­
speed diesel in Figure 3.1. During the SAL implementation 
years of 1982-1984, the retail price of premium gasoline was 
adjusted upward but that of high-speed diesel tended to
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stabilize while the world oil price dropped. It seemed that 
the Thai government tended to use premium gasoline to absorb 
the high cost of energy with the result of a big gap between 
the retail price of premium gasoline and that of high-speed 
diesel. Interestingly, when the world oil price dropped 
further in 1985-1987, the downward adjustment in the retail 
price was mostly on the premium gasoline. Consequently, the 
gap of the retail prices of premium gasoline and high-speed 
diesel narrowed. One of the SAL measure in the energy area 
pressed hard by the World Bank was to narrow down the range 
of retail prices for the various petroleum products but the 
World Bank did not specifically set the retail prices of 
these products as part of SAL conditions. The World Bank 
let the Thai government set the retail prices freely as long 
as the fuel price differential was narrowed. However, as 
discussed above, the Thai government failed to do so during 
the SAL period of 1982-1984 but eventually succeeded to do 
so after 1984.
Figure 3.2 plots time series of the world price of
crude oil in US dollar and domestic user charges of public
u t i l i t y  and bus services in baht for 1977-1987. The 
electric rate, bus fare, and water supply charge were slowly 
adjusted upward in 1979-1980 when the world oil price rose 
sharply. However, their rates were raised sharply in 1981 
right before SAL I agreement. Since then, both bus fare and 
water supply charge hardly moved during the SAL period of 
1982-1984 but the electric rate rose further. The condition 
i m p osed by the World Bank, in relation to the public 
utility, was that public utility enterprises were supposed 
to raise their tariff rates so that the nominal rate of 
return on total asset was at least 8% per year. Note that
the World Bank did not specifically set the tariff rates for
the Thai government. It just gave a broad guideline on the 
above minimum rate of return on asset. It seemed that the 
bus rate and water supply charge were still below their 
costs up to 1984 because both rates were raised sharply even

after the SAL period and even the world oil price waa 
heading downwards. Similar to the case of petroleum product 
prices, the Thai government failed to comply with the 
conditions for public utility tariff rates during the SAL 
period but eventually succeeded to do so in 1985.
The fact that the compliance was least on the above 
conditions (a reduction in fuel price differential and an 
increase in tariffs of public utility) explained why the 
World Bank most imposed on these conditions. In other 
words, the conditions which were pressed hard by the World 
Bank were those with the least compliance.
Now, let us go back to the next factor affecting the 
SAL implementation decision, i.e. the liquidity in the 
government budget. The funding from SALs created liquidity 
that was needed when the government budget was in high 
deficit. This created liquidity facilitated an introduction 
of various policies that might reduce government revenue in 
the short run. Examples of those policies were a reduction 
in export duty rates on rice and rubber and an elimination 
of export duty on maize. For more discussions on taxes, see 
Sahasakul (1987). For the same reason of liquidity in terms 
of government revenue shortfall, some implemented SAL 
measures were reversed. In 1982, the government reduced 
import tariff rate differentials across commodities with an 
aim to reducing distortion. The result was that an average 
import tariff rate and the government revenue fell in 1982. 
Some argued that the revenue shortfall was due to a slow 
growth period of the Thai economy. In any case, the Thai 
g o v e r n m e n t  was a l a r m e d  by this revenue shortfall and 
reversed the measures by imposing surcharges on imports in 
1983 .
Finally, changes in domestic and international economic 
environment also affected the implementation decision. A 
slow growth of the Thai economy in 1982 coupled with the
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r e v enue shortfall are two reasons that changed the 
government decision on the target of government revenue to 
GDP ratio as it lowered the target from 18% under SAL I to 
16% under SAL II. Another example is the Energy 
Conservation Center that was first established for finding 
alternatives to conserving energy. However, when the world 
oil prices have declined, the energy conserving objective is 
no longer a top priority and the Center is now less active 
than before.
There remain other factors specific to the measures 
that are worth mentioning. The ceiling of external 
borrowing was a successful measure because the government 
set the ceiling realistically. When there were many ongoing 
government projects that required substantial financing, the 
ceiling was set above US$1,000 million. However, when some 
of the ongoing projects were completed, the government tried 
not to create new projects and then the ceiling could be 
lowered to US$1,000 million.
The Export Development Fund was not so successful in 
promoting exports because the fund of 300 million baht 
(raised by imposing 0.5% s urcharge on imports) was 
insufficient for seriously promoting exports. The total 
value of exports for 1982-1984 averaged 198,168 millions of 
baht per year. Therefore, the fund of 300 million baht 
would be trivially 0.15% of the average annual export value 
for 1982-1984. Similarly, the Export Development Committee 
was unsuccessful because it did not have an authority over 
other i m p l e m e n t i n g  agencies —  i . e . , the Minister of 
Commerce was initially the chairman of the committee. To 
correct the problem of lack of authority, the chairman has 
been replaced by the Prime Minister.
The measure to reduce p r o t e c t i o n s  on domestic 
industries especially a restructuring of import tariff rates 
slipped for most cases. However, the slippage did not come
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from the industrialists’ lobby against the restructuring. 
The slippage came partly from the conflict of interest among 
domestic producers at different stages of production in the 
same industries (see details on selected sectors below) but 
mostly came from the fact that, after the general election 
in 1983, the then Minister of Industry did not give an 
industrial restructuring (outlined in SALs) a top priority. 
Details are discussed below.
The general tariff reform proposed in SAL I was that, 
during the fiscal year of 1982, tariff rates would be 
modified so that all imports would be subject to the ratio 
ranging from 5% to 60%. Furthermore, the National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB) had commissioned a 
consultant team to carry out an industrial restructuring 
study (see Industrial Management Co. , Ltd. ( 1985 ) as an 
example) whose objective was to provide policy guidelines 
and recommendations for the NESDB in preparing action plans 
for the implementation of the industrial restructuring 
programs as set out in the Fifth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan. Part of the study concerning the 
distortion created by import tariffs and protection of 
domestic producers proposed three alternative sets of 
reforms which were expected to reduce effective protection 
rates for all and across sectors. The study proposed a 
strategy that initially put into effect the first set of 
tariff reforms (see Table 3.2) because it involved only 
small changes from the existing rates. The effects of this 
first step were then ascertained to determine whether sets 
two and three were efficacious and feasible. It should be 
noted that moving from the first set to the third one leads 
to a greater uniformity of tariff rates which was part of 
the SAL II proposal in the industrial area.
Initially, the industrial restructuring got a good 
start and gained momentum especially the stage of carrying 
out the industrial restructuring study (financed by SAL
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Table 3.2 
Proposal of General Tariff Reform
(in percent)
Category of 
Imported Item Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
Final Products 50 40 35
Intermediate Products 40 30 30
Machinery 20 25 25
Raw Materials 10 15 20
Source: Industrial Management Co., Ltd. (1985), p. 7.
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counterpart funds) and other sub-sector studies (financed by 
UNIDO/UNDP) because the then Minister of Industry had 
assigned one of Deputy Ministers of Industry to oversee the 
industrial restructuring under SALs. In order to minimize 
any opposition from the domestic producers whose interests 
might be adversely affected by the restructuring and to 
compromise any conflict of interest among domestic producers 
in the same sector or across sectors, the Thai government 
always consulted the matters with the private sector in the 
Joint Public-Private Consultative Committee on Economic 
Development Policy. This committee then submitted the 
matters for consultation to the vested interest groups. In 
case of the industrial restructuring, it submitted the 
matters to the, then, Thai Industries Association (now, the 
Federation of Thai Industries) which was also a member of 
the Joint Committee. The Thai Industries Association was 
composed of various associations of more specific sectors 
such as textile, electrical goods and so on. Any general 
tariff reform, for example, would affect various sectors 
differently and, even for the same sector, it would have 
different impacts on various domestic producers at different 
stages of production. See more details in the discussion on 
sub sectors below. At that point, most industrialists 
generally agreed with the government that an industrial 
reform at the macro level was necessary but, once it came 
down to personal interests at the micro level, arguments on 
how to reform each industry seemed endless.
The more important factor that put the industrial 
restructuring under SAL proposals into a stand-still was a 
c h a n g e  in the Minister of Industry after the general 
election in 1983. The then coming Minister of Industry put 
aside measures and recommendations under SALs but gave 
p r i o r i t y  to the sugar industry and other matters. 
Therefore, the mechanism to translate technical work in the 
studies into actual plans for implementation came to a halt.
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As a result of conflict of interest among 
industrialists and a political change in 1983, the general 
tariff reform slipped. It was not until April 1984 when the 
Ministry of Finance could partially adjust the tariff rates 
but, since then, it has not done substantial adjustments.
It is also interesting to see the development of trade 
liberalization for specific sector. One of the SAL measures 
was to conduct sub-sector studies whose recommendations 
would be considered by the government and private sector for 
implementation. Those sub-sectors were electrical goods, 
automotive, chemical, plastic products, ceramics, iron and 
steel products, machinery and other equipment, and textile. 
Details of developments for each sector are the following.
(1) Electrical goods sector
The intention of restructuring the electrical goods 
sector was to reduce distortion created by differential 
import tariff rates on imported final products and parts and 
components. A move to a more uniform tariff rate benefited 
and cost domestic producers differently. For example, a 
reduction in tariff rate on imported parts and components 
would benefit those domestic firms which imported parts and 
components for their assembly lines but would reduce the 
c o m p e t i t i v e  p o s i t i o n  of those d o m e s t i c  firms whose 
production lines were more complete and relied little on 
imported parts and components. The first group of domestic 
firms would favor the measure but the second group would 
oppose it as their c o m p e t i t o r s ’ costs were lowered. 
However, if it was a reduction of tariff rates on imported 
final products, all domestic firms would oppose. There had 
been many meetings between the public and private sectors 
but they finally reached a solution of tariff reductions 
although the reduced rates were not as uniform as initially 
planned. The reason that domestic producers agreed with 
these reductions was that these tariff reductions would 
lower an incentive to smuggle electrical goods from abroad,
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which then increased the sale of domestic firms.
(2) Automotive industry
The finding of a consultant team was that Thailand did 
not have a comparative advantage in producing automobiles. 
The team recommended that the protection should eventually 
be phased out by, first, freezing the existing tariff rates 
and required local content in assembled automobiles and, 
then, slowly lowering the tariff rates and required content 
over a certain period. Unfortunately, after the general 
election in 1983, the then Minister of Industry proposed 
just an opposite -- that is, an increase in the required 
local content up to 100% and an increase in imported tariff 
rates. These opposing options were discussed many times in 
the meeting of economic ministers (i.e. industry, finance, 
transport and communications, etc. ) with a compromised 
solution that all existing required local content and 
tariffs would be unchanged.
(3) Textile industry
Similar to the conflict of interest in the electrical 
goods sector, domestic producers such as spinners, weavers 
and garment producers in the textile industry at different 
stages of product line were affected differently from the 
tariff reform. There were many meetings among domestic 
producers and between private and public sectors.
After some progress in the electrical goods sector, a 
compromised solution in the automotive industry and many 
meetings between the domestic textile producers and the 
government, the Thai economy started to pick up in 1986, 
which has turned the focus from the protection issue to the 
issue of i n v e s t m e n t  for exports. Consequently,
recommendations in studies of the other sub-sectors were not 
seriously considered. However, many used-to-be import- 
substitution industries have become export industries since 
1986. The examples are textile and garment, footware,
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e • ,rurniture, iron structure such as pipe, bicycle, electrical
appliances and carpet.
*
CHAPTER IV 
THE MODELLING APPROACH
4.1 Objective and Organization of the Chapter
This chapter presents the methodology and findings of 
the modelling approach whose objective is to investigate the 
impact of b r o adly d e f ined SAL measures on T h a i l a n d ’s 
aggregate economic variables. It basically makes use of 
findings in Thongpakde (1989).
The organization of this chapter is the following. 
Section 4.2 presents previous empirical results of the 
modelling approach done by the World Bank. It also provides 
data on aggregate economic variables of other countries in 
comparison with those of Thailand. Section 4.3 discusses 
the methodology and conceptual framework underlying the 
model. Section 4.4 explains methods of estimation; Section 
4.5, data sources; and Section 4.6, empirical results with 
insight interpretation. Finally, Section 4.7 presents some 
policy simulation results. Appendix E provides data used in 
regress ions.
4.2 World Bank’s Projection Results and International Comparison
The World Bank (1984) has projected T h a i l a n d ’s 
macroeconomic performance under alternative circumstance -- 
that is, with and without structural adjustment -- using the 
W o r l d  B a n k ’s SIAM I model. Its selected results are 
presented in Table 4.1, items b, c, g and h.
The World Bank’s simulation revealed that average 
annual growth rates of real GDP, exports and imports with 
structural adjustment grew faster than the case without 
adjustment. However, the growth of investment without the 
structural adjustment for 1982-1986 was projected to be 
higher than that with adjustment measures. When comparing 
actual figures with the projected ones for 1982-1986, one
6 6
finds that actual growth rates of GDP, exports and imports 
were higher than the projected ones but the actual growth of 
investment was lower than that projected.
The World Bank also projected that the structural 
adjustment would improve the current account deficit in 1986 
and 1990, i.e. the ratio of current account deficit to GDP 
would decline. Surprisingly, the actual current account in 
1986 instead of being deficit turned surplus.
Table 4.1 also provided i n t e r n a t i o n a l  data for 
comparison. Sec items d, e, i and j. For the first half of 
1980s, Thai economy outperformed those of middle-income and 
highly indebted developing countries.
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Table 4.1
World Bank (1984)’s Projection Results 
and International Comparison
Average of Annual Real Growth Rate (%)
GDP Export Import Investment
7.1 11.0 9.1 10.0
5.2 6.9 6.2 6.4
5.0 4.8 5.6 6.9
5.7 9.1 7.7 3.3
5.5 6.8 5.7 6.0
4.5 4.9 4.9 6.0
7.1 14.5 24.4 9.3
2.2(4) 6.6(4) -2.4(5) -2.3(6)
1.9>41 2.9(4) -7.2(5) -6.3<6)
Thailand (1)a) 1976-1981:actual'
b) 1382-1986 (SAL I in 1382 and 
SAL II in 1983)
- Projection with struc­
tural adjustment
- Projection without struc­
tural adjustment
- Actual
c) 1986-1990
- Projection with structu­
ral adjustment
- Projection without struc­
tural adjustment J
- Actual (1986-87)(3)
International comparison 
1982-1986
d) All middle-income developing 
countries
e) All highly indebted developing 
countries
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Ratio to GDP (%)
Investment Current Foreign
account capital
deficit inflow
Thailand
24.7(1) 7.0(1) 6.2(3)f) 1981 actual
g) 1986
- Projection with structural 
adjustment
- Projection without
26.2 2.5 —
structural adjustment
- Actual - 
h) 1990
- Projection with structural
26.8 4 7
,2:d <7»
-
19.7 1.6
adjustment ' 26.9 
- Projection without structural 
adjustment 28.6
International comparison 
i) All middle-income developing
1.8 —
6.0
countries 1980 26.8 4.6 —
1986
j) All highly indebted developing<§P 0.3 —
countries 1980 25.2 4.8 —
1986 19.0 1.4 -
Notes: (1) From International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(1984), Table 3.1, p. 47.
(2) From International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(1984), Table 3.3, p. 53.
(3) Data on GDP, investment, import and export of goods and 
services are from National Income of Thailand, New Series 1970-
1987, Account 6, Tables 7 and 9. Data on foreign capital
inflow and import and export unit values are from Bank of 
Thailand, Monthly Bulletin. Current account deficit was 
computed as the difference between export and import of goods 
and services. Data on real export and import growth were 
constructed by deflating import and export values by their 
corresponding unit values.
(4) From Paul Mosley.
(5) From International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(1988), Table 1. Imports include only those of merchandise 
trade and the average growth was for 1980-1986.
(6) From International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(1988). Data on investment are from Tables 4 and A. 7. Those 
on current account deficit are from Table 1.5 and on GDP are 
from Table A.3.
(7) Thailand experienced current account surplus in 1986.
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4.3 Methodology and Conceptual Framework
To quantify impacts of broadly defined SAL measures on 
some aggregate economic variables, this study constructs a 
simplified macroeconomic model and statistically estimates
it. Basically there are two ways of modelling a reduced-
form or single-equation approach and a structural model 
approach. The former is less complex since it relates 
aggregate economic variables to policy variables and other 
relevant variables without an explicit specification of a 
transmission mechanism. In contrast, the latter postulates 
policy variables and other relevant variables through a 
transmission mechanism into a structural model.
Since we are not strongly i n terested in the 
transmission mechanism which can be captured by a structural 
model. This study employs a reduced-form or single-equation 
approach because of its simplicity. Besides, an estimation 
of a structural model will also face serious problems if 
the model is not specified correctly.
A regression analysis was used to estimate the impacts 
of the SAL m e a s u r e s  on aggregate economic variables. 
However, the nature of a regression analysis rules out any 
possibility of examining impacts of detailed SAL measures 
such as the impact of a tariff reduction in electrical 
appliance imports. It also rules out the possibility of 
examining the impacts of unquantifiable SAL measures such as 
the impact of tax administration changes and reforms. 
Consequently, the broadly defined SAL measures considered in 
the study are limited to an overall average tax rate of the 
government and export and import tariff rates.
As mentioned above in Chapter I, economic variables of 
interest are real gross domestic products, export and import 
quant i t i e s ,  current account deficits, and government 
deficits. Since they are the focus of this study, it is 
appropriate to consider factors determining each of these
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variables in detail.
Real Gross Domestic Products
Many m a c r o e c o n o m i c  textbooks identify fiscal and 
monetary policies as key determinants of real gross domestic 
products (GDP) in the short run. In addition, for a country
like Thailand whose economy is largely open to the world 
economy, terms of trade and real income of trading partners 
surely have a significant impact on real GDP of Thailand. 
But, in the long run, the growth of an economy depends on 
the existing capital stocks and technological progress. 
Details of their theoretical impacts are discussed below.
An increase in gover n m e n t  purchases, raising the 
domestic demand for output, tends to raise real GDP but an 
increase in tax rates, which can be viewed as forced saving, 
reduces incentives to save, to work, and to invest and, 
c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  tends to reduce real GDP. In case the 
government purchases are financed by taxes, the net effect 
on real GDP is theoretically ambiguous and turns out to be 
an empirical issue.
Like the government purchases, the monetary policy can 
have an expansionary effect. An increase in the growth rate 
of money supply creates an excess supply in money market, 
resulting in a drop in the market interest rates. This drop 
in turn reduces interest costs and, therefore, increases 
incentives to invest.
When considering external effects, one finds that an
increase in the terms of trade, defined as the ratio of
export prices to import prices, means that a country’s real
income or real GDP rises. As terms of trade rises,
*producers can sell their products to the world market at 
high prices when compared to the costs (or prices) of 
importing other products from the world market. Producers 
then have more incentives to produce for exports.
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Similarly, an increase in real income of Thailand’s trading 
partners, when keeping the terms of trade constant, tends to 
raise the demand for Thai exports and, consequently, real 
GDP.
In the long run, higher existing capital stocks and 
technical progress tend to give a higher growth rate of real 
GDP.
Based on the above theoretical framework, a reduced 
form of a real GDP equation can be formalized as follows:
Real GDP = F [government purchases, tax rates,
(+) (-)
growth rate of money supply, terms of trade,
(+) (+)
world real GDP, time trend,
(+) (+)
first lagged values of real GDP], (5)
( + )
w h e r e  F is a m a t h ematical function and a positive or 
negative sign under each variable indicates a directional 
impact of that variable on real GDP. Time trend and first 
lagged values of real GDP are used to proxy technological 
progress and existing capital stocks , and world real GDP 
represents real income of trading partners.
The fiscal policy measures included in the equation are 
g o v e r n m e n t  purchases and tax rates. The SAL measure 
affecting real GDP in this case is the tax rate of the 
central government.
Export Quantity
An export of goods and services demanded by the rest of 
the world is one type of a demand function. That is, a rise 
in a relative price of Thai export lowers export quantity 
from Thailand as fore -ners can switch to exports from other
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competitors. In case an export tariff is also imposed
before goods are exported. The relative price faced by 
foreigners is that after taking into account an export 
tariff rate. Changes in exchange rates also have similar
effects on export demand as tariffs since they change 
relative prices faced by foreigners. A baht devaluation 
lowers the relative prices of Thai exports and a baht 
revaluation raises them.
An income variable such as world real GDP (representing 
real income of Thailand’s trading partners) has a positive 
income effect on Thai exports if they are normal goods and 
services. In summary, we have a demand function of Thai 
exports as follows:
Export quantity = F [relative price of export(l + export tariff rate),
(-)
exchange rate in baht per foreign currency,
( + )
world real GDP]. (6)
( + )
The fiscal policy measure affecting export quantity in 
this case is the export tariff rate.
Import Quantity
Like an export demand function in equation (6) , an 
import demand function takes the form of
Import quantity = Ffrelative price of import(l + import tariff rates),
(-)
exchange rate in baht per foreign currency,
(-)
real income of Thailand]. (7)
( + )
Unlike the export demand function, a baht devaluation raises 
a relative price of import faced by Thai residents and,
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therefore, lowers import quantity. Furthermore, an income 
variable in the import quantity function is the real income
of Thailand as it is the demander for imports. Similar to
the export quantity equation, the import tariff rate is the 
policy measure of interest in the import quantity equation.
Current Account Deficits
By definition, a current account deficit is defined as 
the difference between export and import values. As we know 
prices and quantities of exports and imports of goods and 
services, we can calculate a current account deficit as 
follows:
Current account deficit = [export value of goods and services
- import value of goods and services] . (8)
Government Deficits
When government expenditures exceed government revenue, 
the government usually finances this gap by borrowing. This 
amount of borrowing is a government deficit. Therefore,
Government deficit = [government expenditures
- government revenue] . (9)
Government expenditures, according to the national-income 
a c c ount c l a ssification, comprise purchases, transfer 
payments and interest payments while the government revenue 
is composed of tax revenue and other revenue. The SAL 
measure enters the scene through the tax-revenue variable 
which is the result of a tax rate multiplied by a tax base. 
In our case, the SAL measure is the tax rate of the central 
government and the tax base is real GDP as specified in 
equation (5).
4.4 Methods of Estimation
The previous section outlines theoretically factors, 
including fiscal policy measures, that determine aggregate 
econo m i c  variables as shown in equations (5) to (9). 
However, the first three equations of real GDP, export
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quantity and import quantity require an estimation since 
they are either in a reduced form or a structural form. The 
last two equat i o n s  of current a c c ount and government 
deficits are basically definitions.
The e s t i m a t i o n  of e quations (5) to (7) used the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method available in the Micro 
TSP version 4.0. This method seems appropriate since the 
real GDP equation is a reduced form and, therefore, the 
simultaneity problem does not arise. As for the export 
demand equation, the OLS method also seems appropriate 
because Thailand has been a small open-economy. Finally, 
the OLS method is also appropriate for the import demand 
function because the supply of imports from the point of 
view of Thai residents is approximately perfectly elastic 
which is a characteristic of a small country.
4.5 Data
The e s t i m a t i o n  employed annual time-series data 
covering the period 1970-1987. Major sources of data are 
various issues of (1) Bank of Thailand, Monthly Bulletin, 
(2) National Accounts Division, Office of the National 
Economic and Social Development Board, National Accounts of 
Thai l a n d , New Series 1970-1987, and (3) International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. Data 
used in regressions are contained in Appendix E.
4.6 Empirical Results, Their Interpretation and Forecasting 
Ability
Empirical results for estimated equations of real GDP, 
export quantity and import quantity in log-linear form are 
as follows:
Period: 1971-1987
log(GDPt) = 0.2B5 - 0.08 logfTAX^
(0.965) (0.16)
+0.73* log(WGDPt) + 0.70* log(GDPt_-,) , (10)
(0.25) (0.13)
7 5
Adjusted R2 = 0.997
Durbin-Watson Stat = 1.80
S.E. of regression = 0.017 
F - statistic = 1822.54 ,
Period: 1970-1987
log(XGSt) = -3.80* - 0.47* logfFX^ 1+TX+) ]
(0.56) (0.068)
+2.42* log(WGDPt) , (11)
(0.126)
Adjusted R2 = 0.987 S.E. of regression = 0.06
Durbin-Watson Stat =1.80 F - statistic = 629.71 ,
Period 1970-1987
log(MGSt) = -4.47* - 0.77* log [PWL (l+TVL) ]
(0.65) (0.20)
-0.79* log(EX^) + 1.38* log(GDPt) , (12)
(0.25) (0.13)
Adjusted R2 = 0.960 S.E. of regression = 0.06
Durbin-Watson Stat =2.42 F - statistic = 135.56 ,
where log is a logarithm form, a subscript t indicates that 
the s u b s c r i p t e d  variable is in period t, figures in 
parentheses below estimated parameters are their standard
9errors, adjusted R is a coefficient of correlation adjusted 
for degree of freedom, Durbin-Watson stat is a Durbin-Watson 
statistic, and S.E. is standard errors of regression. 
Definitions of variables are as follows:
GDP = real gross domestic products (1972 prices),
TAX = an average tax rate, i.e. the ratio of tax revenue to GDP,
WGDP = real gross domestic products of the world (1980 prices),
XGS = real export value of goods and services,
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PX = relative price of exports, i.e. an export unit value deflated by a 
world wholesale price index,
TX = an average export tariff rate,
TREND = time trend (1970=1, 1971=2,......  and so on),
MGS = real import value of goods and services,
EX = an exchange rate between baht and US dollar,
FM = relative price of imports, i.e. an import unit value deflated by a
domestic wholesale price index,
TM = an average import tariff rate, and
= statistically significant difference from zero at 1% level.
Empirical results in equations (10)-(12) are generally
satisfactory. The coefficients of correlation adjusted for
9degree of freedom, adjusted R , are relatively high -- over
0.96 -- for all equations. This high correlation is mostly 
e x p l a i n e d  by the first lagged value of the dependent 
variable in the real GDP equation or by the income variable 
in the export and import quantity equations. The high F- 
statistic in each equation rejects the null hypothesis that 
all estimated parameters except for the constant term are 
indifferent from zero. The Durbin-Watson statistic reveals 
no autocorrelation problem in GDP and export equations, and 
it falls into a inconclusive region for the import equation.
The results reported in equations (10) — ( 12) are those 
after many alternatives of the right-hand-side variables 
have been tried. For example, the variables of government 
purchases, a growth rate of money supply, terms of trade and 
a time trend were also included as the right-hand-side 
variables, one at a time or in various combinations, in the 
real GDP equation. It turns out that their estimated 
parameters were not statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 5% critical level and, therefore, they were 
dropped from the equation of real GDP. The interpretation 
of the results is as follows.
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Looking at the real GDP equation, one can see that all 
estimated parametars have expected signs. Unfortunately, 
the estimated coefficient of average tax rate variable is 
not statistically significant. It seems that changes in the 
average tax rate have a small overall impact on real GDP. A 
one percentage point increase in the world real GDP raises 
the Thai real GDP by 0.73 percentage points, and a one 
p e r c e n t a g e  point increase in last year's real GDP of 
Thailand raises this year’s Thai real GDP by 0.70 percentage 
points.
The export quantity equation are examined next. A one 
percentage point increase in the relative price of export 
including an export tariff rate [PX(1+TX)] reduces the Thai 
real export of goods and services by 0.47 percentage points. 
The c o n d i t i o n  of the world economy strongly affects 
Thailand’s export demand. The elasticity of this demand 
with respect to the world GDP is 2.42. We also tried a 
variable of an exchange rate but it was not statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 5% critical level 
and therefore was dropped from the equation.
Finally, let us consider the import quantity equation. 
A one percentage point increase in the exchange rate (EX) or 
baht depreciation lowers the real import to Thailand by 0.79 
percentage points. A one percentage point increase in the 
relative price of imports including an import tariff rate 
[PM(1+TM)] reduces the real imports by 0.77 percentage 
points. Holding other variables constant, the imports to 
T h a i l a n d  grew by 1.38 p e r c e n t a g e  points with a one 
percentage point increase in Thailand’s real GDP.
To test the predictive performance of the model, an 
historical simulation from i970-1987, is performed so that 
one can examine how closely each endogeneous variable tracks 
its corresponding historical data series. Then, two well-
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known statistically criteria whose formulas are shown below, 
are employed to analyze the forecasting ability of the 
model.
(1) Root-mean-square simulation error
RMS = aJ  1/T (Pt- A^ .)2
(2) Theil’s Inequality coefficient
where: P^. = a simulated value of a relevant endogenous variable,
= an actual value of a relevant endogenous variable, and 
T = number of period in the simulation.
If the simulated values match the actual value well, 
simulation errors will be small, so will the RMS. The 
scaling of Theil’s inequality coefficient will always fall 
between 0 and 1. If U is equal to zero there is a perfect 
fit. On the contrary, if U is equal to one, the predictive 
performance of the model is the worst it can be. Usually, a 
value of the c o e f f i c i e n t  which is less than 0.3 is 
considered satisfactory.
Values of RMS of the GDP equation, export equation and 
import equation are 0.015, 0.051 and 0.054 respectively. 
The corresponding values of U are 0.001, 0.003 and 0.003.
Values of RMS are small and values of theil’s coefficient 
are close to zero, which indicates that the estimated
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equations perform well in respect to the predictive power. 
Figures 4. 1-4.3 present comparison between the fitted and 
actual values of our endogeneous variables. One can observe 
that the predicted values trace the historical ones quite 
wel 1.
4 . 7 Simulation
As m e n t i o n e d  before, the nature of a regre s s i o n  
a n a l y s i s  limits an e x a m i n a t i o n  of the impacts of SAL 
measures of an overall average tax rate of the government 
and export and import tariff rates. The relevant SAL 
proposed measures were (1) to raise the central government 
revenue/GDP ratio from 13% in 1981 to 18% for FY 1986—  ^ and
(2) to reduce import and export tariff rates. The former 
measure aimed at reducing the government deficit which could 
also reduce the current account deficit while the latter 
measures wanted to reduce the overall level of protection 
and the bias against exporting industries.
The simulation using estimated equations ( 10) — ( 12) 
under two situations -- with and without SALs -- reveals 
impacts of SAL measures on aggregate economic variables. 
However, the coefficient of average tax rate variable in the 
GDP equation is not statistically significantly different 
from zero, although the equation can predict the historical 
values very well. Therefore, the simulation to quantify an 
impact of raising the government average tax rate based on 
this equation may not be accurate. It is only suggestive 
that the overall effect of a change in average tax rate on 
real GDP be small. Apparently, an increase in average tax 
rate may raise government revenue and reduce a government 
deficit (see discussions below equation (9)) since the tax 
base or real GDP does not change.
— Later, the target was reduced to 16%.
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The export and import equations were, then, employed to 
simulate the impact of tariff changes according to SAL 
proposals. We hypothesize that, without SALs, the import 
and export tariff rates since 1982 would be equal to the 
average of the tariff rates from 1975 to 1981. This is 
considered as the status quo scenario. The average import 
tariff rate from 1975 to 1981 was 12.4% and that of export 
was 2.6%. The import and export quantity based on the 
hypothetical tariff rates were calculated from estimated 
equations (11) and (12) for 1982-1987. The simulated 
quantity was, then, multiplied by the relevant actual unit 
values to obtain export and import values . A current 
account deficit is the difference between export and import 
values as shown in equation (8).
The simulated values of these macro variable were then 
compared with the actual ones which represent the with-SAL 
scenario. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 r e s p e c t i v e l y  show the 
difference between actual and simulated values of selected 
variables and their percentage difference.
The results indicate that SAL measures helped to boost 
Thailand’s exports with the average value of 1,956 million 
Baht per annum for 1982-1987. This amount is quite 
impressive although it is quite low when compared with total 
export value, i.e. it is less than one percent.
A r eduction in import tariff rates results in a 
decrease in import prices, therefore, it encourages import 
demand. SAL measures increased values of imports in 1982, 
1983 and 1987. In 1985 and 1986, actual import tariff rates 
were higher than the average rate for 1975-1981, so the 
actual values of import for 1985-1986 were lower than the 
simulated values. However, for every year in consideration, 
the percentage of the difference is very small. For the 
period after SALs were introduced, the simulation indicates
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that import values, if without SALs, were lower than actual 
ones .
As discussed above, the reduction in export and import 
tariff rates has an opposite directional impact on the 
current account. In other words, one improves a current 
account by reducing an export tariff rate but deteriorates 
it by decreasing an import tariff rate. Our simulation 
results show that the net impact of considered SAL measures 
is an improvement of the current account. From 1983-1987, 
actual current account deficits were smaller than those in 
the hypothetical case. The exception was in 1982. The 
average amount of a reduction in current account deficits 
was approximately 1,643 million Baht per year.
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Table 4.2
Difference between Actual Values and 
Simulated Values of Selected Macroeconomic Variables
Year Export Import Current A/C Deficit
1982 1,095.65 2,872.11 1,776.46
1983 614.19 460.35 -153.84*
1984 1,489.94 -5.25 -1,495.19
1985 2,311.10 -237.11 -2,548.21
1986 2,880.02 -1,539.28 -4.419.30
1987 3,351.07 330.19 -3,020.88
Unit : Millions of Baht
$ . ..Minus signs indicate smaller values of current account deficits.
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Table 4.3
Percentage Difference between Actual Values and 
Simulated Values of Selected Macroeconomic Variables
Year Export Import Current A/C Deficit
1982 0.57 1.39 12.33
1983 0.33 0.18 -0.23*
1984 0.69 0.00 -3.55
1985 0.94 -0.09 -8.84
1986 0.99 -0.58 -19.20
1987 0.94 0.09 -275.13
Unit : Percent
Minus signs indicate smaller values of current account deficits.
CHAPTER V 
A SUMMARY AND LESSONS
This project has an objective of searching answers to 
two key questions regarding the World B a n k ’s first and 
second structural adjustment loans (SAL I & SAL II) made to 
Thailand in 1982 and 1983 respectively. These two key 
questions are (1) why were some measures attached to SALs to 
Thailand implemented? and (2) what were the impact on the 
Thai economy of those measures that were implemented?
The project utilized three approaches to answer the 
above two key questions. First, it utilized information and 
data from various documents published in Thailand and by the 
World Bank. Second, it u t i l i z e d  i n f ormation from 
inter v i e w i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  o fficials (involved in SAL 
negotiation, design, and implementation) and affected 
businessmen. Finally, it utilized a mathematical model and 
regression analysis. The interview approach is the core of 
this project to answer the first key question of why some 
SAL measures were implemented. However, data and 
information from various documents substantially help form 
the justification of interviewees’ arguments and the overall 
picture of the structural adjustment process in Thailand.
The motive of having structural adjustments in Thailand 
came from the fact that Thailand, after being aversely 
affected by the second oil shock in 1979-1980, experienced 
rapidly rising current account and g o vernment budget 
deficits in the early 1980s. The world economy at that time 
was also in a bad shape dominated by world wide recessions, 
high real interest rates and high inflation. Therefore, a 
solution to revive the Thai economy from the above twin 
deficits by depending on a recovery of the world economy, at 
that time, seemed hopeless. The remaining solution left 
would be a structural adjustment of the Thai economy.
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The SAL measures made to Thailand were only part of an 
overall program for structural adjustments in Thailand. The 
Thai government itself had formulated broad policies in 
various areas into the Fifth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan for Fiscal Year 1982-1986. In addition, 
the Thai government also took other measures which were not 
included in the SAL agreement. An important one was a 
devaluation of the baht against US dollar in 1981 and again 
in 1984. The Thai government was not alone in launching 
these structural adjustment measures. Various international 
institutions had lent Thailand a hand. Two of them playing 
a very important role are IMF with its standby arrangement 
and, of course, the World Bank with its structural 
adjustment loans. Although the amount of both SAL I and SAL 
II combined was not substantial, slightly above US$325 
million, the proposed measures covered a wide range of areas 
and policies namely, agriculture, industry, energy, fiscal 
policy and institutional development.
To answer the question of why some SAL measures were 
implemented and why some were not, we hypothesize that the 
likelihood of implementing the measures depends on (1) 
whether the measures or their elements were new or had been 
tried in previous years, (2) whether those measures would 
have b e e n  i m p l e m e n t e d  with or without SALs, (3) what 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  the World Bank made to the structural 
adjustment in Thailand, and (4) political and economic 
factors. We tested our hypotheses by interviewing more than 
35 people in eleven organizations. The findings are quite 
encouraging since the responses from our interviewees were 
generally in the same direction. The main findings are as 
follows. First, many SAL measures were not new. Some were 
'""'.going programs or projects. Some were implemented before 
Thailand signed the SAL agreement and were considered by the 
World Bank as the down payment. Finally, some were part of 
the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan.
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Second, the SAL measure would have been implemented 
without SALs. However, the coverage and the speed would 
have been less and slow respectively. Third, the World Bank 
had substantial contributions ranging from the obvious loan 
amount used to supplement Thailand’s international reserves 
and government budget, indirect influence on the Thai policy 
makers, to technical assistance. Finally, the changing 
economic environment is an important factor affecting the 
degree of success or failure of the implementation of SAL 
measures. As important is the views of the general public 
and newspapers towards the measures , Once they did not 
support any measure, the politicians whose popularity 
depends on the approval of the public and newspapers tended 
to hesitate or avoid to implement that measure.
To answer the second key question of what were the 
impact on the Thai economy of the SAL measures that were 
implemented, we have set up a simplified macroeconomic 
model. A regression analysis was then employed to estimate 
coefficients of equations of real GDP, export and import. 
The broadly defined SAL measures are limited by the nature 
of r e g r e s s i o n  analysis to an average tax rate of the 
government and export and import tariff rates.
The estimated equations can predict the historical 
values of dependent variables very well. However, the 
coefficient of the average tax rate variable in the real GDP 
equation is not statistically significantly different from 
zero. A change in the average tax rate seems to have no 
impact on real GDP. In contrast, the relative prices net of 
tariff rates in the export and import equations are 
significant in statistical sense. A one percentage point 
increase in the relative price of experts reduces the export 
demand by 0.47 percentage points. For the import demand 
equation, a one percent point increase in the relative price 
of imports reduces the import quantity by 0.77 percentage
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rpoints.
The export and import equations were, then, employed to 
simulate the impact of tariff changes under alternative 
e n v i r o n m e n t s  —  that is, with and without SALs. The 
simulated results reveal that, if without SALs, the growth 
rate of Thai exports and imports would have been lower and 
the current account deficit would have deteriorated.
The main lesson regarding the "generally perceived" 
success of the SALs in Thailand, in our views, is that the 
success came mainly from a true commitment cf the Thai 
government to restructure the economy as evidenced from (1) 
the down payment of various actions taken before signing the 
SAL agreement, (2) a vigorous implementation of SAL measures 
during the SAL period of 1982-1984, and (3) a continuation 
of the implementation of the measures even after the SAL 
period.
91
APPEND LX A
A SUMMARY
Table A.1 
Table A.2
T o 'u '1 ra * °ldi^jLCj n • o
Table A.4 
Table A.5
REVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS, MEASURES AND IMPLEMENTATION 
RELATED TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOANS
Policy Recommendations Made by the World Bank in 1980
Actions Taken for Structural Adjustment before 
Submitting the Letter of Development Policy for the 
First World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I)
Specific Actions Planned for SAL I
Specific Actions Planned for SAL II
Summary Review of SAL I & II Program Components
A ( 1 )
Table A.l
Policy Recommendations Made by the World Bank in 1980
FISCAL POLICY AND PUBLIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
(a) reviewing government current and capital expenditures to 
eliminate wasteful or unnecessary expenditures and assure that the 
remaining ones conform to the government's priorities for develop- 
ment and adjustment. A comprehensive analysis and review of the 
public investment program and adequate economic evaluation of 
public and public enterprise investments should be a regular
part of the planning and budgeting exercise;
(b) exerting even more vigorous efforts to increase collections of 
existing taxes through improvements in tax administration for both 
direct and indirect taxes, building on the success of initial 
programs in this area;
(c) introducing procedures for more prompt collection of tax 
liabilities and advance payments of some taxes;
(d) discontinuing the present system of treating any corporation as
a personal entity for income tax purposes if one of the 
shareholders owns more than half of the capital;
(e) expanding the personal income tax base to include all income from
property, capital gains, and eventually gifts and transfers;
(f) simplifying the rate structure of the business tax into three 
broad categories with a standard basic rate, reduced rate on 
essential goods and a higher rate on nonessentials. The basic 
rate level should be kept high enough to increase revenues signif­
icantly, and rates should be applied uniformly to domestic goods 
and imports. Consideration should also be given to reforming the 
business tax into a single point tax (probably at the wholesale 
level) with the possibility of eventually moving to a value added 
tax;
(g) implementing proposed reforms of the excise tax structure to 
consolidate nine separate excise codes into a single one, to 
integrate excises with business taxes on selected commodities, to 
widen the excise tax base to include luxury commodities such as 
electrical appliances, electronic devices, automobiles, watches, 
cosmetics, etc., and to convert ail remaining specific excise 
taxes to ad valorem;
AC 2)
(h) increasing collections on the existing property tax, which are low 
because of widespread exemptions, concessional rates, low 
assessments, and poor administration. Introducing a new property 
tax should also be considered in the longer term;
(i) reducing the "standard deductions" for professional incomes or 
replacing them with direct accounting of expenses;
(j) introducing frequent and automatic tariff adjustments for public
enterprises based on their operating costs and investment require­
ments so that they can cover a larger portion of their investment 
programs; and
(k) issuing government bonds that offer positive real rates of
interest to the public to reduce reliance on deficit financing 
from -the banking system. Public enterprises should also be 
encouraged to issue bonds to the public.
MONETARY POLICY, EXTERNAL BALANCES AND FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
(a) establish and adhere to guidelines for rates of monetary expansion 
consistent with expected real growth plus exogenously generated 
price increases. Interest rates should be allowed to adjust as 
necessary (further increases in interest ceilings may be required);
(b) assure that the Bank of Thailand maintains the interest rates that 
it regulates positive in real terms, and that other regulated 
rates move consistently with the overall rate structure.
(c) adjust interest-rate, reserve, and other financial policies to 
assure necessary capital account balances consistent with domestic
objectives of growth and financial stability;
(d) fully implement existing requirements for reporting to the Bank of 
Thailand all actual and intended foreign borrowing by all agents, 
public, and private, and to develop debt management policies to 
coordinate public sector borrowing and provide guidelines for 
private borrowing;
(e) improve financial intermediation by measures to increase credit 
availability for agriculture and small-scale industry through 
changes i- institutional structures and/or regulations; and
(f) encourage longer-term lending by commercial banks and the creation 
of specific institutions with long-term intermediation objectives, 
such as insurance companies and pension funds.
A(3)
ENERGY POLICY
(a) announcing and implementing a program of regular and automatic 
adjustments of petroleum and other energy prices and power tariffs 
in response to changes in external energy costs;
(b) raising excise, business and import taxes on energy products to at 
least their real pre-1973 level and higher if necessary to reflect 
the scarcity of energy resources and of the foreign exchange used to 
import energy;
(c) using substitution or opportunity cost pricing of domestic energy 
resources to reflect the alternate costs of imports, to discourage 
investment. in uneconomic energy-intensive projects and equipment, 
and to encourage further development of domestic energy resources;
(d) enforcing a pattern of refinery expansion that assures an appro­
priate balance of petroleum product supply and demand;
(e) developing adequate conservation measures for both commercial/ 
industrial and residential/individual uses, including more energy- 
efficient machinery, retrofitting to reduce energy losses, and 
improved energy design in the future; and
(f) improving the capacity of energy sector institutions to influence 
the development of the energy supply structure, to manage demand and 
purchasing policies of petroleum and product supplies, to develop 
nonconventional sources, and to allocate scarce energy resources if 
necessary.
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
(a) implementing measures currently under review to reduce biases 
against manufactured exports by full and prompt rebate of all taxes 
and tariffs paid on intermediate imports used directly and 
indirectly in the production of exports;
(b) reducing or eliminating export taxes and other export controls such 
as export licenses and minimum prices, except where foreign market 
limitations (e.g., quotas, inelastic demand) require management
of Thai exports. Wh01"’ licenses allocate foreign quotas, they 
should be easily transferrable among exporters and available 
to bona fide new exoorters;
A(4)
(c) improving the export credit and guarantee schemes, simplifying their 
administration, and extending the facilities to cover pre-export and 
export investment credit requirements;
(d) expanding institutional promotion measures and making export 
promotion incentives available to all trading firms;
(e) replacing all nontariff restrictions on imports with ad valorem 
tariffs and moving toward a more homogenous tariff structure by 
initially reducing tariffs above 50% to 50% and raising tariffs 
below 10% to 10% as a first step toward a uniform tariff.
Infant industries could be allowed an additional 15%
for limited periods of time, and an additional 20% could be 
imposed on luxury imports;
(f) eliminating domestic price controls;
(g) establishing an authority for economic evaluation of all large 
projects requiring major public support in the form of equity, 
credit guarantees, protection, special incentives,'or major 
specific infrastructure construction;
(h) granting investment incentives on an automatic basis to all 
firms which meet certain stated objective development criteria 
except for specifically excluded industries;
(i) implementing more effective measures to promote appropriate 
development of industry outside of Bangkok; and
(j) developing effective ways to encourage higher employment generation 
per unit of industrial investment.
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
(a) design a national land use and development policy and then 
implement an extensive program to reclassify land Dased on 
a national land suitability classification, to expand and 
coordinate land settlement and reform in areas reclassified as 
being suitable for agriculture, to improve credit availability for 
purchasing and improving land, and to improve accessibility to 
full land rights;
(b) increase forest protection, accelerate reforestation in areas 
suitable only for foresty, and expand land conservation and 
improvement programs, especially in areas with low cropping 
intensities;
(c) make better use of available water resources by further develop­
ment of major water control and irrigation schemes, by improving 
existing schemes of on-farm development, by development of 
viable medium and small water resource projects, especially in the 
Northeast, by improving the Royal Irrigation Department's 
planning, monitoring and evalution capacities, and by introducing 
comprehensive water management systems, including the levying of 
water charges;
(d) coordinate research and extension activities providing applied 
technology for rainfed agriculture and to encourage changes in 
cropping patterns to achieve improvements in yields and farm 
incomes;
(e) expand programs of government assistance for specialized crop 
development (particularly tree crops), livestock raising, and fish 
farming as supplementary sources of income for low-income farmers;
(f) provide adequate institutional credit to farmers through better 
coordination of the government development agencies with the 
banking system and more systematic use of the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperatives to complement the activities of the 
commercial banking and informal credit systems;
(g) improve the efficiency and stability of the agricultural marketing 
and pricing system in order to increase returns to" farmers,
by examining the possibility of phasing out the present premia, 
taxes and reserve requirements for rice exports, reducing 
wholesale price fluctuations of major crops, and removing" 
restrictions that introduce inefficiencies in private market 
development, such as limitation on livestock movement;
(h) develop adequate mechanisms for grading and quality control 
for seeds and fertilizers; and
(i) develop programs which respond to the specific problems and needs 
of different areas of the country, especially those which have been 
left behind in the development process.
Source:  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Bank f o r  R econ struc t ion  and Development (1980A),
pp. 5 3 - 5 4 ,  58,  6 4 -6 5 ,  68-69  and 72 -73 .
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Table A.2
Actions Taken for Structural Adjustment
before submitting the Letter of Development Policy
for the First World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I)
Sector or Policy Area 
AGRICULTURE
Actions Taken
1. Land Use Policy 
(a) Land use study
(b) Land certification
(c) Land reclassification
Marketing and Pricing Policy
(a) Export restriction 
on cassava, maize, 
and sugar
(b) Export tax for rubber
(c) Rice programs on price, 
distribution, and reserve 
requirement
The government had prepared, for the 
Fifth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan, a study on land use 
and development policy and the 
magnitude and regional distribution of 
the problem had been identified.
The decision was made to issue "right 
to farm" certificates (or "S.T.K.") to 
farmers who were cultivating soils 
suitable for agriculture.
The government had begun the process of 
land reclassification with the 1982 
fiscal year budget of baht 73 million 
and had prepared a broad program for 
land reclassification aimed at covering 
the majority of the problem area during 
the Fifth Plan period.
Export quota system for cassava had 
been eliminated and that for maize had 
been made more flexible. Ban on sugar 
exports had been lifted.
Reduced from 25% to 11%
The efficiency and effectiveness of the 
rice price support program had been 
improved; paddy prices to the the 
farmers increased by about 20-25% over 
1981.
The effectiveness of the cheap rice 
distribution program meeting the needs 
of poverty groups had been improved by 
limiting quantity and eligibility for 
purchases and by increasing the 
proportion of cheap rice marketed 
outside Bangkok from 40% in 1980 to 65% 
in the first half of 1981.
In December 1981, rice reserve
A (7)
Table A.2 (Cont ’d)
Actions Taken for Structural Adjustment
before submitting the Letter of Development Policy
for the First World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I)
Sector or Policy Area Actions Taken
requirement was halved, resulting in a 
reduction of its effective burden on 
rice exports from an estimated 20% down 
to 10%.
INDUSTRY
1. Discussions and Seminars Broad ranging discussions on industrial
development policies had begun between 
officials of the agencies concerned, 
industrialists, private bankers and 
manufacturers.
Public seminars were held on
(1) rationalization of industrial 
protection policies,
(2) productivity improvement,
{3) export promotion, and
(4) energy conservation.
2. Committee establishment Setting up a permanent high level
interdepartmental committee to 
coordinate, implement and monitor 
industrial development.
3. Export Promotion The dollar value of the baht was
reduced in 1981 by about 10%.
A new export tax drawback Act was 
approved by Parliament.
Legislation had been passed to 
establish an Export Development Fund to 
provide technical and promotional 
support for exports.
Reform of the Protective Structure
(a) Subsector study Arrangements had been made for the
World Bank to assist with the study on 
the electrical goods sector.
5. Investment Incentives 
(a) A study Under the UNDP/IBRD technical 
assistance arrangement to the Board of 
Investment (BOI), a comprehensive study- 
had been completed on the system of
Table A.2 {Cont *d)
Actions Taken for Structural Adjustment
before submitting the Letter of Development Policy
for the First World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I)
Sector or Policy Area Actions Taken
(b) Committee establishment
investment incentives and on the 
functions and procedures of BOI.
A high level committee had been set up 
to review the existing system of 
investment incentives, based on the 
policy recommendation of the above
study.
ENERGY
1. Pricing and tariffs
2. Supply side
By April 1981, average power tariffs 
and petroleum prices had been raised by 
about 120% over the average level in 
March 1979 to reduce underpricing of 
energy.
Availability of natural gas in the Gulf 
of Thailand since September 1981 had 
reduced the dependence on imported oil.
FISCAL POLICY
1. Measures to reduce 
budget deficits
2. Short-term fiscal
stabilization measures
In fiscal year 1981 and in the budget 
for fiscal year 1982, the government 
had started (1) to increase discipline 
over public spending and (2) to impose 
selected tax measures and substantially 
increase public enterprise tariffs.
The government had the Standby 
Agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Its amount was 
SDR 814.5 million over a two-year 
period which started in May 1981.
3. Tax policy
(a) Tax administration As of January 1982, the Revenue 
Department had set up five Area Tax 
Offices in Bangkok.
The IMF had provided extensive 
technica 1 support in the area of tax
administration.
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Actions Taken for Structural Adjustment
before submitting the Letter of Development Policy
for the First World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I)
Sector or Policy Area Actions Taken
(b) Tax Policy Board The Board had recently been set up. 
Its functions were to identify an 
appropriate long-term tax structure and 
develop a program of phased movement 
towards it.
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1. Policy analysis and 
coordination
A permanent high-level National 
Economic Policy Steering Committee was 
formed in November 1980 under the 
Chairmanship of the Prime Minister and 
with the NESDB functioning as its 
secretariat.
2. Program formulation, 
evaluation and 
implementation
Since March 1980 a consultant firm had 
been working with the Budget Bureau to 
improve the national budget system. 
The first phase of this undertaking was 
completed in September 1981. The 
second phase of this project was 
initiated at the end of 1981 for the 
conversion of the entire government to 
full program budgeting.
Note: Extracted from the Letter of Development Policy No. MF.0304/4460, dated
February 4, 1982, from Mr. Sommai Hoontrakul, Minister of
Finance, to Mr. Clausen, President of the World Bank; Re: Thailand-
Structural Adjustment Loan.
Table A.3
Specific Actions Planned for SAL I 
Sector or Policy Area Planned Actions
AGRICULTURE
1. Land Use Policy
2. Marketing and Pricing Policy
(a ) Rice programs
Actions aimed at increasing 
productivity through the improvement of 
incentives to farmers.
Work on land certification and 
reclassification was continued. By 
March 1982, the Ministry of Finance 
would prepare a more detailed work 
program for land reclassification.
Further improvements in the procurement 
and distribution.
(b) Deregulation of
livestock marketing
(c) Fertilizer marketing 
study
INDUSTRY
1. Export Promotion
(a) Customs Department
(b ) Bonded warehouses
and export processing 
zones
Further reductions in the overall 
burden of rice taxation.
Permitting the establishment of private 
slaughterhouse facilities for export by 
April 1982.
Reviewing the public sector program for 
supplying fertilizer to farmers, paying 
particular attention to pricing issues 
and distribution mechanisms and
objectives.
Action aimed at inducing efficient 
growth.
Broad based improvements, implemented 
in 1982, in organization of the Customs 
Department and in procedures for 
implementing the import tax refund 
scheme and the new export tax drawback 
Act.
Customs stations would be created at 
industrial estate locations and in
major regional cities.
Five additional bonded warehouses would
be created in 1982.
Export processing zones would be set up 
in Bangkok and Sattahip early in the 
Fifth Plan period (1982-1986).
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Sector or Policy Area Planned Actions
(c) Export Development Fund
(b) Subsector studies
3. Investment Incentives
(a) Board of Investment
(b) A study
4. Large Scale Projects
ENERGY
1. Pricing
(a) A study
Details concerning the financing and 
operations of the Fund would be decided 
by June 1982.
2. Reform of the Protective Structure
(a) General tariff Reform During the fiscal year of 1982, tariff 
rates would be modified so that all 
imports would be subject to the ratio 
ranging from 5% to 60%. Exceptions 
would only be granted in special cases.
By mid-1982, further appropriate 
changes in both tariff and nontariff 
restrictions.
Plan for automotive in 1982; chemical, 
plastic products, and ceramics in 1983; 
iron and steel products, machinery and 
other equipment in 1984.
By March 1982, the government would 
formulate a more detailed program and 
phasing for the reform of the 
investment incentives.
By mid-1982, the Ministry of Finance in 
cooperation with the BOI, would 
initiate a study of the economic and 
fiscal consequences of the present and 
proposed incentives.
Ad hoc arrangements would be made for 
reviewing whether large scale projects 
met the criterion of economic viability 
as long as the National Economic and 
Social Development Board (NESDB) and 
BOI were not yet in a position to 
fulfill their functions for all large 
projects.
Actions aimed at reducing the demand 
for largely imported energy and 
eliminating underpricing of energy.
A study of the relative price structure
of petroleum products.
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(b) Pricing changes
2. Energy Strategy formulation
(a) Energy studies
(b) Strategy formulation
FISCAL POLICY
1. Tax policy
(a) Tax measures
Plan to initiate appropriate changes in 
the price structure in 1982.
Studies on the energy master plan,
utilization, domestic nonconventi„ _
energy, and energy conservation.
Based on the findings in the above 
studies, the National Energy Authority 
(NEA) in consultation with other 
concerned agencies would formulate and 
implement the energy strategy.
Restructuring of personal and corporate 
income taxes, and a progressive income 
tax on sales of property.
Selective increases in import duties on 
goods now exempted or taxed at low
rates.
(b) Tax administration
Increases in excise taxes on certain 
sumptuary items and the change in the 
excise tax on cement from a specific to 
an ad valorem base.
By March 1983, the Revenue Department 
would have set up the total of eight 
Area Tax offices in Bangkok.
By mid-1982, regulatory action required 
for the Revenue Department to implement 
a separation of headquarters from 
operational functions and to organize 
its headquarter along functional lines 
would be completed.
2. Development of a medium-term Fiscal strategy
(a) Integrated fiscal Preparing phased implementation program
planning for attainment of the expenditure and
revenue targets and of the broad fiscal 
policies identified in the Fifth Five- 
Year Plan for the entire public sector. 
Specifically, central government
A (13)
Specific Actions Planned for SAL I 
Sector or Policy Area Planned Actions
Table A.3 (Cont’d)
(b) Public enterprises
(c) A study
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1• Policy analysis and coordination
(a) In-house capabilities
(b) Outside capabilities
revenues would be raised from 14% to 
18% of GDP over the Plan period.
Establishing realistic financial 
targets for all major public 
enterprises and a phased program for 
the achievement of these targets. 
Operational losses in these major 
public enterprise would be eliminated.
Reviewing the operations and 
effectiveness of the extra-budgetary 
funds with the objective of 
establishing clear performance criteria 
and a central monitoring system and 
considering whether they should 
continue to operate as separate 
entities.
Strengthening the in-house capabilities 
of the core agencies (primarily NESDB, 
Ministry of Finance and Budget Bureau) 
responsible for economic and fiscal 
policy analysis and advice.
With effect from fiscal year 1983, 
provision of regular budget resources 
to permit the greater utilization of 
analytical capabilities outside the 
core agencies in the conduct of key 
policy studies.
The creation of an autonomous economic 
and social policy research institute 
early in 1982 to provide research 
support and consulting services to 
NESDB and other government agencies.
2. Program formulation, evaluation and implementation
Consultants would assist the NESDB to 
design, test and introduce new planning 
and programming systems which comprised 
a three-year rolling investment 
programming system, a uniform project 
preparation and investment appraisal
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system, and a comprehensive program 
monitoring and evaluation system.
3. Personnel management
(a) Studies The Prime Minister’s office would 
initiate studies of the organization, 
management and compensation of the
civil service during 1982.
Note: Extracted from the Letter of Development Policy No. MF.0304/4460, dated
February 4, 1982, from Mr. Sommai Hoontrakul, Minister of
Finance, to Mr. Clausen, President of the World Bank; Re: Thailand-
Structural Adjustment Loan.
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Specific Actions Planned for SAL II
Sector or Policy Area 
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
Planned Actions
1. Fiscal strategy
(a) The revenue side
(b) The expenditure side
(c) Public enterprises, 
extra-budgetary funds, 
and local government
(d) Role of the Fiscal Policy 
Office (FPO)
2. Medium-term fiscal Reform
(a) Tax measures
Strengthening of the link between the 
new revenue targets and the tax policy 
and tax administration changes. The 
target of central government 
revenue/GDP ratio was dropped from 18% 
as stated in SAL I to 16% in FY 1986.
Improvement of the methods to project 
central government outlays.
Medium-term projections would be made 
for the financial operations of public 
enterprises. These projections and 
those for extra-budgetary funds and for 
local government would then be 
integrated into an overall financial 
strategy for the entire public sector.
With IMF assistance, a program for 
broadening and intensifying the role of 
the FPO of the Ministry of Finance as a 
central fiscal planning unit.
The implementation of a phased program
for simplification of business taxes 
and excise duties.
The enactment of selected revisions of 
the revenue code and customs laws to 
enhance their scope and impact.
The enactment of the new consolidated
excise tax law.
(b) A study The initiation of a study on the
feasibility of introducing value-added
taxation on selected items.
(c) Local finances The development of an action program to
strengthen local finances by bringing 
up-to-date land housing assessment 
values, local fines and fee structures, 
and improve coordination between the 
Interior and Finance Ministries on
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Local taxes.
(d) Extra-budgetary funds
3. Tax administration
(a) The Revenue Department
(b) The Customs Department
(c) The Excise Department
(d) Tax Training Institute
(e) Tax Rulings Committee
4. State enterprises (SEs)
(a) Commercially-oriented 
SEs
(b) Public utilities SEs
An analysis of the operation and 
effectiveness of the various extra- 
budgetary funds, and the implementation 
of appropriate recommendations.
Computerizing its operations and 
further decentralization on the basis 
of evaluation of experience gained from
area offices already established.
Rationalizing import/export forms and 
documents to eliminate unnecessary 
papers.
Decentralizing and reorganizing this 
Department to facilitate trade flows.
To be reorganized during 1983, based on 
IMF proposals and following the 
enactment of the new excise laws, to 
eliminate overlaps in several 
departments and enhance efficiency.
Its creation for tax, excise and 
customs specialists.
In October 1982, a high level Committee 
for Tax Rulings was established to help 
solve assessment and tax liability 
problems and to formulate a tax arrears 
policy. Its establishment aimed 
towards a fairer tax system.
No new SEs competing with the private 
sector would be set up in the future.
Existing SEs would have to stand on 
their own feet or be liquidated. In 
1983, the government would formulate an 
act.ion program to implement this
policy.
[ n  1 . 9 8 , j , t he government would determine 
Es i t would be willing to assist
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financially, and to what extent.
(c) Other SEs Would have to earn appropriate returns
on assets by the end of the Fifth Plan.
(d) SEs incurring The government would assess and project
considerable losses forward the overall magnitude of the
losses.
The government would develop, with the 
World Bank assistance, a firm medium- 
term plan to reduce these losses 
gradually over 1983-1986 through rate 
increases and efficiency improvements. 
With respect to the latter, the new 
policy directions were (i) each major 
SE would be subjected to a 
comprehensive program of efficiency- 
enhancing measures, (ii) salary 
structures would be reviewed to attract 
capable managers, (iii) technical 
efficiency would be improved by better 
maintenance, modernization of 
accounting and billing systems, and 
(iv) operations would be decentralized 
and management by objectives (including 
program budgeting) would be introduced.
(e) A study To introduce the new policy directions,
regarding the efficiency improvements, 
on a more systematic and permanent
basis, particularly in the major
enterprises.
5. Foreign debt
(a) Three-year rolling plan The formulation of a three-year rolling
plan for planning, evaluation and 
monitoring of the government’s external 
borrowing program, in conjunction with 
the formulation of the three—year 
(1984-1986) fiscal strategy discussed 
under (1) above.
(b) Data base and analysis An improvement in the external debt
data base and analysis.
(c) Coordination Improvement in the coordinating
me sm f. or external resources
A( 18)
Specific Actions Planned for SAL II
Table A.4 (Cont’d)
Sector or Policy Area Planned Actions
(d) Reduction in the ceiling 
on public external 
borrowing
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1• Continuation of SAL I
(a) Assistance of a consultant 
team
mobilization which had been put into 
operation by the Committee on External 
Debt Policy in June 1982.
From US$2,400 million to US$2,060 
million per year, a reduction of 
approximately 14%.
The design and implementation of new 
project proposal and rolling investment 
systems.
(b) A program budget system
(c) A report on accounting 
system
(d) Improvement in systems 
for provincial financial 
reporting
Monitoring and evaluation systems to 
meet the needs of central core and line 
agencies.
Had been designed and would be 
implemented in FY 1984. This system 
would be linked with the planning 
systems.
A comprehensive report on necessary 
changes in the governmental accounting 
system would be completed in 1983.
Based on recommendations, it was 
implemented.
(e) Auditing New procedures and standards for 
performance auditing had been designed 
by the office of the Auditor General.
(f) Staff training programs
A study on the introduction of 
comprehensive auditing would be 
undertaken.
Would be formulated during 1983 in all 
of the central management functions.
2. New actions
(a) Studies A broad study on the organization, 
compensation and personnel 
administration of the civil service, 
study would also identify
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weaknesses of the governmental
machinery in departmental
reorganization procedures and
processes.
(b) Policy analysis and 
formulation
A reorganization study for a 
realignment of several of the NESDB 
functions.
A study of the staffing needs and 
arrangements for NESDB and of selected 
ministerial planning units.
Encountering difficulties in 
establishing an independent 
research/development institute, the 
government enhanced the NESDB’s 
capacity to coordinate and manage the 
conduct of the policy research.
INDUSTRY
1. Continuation of SAL I
(a) Export promotion Reduction of the bias against exporting 
vis-a-vis import substitution.
Establishment of export processing 
zones in industrial estates.
(b) Reform of the protective 
structure
Overall reduction and greater 
uniformity of effective protection 
through general and/or subsectoral 
actions.
Arrangements with UNIDO to implement a 
program of restructuring feasibility 
studies, per subsector.
A study on textile industry was added.
Expanding the scope of subsector 
studies to include the nature and 
extent of incentives to be granted by
the BOI.
Implementation of appropriate non- 
reform policies in the
subsectors under review.
A( 20)
Specific Actions Planned for SAL II
Table A.4 (Cont’d.)
Sector or Policy Area Planned Actions
(c ) Investment incentives
(d) Large scale projects
Plan for the reform of BOI activities 
started to implement.
A study on the fiscal and investment 
consequences of the revised investment 
promotion structure was initiated.
Ad hoc arrangements had been put in 
place to undertake comprehensive 
economic and technical evaluations.
2. New actions
(a) Export credit and 
guarantee schemes
(b) A study
The NESDB short-listed a number of 
consulting firms and invited proposals 
for in-depth technical and economic 
reviews of the remaining large 
industrial projects.
Exploring its feasibility in order to 
provide the financial needs of new 
exporters especially of non-traditional 
manufactured items.
Recommendations on the ways in which 
NESDB’s capacity to undertake 
preliminary evaluations of proposed 
major investments could be 
strengthened.
ENERGY
1. Continuation of SAL I
(a) Studies
(b) Implementation
On energy pricing, conservation and 
strategy formulation became available 
around September 1983.
Based on findings in the above studies.
2. New actions
(a) Reduction in fuel 
price differential
(b) Reduction in energy 
consumption
Appropriate steps to gradually moderate 
the large price differential between 
gasoline and diesel fuel prices.
Formulating policies and implementing
measures.
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(c) Strengthening NEA’s 
ability
(d) Establishment of the 
Energy Conservation 
Center of Thailand 
(ECCT)
To prepare, maintain and update the 
medium-term energy strategy.
Having been providing limited technical 
and technology assistance to industries 
for energy conservation.
(c) Transport energy 
conservation 
studies
Two studies on energy policies and on 
road user taxation had been completed. 
An action program would, then, be 
prepared to implement appropriate 
recommendation on transport energy 
conservation.
AGRICULTURE
1. Continuation of SAL I
(a) Land use policy
(b) Marketing and pricing 
policy
Issuance of "right-to-farm" (STK) 
certificates in forest reserve areas. 
The certificates were legally limited 
to 15 rai per family but landholdings 
of up to 50 rai would be recognized. 
However, land rights for areas in 
excess of 50 rai per family occupying 
forest reserves would not be 
recognized.
During implementation of the land 
reclassification program in each forest 
reserve area, the government would 
ascertain (1) the extent and location 
of excess land in holding over 50 rai 
and (2) encroachment in areas 
determined to be unsuitable for 
sustained yield agriculture.
No increase in the taxation of 
agricultural exports beyond the levels 
in March 1983.
The Rice Policy Committee would conduct 
an evaluation of the 1982/1983 rice 
price support program and propose
measures to improve it.
mmittee had been established to
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2. New actions
(a) Land bank study
(b ) Water resource 
and management 
(i) Studies
development
review the whole marketing 
infrastructure and to develop an 
agricultural trade information system.
Aimed at the feasibility and 
desirability of establishing a Land 
Bank. The study would be carried out 
under the supervision of the National 
Rural Development Committee’s Land 
Policy Subcommittee. The Land Bank 
would enable transfer of land covered 
by STKs and leases and thereby improve 
access to credit by STK certificate 
holders. It would also function as the 
financial arm of the government’s land 
tenure and land reform policies.
On organizational, legal, development 
potential and information needs would 
be initiated.
(ii) Staff and institutional 
support
Would be strengthened.
Note: Extracted from the Letter of Development Policy, dated March 7, 1983,
from Mr. Sommai Hoontrakul, Minister of Finance, to Mr. Clausen, 
President of the World Bank; Re: Second Structural Adjustment Loan.
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Sector/policy area Status of Implementation-
I. Agriculture
1. Land llBe Policy
(a) Land certification
(b) Land reclaaaificatlon
(c) Socio-economic survey
In 1982 the Cabinet Issued a comprehensive set of guidelines on land 
use and land rights policy aimed at bringing land use and classifica­
tion better In line with land suitability.
STK ("right to farm") certificates have already been Issued to one- 
third of a million farm families who previously had no rights over 
their land. Forestry Department continues with the certification pro­
gram which la expected to affact one million families.
Surveys have been completed or are under way In almost two million ha 
of pre—reserved forests In order to determine what the more appropriate 
classification, would be, prior to proceeding with land certification/ 
titling. Procedures for approval of classification recommendations are 
proving too cumbersome and the Land Reclassification Committee, aa a 
result, haa become a bottleneck..
Two rounds of surveys have been carried out and their results are 
shedding new light on the socio-economic characteristics of the farmers 
in the forest.
(d) Land Bank study This study of the feasibility of a land bank Is due for completion in 
November 1984.
2. Marketing and Pricing Policy The Government's commitment to deregulation of agricultural exports has 
manifested itself in liberalization measures across the board.
(a) Export duties
(b) Export quotas and licensing
Step-by-step reductions in export duties for rice have lowered the 
burden on rice exports from over 30Z (in early 1981) to the current 5Z 
of FOB prices, eliminating the burdensome reserve requirement in the 
process. The tax on rubber exports was also reduced from 25Z to 11Z 
(of September 1981 FOB prices), and further reduced in 1984.
Restrictions on the export of maize, rice, and partly, sugar have been 
lifted since 1982.
(c) Domestic Intervention After several modifications, the costly and ineffective rice price 
support program was substantially eliminated with effect in the 1983/84 
season.
(d) Marketing study
(e) Fertilizer study
A start towards deregulation of livestock and meat marketing was made 
in 1982 with the authorization of private slaughterhouses for beef and 
hogs, primarily for export purposes.
A major study to identify improvements in agricultural marketing 
information and infrastructure was completed in mid-1984 and an action 
plan la now being prepared on the basis of its findings.
A study of the fertilizer marketing system (Involving a large scale 
survey of distributors) is nearing completion. Due to delays in its 
initiation lta findings may turn out to have been overtaken by develop­
ment of the National Fertilizer Corp.
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3. Water Resource*
II. Industry
1. Protective Structure
(a) Ceneral Tariff Refora
(b) Subsector Studies
2. Investment Incentives
(a) Board of Investment
(b) Plscal Impact 
3. Export Proaotlon
4. Large-Scale Projects
Cabinet established, In 1983, the national Water Resources 3oard 
(chaired by a Deputy Prlae Minister) to oversee the management and 
development of water resources. Problems In sectlng up a permanently 
staffed secretariat have delayed Initiation of the related program of 
studies.
The general tariff reform undertaken In the SAL context was successful 
In terms of (i) substantially reducing overall levels of protection;
(il) decreasing the bias of the protective structure against exporting 
Industries; and (ill) narrowing down the range of rates of 
protection. Most of the progress across the board was aade in 1982 
with reform continuing more selectively and at a slower pace in 1983 
and 1984 and in 1985 was slightly revelsed for revenue reasons.
A somewhat scaled-down program of subsector studies has been under way 
since 1982. The electrical goods study, finalized in 1982, has already 
resulted in tariff reforms. Hie automotive industry study was com­
pleted and reviewed in 1983 and some of its recotmsendatlona have 
already been implemented (e.g., a freeze on the domestic content 
requirements progression). The chemicals and plastics study is nearing 
completion. And, In the textile subsector, the Government is proposing 
to establish an "intelligence unit" to prepare a reform program.
In early 1983 the Government Issued policy guidelines for investment 
promotion and for tax privileges as an explicit framework for Board of 
Investments (BOI) activities. Even though the guidelines were largely 
restating existing policies, disseminating then served a useful purpose 
and it was followed by the approval of an action plan for BOI which 
Included an effort to design specific subsectoral and product group 
promotional packages and which will also involve changes in Incentive 
administration to be reflected in a revision of BOI's Act.
A study of the fiscal Implications of investment Incentives is now 
under way (and scheduled for completion within 1984), after being 
repeatedly delayed by disagreements on its scope between 301 and the 
Ministry of Finance.
<
The export rebate and duty drawback systems were overhauled and pro­
cedural changes made so that the schemes are now working well - though 
their reach needs to b* expanded. In addition, through tariff reforms, 
an attempt was made to move towards duty-free status for export produc­
tion in a few selected areas (e.g., electronics and footwear). An 
Export Development Fund was established in 1982, followed in L983 by 
the creation of an Export Development Committee. During tne same 
period the nianber of bonded warehouses was expanjed and the Export 
Service Centers were upgraded as well. Finally, a study of the feasi­
bility of an export credit guarantee was completed in 1984 and the 
Government is reviewing its recommendations.
A study on the evaluation of large-scale projects was completed in mid- 
1984 and a series of seminars have been held to review it.
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III. Energy
1. Pricing and Taxation
2. ConservatIon
(a) In Industry
(b) In Transport
(c) National Center
3. Strategy Formulation
IV. Fiscal Policy
I. Consolidated Public Sector Finances
(a) Integrated Fiscal Planning
(b) Role of FI seal Policy Office
As a result of the. introduction of a number of modifications in the 
petroleum price structure, the range of retail prices for the various 
petroleum fuels has been narrowed and the Oil Pund has had a surplus 
since lste 1983. A comprehensive energy pricing study was completed in 
late 1983, as well, and is now under review by the steering comml Ctee - 
which will prepare recommendations for the appropriate policy malting 
bodies (Including the Cabinet) by the end of 1984.
A study of Incentives for energy conservation in industry is now get­
ting under way, after having been delayed to ensure coordination with 
ADB-sponsored energy audits which were carried out during 1983.
An action plan for energy conservation in the transport sector was 
approved in principle by Cabinet in 1983 and considerable progress was 
made subsequently in designing programs for specific policy action, 
including a new structure of road user charges.
The National Energy Conservation Center was formally established by 
Cabinet in mid-1984, under the auspices of the Association of Thai 
Industries, with initial supervision from the National Energy Adminis­
tration (NEA), and with Government (SAL) funding.
Two separate studies have been completed. An energy assessment has 
been completed aa a collaborative task supported by UNDP/World 
Bank/NESDB/CIDA and is expected Co be an important input into the Sixth 
Plan. A strategy formulatin study has been completed for the NEA, 
after substantial delays, and is now being reviewed.
An integrated fiscal plan waa first prepared in 1982/83 jointly by the 
National Economic and Social Development 3oard (NESDB), the Bureau of 
the Budget (BOB) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in collaboration 
with World Bank, for the Fifth Plan period. NESDB has updated develop­
ment expenditure program and financing plan since then on a routine 
basis. New comprehensive expenditure program being prepared for Sixth 
Plan. Aa a result of revenue and expenditure measures undertaken, 
total public sector deficit as a proportion of CDP fell from 7.9Z in 
FT80 to an estimated 5.RX in FY84,
Stronger capacity developed for central government revenue projec­
tions. Proposal prepared for fiscal planning committee structure 
incorporates all major elements of fiscal planning for the entire 
public sector and all core agencies as committee participants, follow­
ing recommendations of Bank Report No. 4366-TH. FPO is to have central 
role in leading coordination effort. Implementation of proposal cur­
rently under review; may be incorporated in future SAL program.
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Robuat revenue projection model developed for multi-year revenue plan­
ning and annual budgeting purposes, replacing purely ad hoc annual 
extrapolation previously used. The need for discretionary tax measures 
can thus now be clearly defined in advance, to ensure gradual achieve­
ment of revenue target.
(b) Tax Measures Annual tax packages Introduced in 1981, 1982 and 1983 increased the
central government revenue/GDP ratio from 132 in PY81 to 15X in PY84. .
This is the first significant Increase in Thailand's revenue/GDP ratio 
in 15 years and represents substantial progress towards achieving the 
government's target of a 16Z ratio for 1986. (The revenue target ratio 
was reduced from 18X originally postulated under SAL I to 16Z under SAL 
II, on the ground that the latter provided a more realistic goal, given
a less buoyant outlook, for the Thai economy).
(c) Tax Structure Improvements Change to ad valorem rates for various excise taxes;
Adjustment in tax rates on business tax to reduce cascading effects;
Extensive adjustments in export and Import duties (see under agricul­
ture and industry headings);
Study carried out on indirect tax reform (with IMP assistance); and
Legislation submitted to Parliament for overhauling motor vehicle taxa­
tion.
(d) Local Government Revenues Numerous studies and measures carried out to strengthen local govern­
ment revenue base (including property tax mapping, road user charges, 
fees, etc.).
Establishment of District tax offices In Bangkok and reorganization of 
headquarters functions; introduction of uniform tax identification 
numbers, computerization of tax files, automatic mailing of tax notifi­
cations, scop filer program and Increase of audit program. The program 
represents a•far-reaching reform of Revenue Department operations, fol­
lowing technical assistance provided by IMP.
•
Various informal changes in operations following advice of IMP expects, 
including effective separation of headquarters functions from customs 
administration at port of Bangkok.
Enactment of bill reforming operations of Excise Department and trans­
ferring selected business taxes to Excise Department for administra­
tion. (Latter provision may not serve long-term objective of rational­
izing tax structure and may lead to fragmentation of business tax 
domain, thus making it more difficult Co transform the business tax 
into a broad-based sales tax).
Study carried out to assess need for centralized tax training concluded 
that decentralized training functions developed by the three MOP 
departments provide adequate initial response to training needs of MOP 
staff, although selective training functions can eventually be taken 
over by small central MOP training unit.
3. Tax Administration
(a) Revenue Department
(b) Customs Department
(c) Excise Department
(d) Tax Training
2. Tax Policy
(a) Revenue Projections
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4. Expenditure Policy
(a) Public Expenditure Program Comprehensive public expenditure program review carried out in 1982.
Aa a result, the investment programs of state enterprises were progres­
sively scaled back In 1982 and 1983. NESDB prepared for the first time 
a priority projects list for budget preparation, and on this basis 
engaged in effective discussions with BOB on reflecting Plan priorities 
in the annual budget. Central government expenditure growth for items 
other than debt service was significantly reduced compared with the 4th
Plan expansion, in both nominal and real terms.
(b) Expenditure Strategy Comprehensive expenditure program developed for 5th plan period,
consistent with macroeconomic targets and based on agency-specific 
expenditure plans. NESDB now periodically prepares development 
expenditure programs; BOB prepares multi-year recurrent expenditure 
forecasts. Two studies were carried out to provide guidance for 
further improvements of comprehensive public expenditure programming; 
their findings are currently under review.
5. State Enterprises Financing and Management
(a) .Program of Tariff Increases Substantial tariff Increases were carried out in a number of state
enterprises in 1980 and 1981. A program of further tariff increases
was developed, and accepted In principle by the Cabinet in October
1982, with implementation delegated to individual enterprises and their 
supervising ministries. However, the program was not implemented as of
August 1984, because of political obstacles. Minor tariff increases
have been implemented for the Bangkok water company (MWWA) aa part of a 
program of small monthly Increases initiated in June 1984, and small 
railway tariff increases were introduced. Purther tariff measures in 
the four major loBS-making enterprises are urgently needed still. 
Electricity tariffs were maintained roughly unchanged despite substan­
tial reductions in costs of imported fuels.
(b) Improvements of SES Finan- NESDB carried out overview study of state enterprise financial aanage-
cial Management and Operations meat practices and problems, and identified various measures to improve
SE management in principle. The recommendations received Cabinet 
endorsement, and were submitted to the high-level Administrative Reform 
Committee for review and the preparation of detailed reform 
proposals. Progress to date has been made in the following areas:
(i) Some small manufacturing SEs have been liquidated or put up for 
sale to the private sector; private bus operators are licensed 
to compete with loss-making public bus company;
(ii) Corporate planning has been introduced for ail SEs, as a means 
to increase management accountability of state enterprises;
(iii) Financial revitalization programs for major loss—making SEa are 
being prepared; in some agencies (esp. the Provincial Water 
Works Authority) substantial operational improvements have been 
made.
(iv) 3angchak oil refinery reorganization planned, with Bank assist­
ance, and agreed upon by all parties concerned.
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6. Extra-budgetary Funds
7. External Debt Management
(a) Foreign Borrowing Strategy
(b) External Debt Monitoring
V. Institutional Development
1. Systemic Changes
(a) Planning
Study identifying all extra-budgetary funds, found that only a few are 
individually of any substantial size, and that all combined do not 
amount to a significant portion of total financial flows of the public 
sector. Therefore, it was concluded that no major Importance needs to 
be attributed to "cfont of extra-budgetary funds at this point.
Comprehensive three-year rolling program for public foreign borrowing 
Introduced as a management tool for controlling total public foreign 
borrowing. A strategy waa adopted to limit total public borrowing in 
line with macroeconomic and balance of payments constraints; the ori­
ginal annual public borrowing ceiling for the 5th Plan period vti 
reduced in 1983 from US$2.6 billion to US$2.04 billion, reflecting more 
stringent international capital market conditions and revised outlook 
for Thailand's debt carrying capacity.
FPO acquired computer facility for Improved public debt analysis and 
monitoring. However, it still lacks analytical capability to utilize 
these facilities effectively.
A Beries of consultant studies Initiated in the context of SAL I led in 
most cases to action plans to Implement the relevant recommendations.
A project appraisal/investment planning system has been developed In 
NESDB, but Its full implementation has been awaiting approval of 
NESDB's reorganization by the Administrative Reform Committee. Mean­
while a related staff development/training program is under way. A 
planned study of the staffing needs of other planning agencies has not 
been undertaken.
(b) Monitoring and Evaluation The consultants failed to produce an appropriate blueprint for the
development of a monitoring and evaluation system but NESDB has come up 
with Its own system development program, which will be stretched over 
four years.
(c) Budgeting FY84 was the first year of implementation of government-wide program
budgeting, and refinement/adjustments continue to be introduced. BOB'* 
task for years to come will be to take "on board" the rest of the * 
financial management system and to deepen the understanding of program 
budgeting among budget staff in line agencies. BOB developed accord­
ingly a 3-year training program with an annual throughput of 120 of ita 
own staff and 200 line agency staff.
(d) Provincial Finances, The consultants' recommendations on provincial accounting are being
implemented, albeit at a slower pace than was anticipated. Faster pro­
gress appears to have been made in improving provincial cash manage­
ment.
(e) Central Government Accounting A set of consultant reports on the accounting system of the control
government was reviewed by the Controller General's Department and Its 
recommendations were largely found to be uniaplementable at this point; 
in a "”mber of cases minor modifications of the accounting procedures 
will be implemented. The main stumbling block la that computerization, 
a keystone of the consultants' proposed reform, does not appear prac­
ticable, given existing staff skills snd advisory capacity in Thailand.
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(f) Performance Auditing
2. Institutional Infrastructure 
(a) Civil Service
(b) TDRI
I
(c) Structural Adjustment 
Process
The establishment of a new performance auditing division in the Office 
of the Auditor General haa been finally approved by the Administrative 
Reform Committee. Meanwhile a performance auditing manual to guide 
staff is being finalized.
A study of organization, management and compensation in the civil ser­
vice was planned for 1982. Opposition by some government agencies to 
the sife of the budget proposed by the consulting groups which bid for 
the contract led to the study's scope being reduced and to two separate 
teams being hired for the compensation and organization/management com­
ponents. Both studies are now scheduled for completion in February 
1985.
The Thai Development Research Institute was set up in early 1984, with 
the legal issues that delayed its inception resolved by its being 
formed as a private foundation (with bilateral grants providing a trust 
fund) governed by. a board chaired by NESDB's Secretary General.
The mechanisms for policy supervision and implementation of the SALa 
program were significantly improved with a committee structure and a 
Joint NESDB-MOF secretariat, which became effective in September 1983.
Sou rce: I n te r n a t io n a l  Bank, fo r  R econstruction  and Development Q 9 8 6 ) ,  
Annex 2 , pp. 9 7 -1 0 3 .
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APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY
B.1 An Introduction
This appendix describes the methodology of the interview approach. We 
believe that the methodology such as sample selection and the way we 
conduct interviews may affect the answers from our interviewees and 
consequently the results. Therefore, we first present in this appendix 
details of our methodology so that the reader can judge whether results are 
biased because of the methodology. Our methodology starts with sample 
selection, coupled with a list of interviewees, and, then, moves to some 
ground rules that we followed during the interview.
B.2 Sample Selection and a List of Interviewees
We first chose the public and private organizations that intuitively 
should involve in SALs decision and implementation. For example, the 
fiscal policy area under SAL agreement is obviously the area of the 
Ministry of Finance. As a result, twelve organizations were chosen to be 
included in our sample. Nine of them are public organizations and the 
other three are private organizations. The nine public organizations are
(1) the Bank of Thailand, (2) the Board of Investment, (3) the Bureau of 
Budget, (4) the Royal Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives, (5) the Fiscal Policy Office, (6) the Revenue Department,
(7) the Excise Department, (8) the Customs Department—7 and (9) the 
National Economic and Social Development Board.
The other three private organizations are (1) the Board of Trade of 
Thailand, (2) the Federation of Thai Industries, and (3) the Thailand 
Development Research Institute (TDRI). We also chose the private-sector 
organizations because many SALs measures affected their economic behaviors 
and, therefore, their views should be heard. One exception is TDRI. That 
is, we did not choose TDRI because it has been affected by the SALs 
measures. We chose it because the interviewees there were key persons when 
SALs were negotiated and implemented.
Letters requesting an interview with key persons who know about SALs 
negotiation and/or implementation were, then, delivered. In a few cases, 
we identified interviewees but, in many cases, we left the matter of 
selecting interviewees up to the decision of the organization. Out of the 
above twelve organizations, the Federation of Thai Industries declined to 
be interviewed. The others accepted.
A list of our interviewees in alphabetical order of their affiliations 
is shown below.
Bank of Thailand
Prangtip Busayasiri, Pisit Samahito, Yoottaphol Singhaumpai and Hansa 
Sri-ityawit
Board of Investment
Vanee Lertdumrikarn, Premsri Katewongse, Prani Yasasindhu, Thamrong
Organizations nos. 5 to 8 are in the Ministry of Finance.
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Mahajchariyawong, Jirapom Chewaprecha, Wichan Kwanchadr, Nongluk Rangnoi, 
Tayapom Srisung, Vanchai Mahatanangkoon, and Nalinee Luerngthada
Board of Trade of Thailand
Yukta Na Thalang, Suvit Wanglee, Thapana Bunnag, Amnuay Sujarittharn, 
and Dr. Phadej Rojanasakul
Bureau of Budget
Prachitt Kambhu, Thongchai Lumdubwong, Satri Pradipasen, and Vittaya 
Praisuwan
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives - The Royal Forestry Department 
Krishna Brikshavana and Somthep Lacharroj
Ministry of Finance
- Fiscal Policy Office
Nibhat Bhukkanasut, Sommai Phasee, Machima Kunjara-Na-Ayudhya, 
Dr. Charnchai Musignisarkom, and Vichai Mittongtare
- Revenue Department
M .R . Chatumongkol Sonakul
- Excise Department
Prachaya Arreeraksa
- Customs Department
Pisit Chatvachirawong
National Economic and Social Development Board 
Dr. Bunyaraks Ninsananda
Thailand Development Research Institute
Dr. Phaichitr Uathavikul, Dr. Narongchai Akrasanee, Dr. Virabongsa 
Ramangkura and Dr. Direk Patmasiriwat (Ex-World Bank staff in Thailand)
Though our interviewees are grouped by their affiliations, their views 
on the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Loans may not necessarily 
represent the views of their affiliations.
B. 3 Some Ground Rules During the Interviews
Before conducting the interviews, we briefed our interviewees on the 
following subjects: (1) how TDRI obtained the research grant to evaluate
SALs (see Preface of this paper), (2) TDRI has requested a permission to 
conduct SAL evaluation in Thailand from the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Finance, (3) objectives of the project (see Chapter I of this 
paper), and (4) our strict confidentiality policy of not citing each 
individual as source of information. We also asked our interviewees’ 
permission to tape the interviews and were willing to stop taping during 
the course of interview as they wished. Furthermore, we promised to send 
copies of this paper to them and disseminate findings to the general 
public.
When asking questions, we focus on our- four key questions listed in 
the section of "Objectives of the project" in Chapter I. That is, whether
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the SALs measures were new or had been tried in previous years, whether 
those measures would have been implemented with or without SALs, what 
contribution the World Bank made to the structural adjustment in Thailand, 
and what political and economic factors affected the implementation 
decision.
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Table C.l
Interviewees' Responses to the Question,
"Were the SAL Measures New or Had Been Tried in Previous Years?”
Interviewee Response
A Not New. However, packaging and managing SAL measures were new.
B Many SAL measures were not new as they had been discussed among
Thai policy makers such as an idea to restructure the Thai 
economy. However, those measures could not been implemented due 
to lack of funding. The SAL proceeds helped provide liquidity. 
However, some measures were new, i.e., a restructuring of 
petroleum product pricing to reflect their cost structure.
C Some SAL measures such as export promotion policy were not new
as Thailand was pursuing them when negotiating SAL. Other 
measures were planned to implement, therefore, they were 
included as part of SAL measures. However, a measure suggested 
by the World Bank but not included in the SAL measure was a 
close cooperation between public and private sectors in managing 
the economy. This idea, nevertheless, was developed 
independently by the Thai government to be "the Joint Public and 
Private Sector Consultive Committee." Many people think that 
this committee has helped resolve many conflicts between public 
and private sectors.
D More than one half of SAL measures initiated by the Thai
officials were not new. They were the ongoing measures used to 
solve the existing problems in the early 1980s. For example, on 
the agricultural area, Thailand has diversified its farm 
products even before it implemented SAL measures. Similarly, on 
the industrial area, Thailand started to switch from the policy 
of import substitution to export promotion before implementing 
SAL measures.
E Many SAL measures were those of the Fifth Economic and Social
Development Plan. They initially could not be implemented 
because of lack of funding. However, the SALs provided 
liquidity and, therefore, were used to finance those measures.
F, G Not all SAL measures were new. However, some new measures were
initiated during the negotiation between the World Bank staff 
and the Thai officials.
G Approximately 30-40% of the SAL measures came from the Fifth
National Economic and Social Development Plan.
H Some SAL measures such as land certification and
reclassification were not new. They were ongoing measures. The 
land certification was initiated by the Cabinet Ruling on 28 
August B.E. 2522 (or in 1979). The Ruling gave the "Right to
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Interviewees’ Responses to the Question,
"Were the SAL Measures New or Had Been Tried in Previous Years?"
Interviewee Response
Farm" certificates to fanners occupying the reserved forest 
areas. It was estimated that there were approximately one 
million families occupying the reserved forest areas. ITie land 
certification started in 1982 with limited government budget 
allocation. However, when SAL agreement was reached, this 
measure was also included as part of SAL measures and therefore 
it received a larger budget financing.
Similarly, the land classification was not new since it was 
included in the First National Economic and Social Development 
Plan in 1961.
I Some SAL measures such as the export promotion policy was not
new. Producers in exporting industries could obtain tax 
privileges from the Board of Investment. This policy contained 
in the Investment Promotion Act in 1977.
J Some SAL measures were not new. For example, in 1981, the
Excise Department added ad valorem rates to the existing 
specific tax rate schedule where the applicable rate depends on 
whichever tax rate generates higher tax revenue. This action 
took place before the SAL implementation but it was included as 
part of the SAL measures.
K Reduction of tariff and premium rate on rice export was new.
This measure was sensible as the world price of rice had 
declined substantially in the early 1980s.
M Some measures were new, some were not. However, SALs helped
broaden the coverage of issues, sharpen the idea and speed up 
many measures. For example, SALs helped speed up issues of 
energy pricing, tariff liberalization and export oriented 
policies. Many studies were completed, using the SAL proceeds.
In fact, both SAL measures and the Fifth National Economic and 
Social Development Board shared the same principle of using 
market mechanism which was based on the World Bank’s studies. 
However, when the World Bank’s staff conducted research in 
Thailand, they always talked to and consulted their Thai 
counterpart. Therefore, it was quite difficult to naildown who 
really originated the idea. Probably, the World Bank and the 
Thai government contributed evenly.
N Most of the SAL measures were ongoing programs. However, the
new outcome that was generated from SALs was the macroeconomic 
management technique of the Thai government which involved a co-
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"Were the SAL Measures New or Had Been Tried in Previous Years?"
Interviewee Response
ordination of various government agencies. The most important 
impact is to raise consciousness of economic-decision making 
among Thai officials. This macroeconomic management technique 
required, from various government agencies, a similar target, a 
similar methodology, and a check and balance system. 
Furthermore, it also opened the working of the government 
policies to academics. Their contributions mainly came from 
studies and discussions in seminars and conferences.
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Interviewees’ Responses to the Question,
"Would the SAL Measures Have Been Implemented Without SALs?"
Interviewees Response
A The SAL measures would have been implemented if without SALs.
However, the measures would have been piecemeal, not systematic 
or organized. Furthermore, the coverage of measures would have 
been less because, if without SALs, Thailand would not have 
international commitments to introduce sensible but unpopular 
measures.
B Some SAL measures would not have been implemented if without
SALs because those measures might lower government revenue in
the short run and, therefore, worsen the government deficit, 
situation. The SALs removed this constraint as the loans 
provided liquidity during the revenue short fall in the short 
run. However, some may argue that, if Thailand at that time 
needed liquidity, it could borrow from the international credit 
market. Two disadvantages of doing so are (1) the interest rate 
charged by the international credit market was higher than that 
charged by the World Bank and (2) more importantly, the 
international credit market required no conditions or measures 
that benefited the Thai Economy. Moreover, the success in SAL
implementation later on became an evidence of prudently
responsible government and, therefore, raised Thailand’s 
creditability in the international credit market once additional 
loans were needed.
C Even without SALs, Thailand would have implemented similar
measures anyway. However SALs helped speed the process of 
designing programs and measures, the process of coordination and 
the process of monitoring implementation of measures.
There is a point regarding the counterpart funds of SALs. As 
few SAL measures really require additional funding besides 
government budget, a majority of counterpart funds were used to 
finance state enterprises. Therefore, there was less pressure 
on those state enterprises to raise their product or service 
prices.
D Thailand had set up various projects or measures to cope with
internal and external imbalances. However, if without SALs, it 
might not have sufficient government budget to finance all 
measures. SALs helped finance many measures and reorder the 
priority of the measures. For example, the tax policy reform 
and the establishment of district tax offices in Bangkok became 
the first priority measure in SALs. Furthermore, SALs helped, 
keep the implementation of measures as planned.
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Interviewers’ Responses to the Question,
"What Contribution did the World Bank Make to the Structural Adjustment
in Thailand?"
Interviewer Response
A Many contributions: (1) the lending money; (2) the World Bank
team included staff with high caliber and experience, which 
reduced transaction costs in negotiating the SAL terms; (3) the 
World Bank involvement was an international commitment among 
Thai politicians, which helped implement sensible but unpopular 
measures; (4) the World Bank involvement also helped raise 
cooperation among Thai government officials; (5) the World Bank 
helped design approximately one half of the measures; and (6) 
the World Bank provided some technical assistances.
B Couple contributions: (1) the loans boosted Thailand’s
international reserves when the reserves were substantially low; 
(2) with the World Bank involvement, Thai government officials 
gave more weights to the SAL measures; (3) the World Bank 
lobbied for and reminded of the measures to implement, which 
helped speed the implementation; and (4) technical assistances 
provided by the World Bank have long been beneficial to Thailand 
especially those on macroeconomic analysis and on suggesting 
various measures since the drafting of the Forth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan.
C First, the loans were used to raise international reserves.
Second, the Ministry of Finance and the National Economic and 
Social Development Board whose aim was to make structural 
adjustment used the SALs to commit other governmental agencies 
to adopt the structural adjustment measures. Third, the World 
Bank heLped design the measures although more than one half of 
the measures were designed by the Thai authority. Forth, the 
World Bank indirectly helped the Thai government to set the 
priority of measures. Finally, the World Bank helped point out 
which government agencies should be responsible for each measure 
and which structure should be changed. In fact, the Energy 
Conservation Center was an original idea of the World Bank.
D The World Bank played many roles. First, the loans were used to
raise international reserves. Second, the World Bank helped 
adjust some measures so that they were more practical. For 
example, Thailand initially set the target of government revenue 
to GDP ratio at 18% but, later on, the World Bank helped adjust 
the target down to 16%. Third, the loan proceeds created a 
commitment among Thai policymakers. This commitment helped 
speed the decision process. Finally, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund urged the Thai government to adopt 
fiscal discipline that focussed on a realistic forecast on 
government revenue, a control on expenditure and a reduction in 
government deficits.
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"What Contribution did the World Bank Make to the Structural Adjustment
in Thailand?"
Interviewer Response
E The loans were used to supplement both international reserves
and government budget. They also helped finance many projects. 
Furthermore, the Thai technocrats, especially those in the 
Ministry of Finance, National Economic and Social Development 
Board, Bank of Thailand and the Budget Bureau, used SALs to 
indirectly influence Thai policymakers. This indirect influence 
started with the Thai side laying down ground work of the 
measures. Then, they worked closely with the World Bank staff 
to arrive at the consensus. The World Bank staff, then, 
submitted the case to the World Bank executives which, in 
return, had influence on policymakers in Thailand. Without 
SALs, the Thai technocrats would have found it more difficult to 
influence Thai policymakers.
F The loans were used to supplement government budget. Many
projects would not have been supplemented if without SALs. Most 
of the counterpart funds were spent on studies and hiring 
consultants.
G The loans were used to supplement government budget and
international reserves. The counterpart funds were spent on 
studies and financing state enterprises.
L The World Bank gave a general guideline but the Thai government
worked out details. The loans were used to supplement 
government budget and international reserves. Part of the 
counterpart fund were used to finance state enterprises.
M Many contributions: (1) providing loans, (2) speeding the
implementation of the SAL measures, (3) sharpening the SAL 
measures such as the energy policy and educating the Thai 
technocrats, (4) directly discussing with Thai policymakers 
about the structural adjustment and their implementation, and 
(5) SALs were used to supplement international reserves and 
government budget.
N The loans were used to supplement international reserves. The
World Bank’s contribution was approximately 50-60% of the inputs 
especially studies. Although the Thai officials did not have 
time to conduct studies, they also helped to formulate measures 
as the World Bank staff when doing research collated information 
and then discussed with Thai officials. Therefore, it is not so 
surprising that many measures were originated by Thai officials. 
In return, Thai officials used the World Bank’s studies to
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"What Contribution did the World Bank Make to the Structural Adjustment
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Interviewer Response
support their arguments when proposing structural adjustment 
measures to policymakers.
The World Bank involvement in Thailand perceived by some as a 
surrender of sovereignty of the nation to the World Bank.
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Interviewees’ Response to the Question,
"What Political and Economic Factors Affected the Implementation Decision?"
Interviewee Response
A All SAL measures were implemented. The main reason is that
Thailand really had a strong intention and commitment towards 
structural adjustment as shown by the fact that Thailand had 
launched many measures even before signing the first SAL 
agreement with the World Bank. Those measures launched 
accounted for more than one half of the SAL measures mentioned 
in the first Letter of Development Policy. This action raised 
the probability that Thailand would comply with the World Bank’s 
conditions and eased the negotiation process. As a result; 
Thailand was the only country, among those countries receiving 
SALs, that tranching of the loans was not imposed.
Structural adjustment tasks can be classified into two types. 
First, those that Thailand had sufficient information and 
understanding and, second, those that Thailand did not have. 
Thailand designed its own measures for the first type of tasks 
and implemented them immediately with success. Examples of 
these tasks are a restructuring of customs tariff system that 
narrowed down tariff rates across commodities and the land 
certification or "S.T.K." The Ministry of Finance took a 
leading role in implementing the first type of tasks. In 
contrast, Thailand started with research studies for the second 
type of tasks it had incomplete information and understanding. 
Unfortunately, the Ministry of Finance did not have time to 
follow up/monitor the studies; therefore, results of the studies 
were either incomplete or unsuited for the new economic 
environment. Examples of studies are those on energy policy and 
some tax issues.
Another factor contributing to the success of SAL implementation 
is an international commitment made among Thai politicians.
Although SAL I could be considered a success story, SAL II was 
less successful. Under SAL I, many studies were conducted but, 
under SAL II, recommendations in those studies should have been 
implemented. However, they were not because (1) as mentioned 
above, results or findings from the studies under SAL I were 
either incomplete due to lack of monitoring on the Thai side or 
inappropriate as the world and Thai economies had changed and
(2), more importantly, there was no leading organization on the 
Thai side to take roles in reviewing and monitoring SAL measures 
under SAL II especially when economic environments had changed.
%
B SAL I measures whose majority being studies were successful.
But SAL II measures whose majority being actions slipped 
because of political and economic reasons. For example, the
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measure of raising petroleum product prices, bus fares, 
electricity rates and water supply user charges to reflect real 
cost of resources was a good measure. However, it was 
politically unpopular among political party members as the 
measure was generally opposed by the public.
Other examples of successful and slipped measures when 
implemented are
(1) Success story: The Thai government could reduce export 
duty on rice and rubber and eliminate export duty on maize 
although the measure created the shortfall in government 
revenue and although Thailand still experienced a 
relatively slow growth because the SALs supplemented 
international reserves and provided liquidity to the 
government budget.
(2) Slippage story: a measure to narrow down import tariff 
rates across commodities slipped because of changes in 
economic environment. In 1982, the Thai economy 
experienced a relatively slow growth, which created a 
government revenue shortfall. This shortfall surprised the 
Thai government which responded by temporarily imposing 
surcharges on imports. However, this reverse policy was 
acceptable by the World Bank.
(3) Slippage story: another slippage story because of changes 
in economic environment is the SAL measure of setting the 
target of central government revenue to GDP ratio at 18% 
under SAL I. The fact that other tax system adjustment 
tended to reduce government revenue and the Thai economy 
experienced a relatively slow growth in 1982 had altered 
the target of revenue to GDP ratio down to 16% under 
SAL II. Actually up to 1986, the target was never been 
reached.
(4) Success story: the SAL measure of setting a ceiling of 
external public borrowing was successful in implementation 
because the Thai government realistically set the ceiling 
by taking into consideration the ongoing projects of the 
government that needed funding. Initially, the ceiling was 
set above US$1,000 million because there were many ongoing 
projects. However, when some projects were completed and 
new projects were not initiated. The ceiling could be 
lowered to US$1,000 million.
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(5) Slippage story: losses in some state enterprises required
some forms of financing from the central government, which 
worsened the budget deficit. The SAL measure of raising 
service or product charges of those state enterprises was 
one solution to solve their losses. However, the 
implementation of this measure slipped because doing so 
might trigger public unrest and, consequently, instabilize 
the government. Interestingly, part of SAL money was used 
to help finance losses of some state enterprises.
C The fact that SAL measures in Thailand were generally considered
as a success story came from two factors: (1) the screening of
planning agencies, the Ministry of Finance and the National 
Economic and Social Development Board and (2) many SAL measures 
were initiated by the Thai government officials. The former 
factor, screening of the planning agencies during the 
negotiation with the World Bank mission, resulted in SAL 
measures that, from the Thai view, had a high probability of 
getting through the cabinet approval. The latter factor, 
measures initiated by the Thai officials, resulted in flexible 
measures very few of which had to be changed because of changing 
political and economic environments.
Details of some SAL measures are as follows:
(1) Up to now, the study on fertilizer marketing system has not 
been completed.
(2) New pricing of state enterprises’ services (electricity, 
water supply and bus) was not successful in implementation 
during 1982-1984 but was recently successful because a 
recovery of the Thai economy in recent years has raised the 
purchasing power of the public so that they can afford 
higher prices of utilities.
(3) An establishment of the Energy Conservation Center, whose 
purpose is to suggest alternatives to conserving energy and 
reducing oil import bills, was a successful measure. 
However, when the world energy situation has changed as the 
world oil price has declined, the need to conserve energy 
is less important and, therefore, the Center was not fully 
supported as it used to be.
(4) Thailand had adjusted its pricing on petroleum products but 
the adjustment was not along the line of what the World 
Bank would like to see. The Thai government’s policy on
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the pricing of petroleum products was to subsidize the low 
income class but the World Bank ’ s view was to move toward 
commercial pricing. Although the Thai government agreed 
with the World Bank in principle that pricing of petroleum 
products in the long run should not be subsidized. 
However, in the short run, as the low income people were 
subsidized in the past, a drastic change in the pricing 
might result in an adverse effect on inflation and costs of 
production which, in turn, might make Thailand less 
competitive in the world market.
(5) One of the SAL measures was to set up a government 
organization overlooking the pricing policy of petroleum 
products. This measure was fully supported by the Thai 
government. Eventually, the Thai government has set up 
"The National Energy Policy Office" in the office of the 
Prime Minister although the set up was after the period of 
SAL II.
D Details on implementation:
(1) The Export Development Fund was established by imposing 
0.5% surcharge on imports. The total amount of fund turned 
out to be 300 million baht. This amount was used to 
promote exports. The Export Development Fund was not so 
successful in promoting exports because the fund amount was 
limited.
(2) The Export Development Committee was not successful because 
it lacked authority over other implementing agencies. 
Later on, there was a structural adjustment which mainly 
replaced the Minister of Commerce by the Prime Minister as 
the Chairman of the Committee.
(3) Bonded warehouse was successful because it resolved the 
delay of tax rebate to exporters.
(4) There was a delay in the implementation of the Export 
Credit Guarantee because initially there were arguments 
over forms of organization. Later on, when it was decided 
to form as the Export Credit Guarantee Fund, participants 
argued over the activities that the Fund should promote.
(5) External debt management was successful as the Thai 
government reduced the debt ceiling and government 
expenditures.
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(6) The protection of domestic producers had been reduced. The 
rate of protection across industries has been lowered 
since 1982. Even the protection on products receiving the 
Board of Investment promotion has also been reduced. For 
example, the number of imported items that the Board of 
Investment imposed surcharges has been reduced from 30-40 
items per year to less than 10 items per year. The 
protection rates for the protected items have been frozen 
or reduced. For example, the rates on chemical and plastic 
products have been frozen at 40% in spite of a lobby for 
the rate of more than 40%. Another example is textile 
whose protection rate has been reduced from over 40% to now 
almost zero percent.
(7) Two or three years ago, automobile imports were generally 
banned but now imports are allowed. However, imported 
automobiles are taxed. The purpose of taxing imported 
automobiles is not to protect domestic producers but to 
keep the trade deficit from worsening.
(8) Since 1982, there has been an attempt to eliminate tax 
burden on exporters by giving tax rebate on raw materials 
or intermediate products used in the production. In the 
past, the rebate was based on some fixed formula that did 
not reflect actual uses but now, it is based on the 
physical coefficient which is more realistic. The 
industries that use this new rebate method are automobile 
and most of canned food.
G The effectiveness or accomplishment of SAL implementation is
approximately 60% of the proposed measures.
I In case of reducing protection on import substitution products,
it is naturally that adversely affected producers have a 
tendency to put pressure on the government so that the measure 
can be reversed. However, the SAL measure of reducing 
protection on import substitution product was eventually 
implemented. Its success depends on various factors. First, 
the Thai government always consulted private sector such the 
Thai Industries Association (now, the Federation of Thai 
Industries) before implementing the measure. Second, the 
domestic producers also benefited from the export promotion 
policy as they switched from import-substitution products to 
exporting products. Finally, many used-to-be import 
substitution industries now become exporting industries for 
Thailand, for example, textile and garment, footwear, furniture,
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iron structure such as pipe, bicycle, electrical appliances, and 
carpet.
M Examples of success and slippage stories:
(1) The implementation of raising the energy pricing and 
service charge of state enterprises was slow mainly because 
doing so was usually objected by the public.
(2) Reductions of export taxes and other structural adjustments 
for export promotion were slow in implementation in 1982 
since the world economy was in recession which, in turn, 
reduced the government revenue. Reductions of export taxes 
and other adjustments might worsen the government budget
further. Therefore, the government slowed down the
implementation.
N Political conflicts are common when there is a structural
change. There were couple political battles with respect to 
implementing SAL measures:
(1) The industrial policy that dropped import substitution 
policy and promoted export industry involved changes in tax 
policy, subsidy policy, financial assistance, import quota 
and the Board of Investment’s investment incentives. These 
changes of course were objected by import substitution 
industrialists. However, the Thai government insisted on 
export and gave various incentives to export such as 
reducing export taxes and impediments to exports. Many 
industries had moved from import substitution industries to 
exporting industries. However, in some industries such as 
automobile, the battle continues.
(2) Agriculture has been a major sector of Thailand. The 
majority of population depend on agriculture and they are 
relatively poor, therefore, when one considers the 
agricultural sector, he/she always takes into consideration 
the equity or distribution of income and, consequently, 
supports the policy of farm price supporting program and 
ignores the market force or market mechanism. The SAL 
measures in the agricultural sector aimed to change the 
traditional farm price supporting program. As Thailand has 
been the country of rice monoculture, the SAL measures 
tried to change from the rice monoculture to cash cropping 
and tried to diversify the crops from few major farm 
products to various fruits and vegetables. The objection
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of these new SAL measures, of course, came from the 
farmers. However, the Thai government, like the policy for 
industry, insisted on export and also reduced export taxes 
and premium on those major farm products to promote exports 
and to allow the market mechanism to change the structure 
of the agricultural sector. However, this battle is still 
ongoing.
(3) There has been a perception among politicians and 
newspapers that prices of petroleum products should be kept 
low and it is the role of the government to subsidize those 
products. As a result, raising petroleum product prices 
has been a political issue and, in the past, many Thai 
governments had to resign from the post after raising 
petroleum product prices. Up to now, this battle does not 
end. However, the Thai officials has tried to depoliticize 
the issue by imposing the maximum tax rates on petroleum 
products and then trying to rationalize the pricing.
(4) It is generally perceived that services of state 
enterprises are public goods and, therefore, the service 
price should be kept low. In case of losses, the 
government should subsidize those state enterprises. The 
SAL measures with respect to state enterprises did just the 
opposite. That is, the measures asked for an increase in 
the service charge (and an improvement in management) of 
state enterprises so that the central government could 
eventually terminate its subsidy. This, of course, reduced 
government expenditures and deficits. At that time, the 
state enterprises also agreed on the measures. However, 
resistance came from the public. As a result, the increase 
in service charge of many state enterprises has been slow.
(5) The next battle was to improve the tax system. It has two 
problems. First, at the policy level, both politicians and 
businessmen did not favor tax increase. Second, tax 
collectors resisted to change their routine work and learnt 
to work under the new system. One solution was to change 
the philosophy of tax collectors and taxpayers. This 
battle, however, continues.
It can be seen that many SAL measures affected more or less 
everyone and the difficult task of Thai officials was to sell 
their cases to the cabinet. The way they did was to use 
findings in the studies under SALs to support their cases. 
Furthermore, the SAL proceeds under the counterpart funds also
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Table D. 
Table D.2 
Table D.3 
Table D.4
PETROLEUM PRODUCT PRICES AND UTILITY CHARGES
1 Retail Prices of Premium Gasoline and High-speed
Diesel, 1971-1988
Monthly Electric Rate, Effective 1 August 1977 - 1 June 
1987
Monthly User Charge Rate for Water Supply in Bangkok 
Metropolitan Area, Effective 1 July 1972 - January 1988
Bus Fare in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Effective 1976 - 
15 February 1985
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Retail Prices of Premium Gasoline and High-speed Diesel
1971 - 1988
Table D.l
(Baht/Litre)
Effective
Date
Premium
Gasoline
(1)
High-speed
Diesel
(2)
Ratio 
(3)=(1)/(2)
1 Apr 71 2.10 0.98 2.14
4 Jul 73 2.30 1.05 2.19
14 Nov 73 2.69 1.41 1.91
17 Dec 73 3.01 1.60 1.88
27 Feb 74 3.62 2.33 1.55
15 Mar 77 4.22 2.64 1.60
9 Mar 78 4.98 2.64 1.89
31 Jan 79 5.60 3.03 1.85
14 Jul 79 7.84 4.88 1.61
10 Feb 80 9.80 7.39 1.33
19 Mar 80 9.80 6.54 1.50
21 Jan 81 11.90 7.39 1.61
2 Dec 81 13.45 7.39 1.82
29 Mar 83 12.60 6.99 1.80
1 Dec 83 11.70 6.70 1.75
21 Feb 86 10.20 6.70 1.52
29 Anr 86 9.50 6.50 1.46
1 Jul 86 8.90 6.30 1.41
25 Nov 88 8.45 6.10 1.39
Note: Data are from the Energy, Infrastructure and Urban
Development Program, Thailand Development Research Institute.
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Table D.3
Monthly User Charge Rate for Water Supply in Bangkok Metropolitan Area 
Effective 1 July 1972 - January 1988 
(baht per cubic meter unless specified otherwise)
Monthly use 
in cubic aeter
Bffective Date
July 1972115 Acr 1981111 Sent 1984111 Oct 1981-11 Oct 1985 11 Adt 1986
111 Sent 19851 1
11 Oct 1986 20 Jan 1987 Jan 1988
Residential
0 - 6  
6 -12  
12-20  
20-25 
25-30 
30-40 
40-50 
50-60 
60-70 
70-80 
80-90 
90-100 
100-120 
120-160 
160-200 
200 up
Industrial
0-6
6-10
10-12
1 2 -2 0
20-25
25-30
30-40
40-50
50-60
60-80
80-100
100-120
1 20 -1 6 0
1 60 -2 0 0
0.50
1.00
1.50
r 2.00
2.50
0.50
1.00
1.50
y 2 . 1
I Luo Sub 
| 20 baht
1.50
] Lua Sua 
50 baht
t 3.25
] Uui Sua 
j  50 baht
3
i  Lua Sub 
J  50 baht
3.25
3.50
3.75
4.00
4.25
4.50
4.75
5.00
5.25
+0,25 baht 
Der annth*
1 Lua Sua 
j  50 baht
6.25
6.50
6.75
7.00
7.25
7.50
7.75
8.00
8.25
8.50
-j
4.05 4.00 ! 4.05 4.00
y  1.50 with a with a ‘.with a with a
{ -4.10 ' lu a  sue lui! SUE tlue SUB l u a  sue
t  1.50 ainiiua of ainiauE of :aimsuii of rainiaua of
/ * y 20 'baht y 20 baht >!20 b a h t 20 baht
1.75 4.35 4.30 4.25 ! 4.30 4.25
2.00 .+0.20 baht 4.60 4.55 4.50 ! 4.55 4.50
L • Lu per aonthJ 4.85 4.80 4.75 1 4.80 4.75
2.50 5.10 5.05 5.00 ! 5.05 5.00
2.75 5.35 5.30 5.25 5.30 5.25
3.00 6.25 6.20 6,15 ! 6.20 6.15
3.25 6.50 6.45 6.40 6.45 6.40
3.50 6.75 6.70 6.65 I 6.70 6.65
3.75 7.00 6.95 6.90 I 6.95 6.90
4.00 7.25 7.20 7.15 ! 7.20 7.15
4.50 y 7.75 7.70 7.65 ! 7.70 7.85
Lua Suit 
J"50 baht 
6.20
5.45
6.70
6.95
7.20
7.45
7.70
7.95
8.20
8.45
] Lua Sue 
J 50 baht 
.15
6.40
5.65
6.90
7.15
7.40
7.65
7.90
6.15
8.40
Lua Sub 
50 baht 
6.20
6.45
6.70
6.95
7.20
7.45
7.70
7.95
8 . 2 0
8.45
Lua Sua 
50 baht 
6.20
5.45
6.70
6.95
7.20
7.45
7.70
7.95
8.20
8.45
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Table D.4
Bus Fare in Bangkok Metropolitan Area 
Effective 1976-15 February 1985
(baht/trip)
Effective
Date
Zone Rate
Inner Zone Outer Zone Between Inner and Outer Zones
1976 0.75 0.75 1.25
1 Apr 1978 1.00 1.00 1.50
Moving Rate
0-10 Km Next 10 Km Maximum rate
1 Aug 1980 1.00 1.00 2.00
1 Mar 1981 2.00 1.00 3.00
20 Mar 1981 1.50 1.00 4.50
6 Nov 1982 2.00 1.00 no maximum
25 Nov 1982 1.50 1.00 no maximum
Flat Rate
15 Feb 1985 2.00*
Notes: * Besides the flat rate of 2 baht/trip for the ordinary bus, there
are other bus fares for special typed bus such as the rate for 
the express bus is 3 baht/trip and that for air-conditioned bus 
starts from 5 baht/trip to a maximum of 15 baht/trip.
Data are from the Bangkok Mass transit Organization.
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Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
APPENDIX E 
DATA USED IN REGRESSIONS
Table E.l 
Data Used in Regressions
GDP Terms of Exchange Average
(Millions of Trade Rate Tax Rate
Baht) (1975=100) (Baht/S) (%)
155694.0 114.35
163420.0 87.22
170076.0 96.25
186845.0 133.62
194979.0 112.46
204428.0 100.00
223594.0 92.22
245727.0 86.80
271378.0 87.50
285797.0 88.37
299472.0 84.85
318439.0 70.06
331380.0 63.50
355408.0 68.24
380738.0 66.63
394113.0 62.91
412609.0 69.66
441893.0 74.84
20.928 12.49
20.928 12.46
20.928 12.38
20.652 12.04
20.375 13.59
20.379 12.94
20.40 12.54
20.40 13.62
20.336 13.61
20.419 14.43
20.476 15.05
21.82 14.71
23.00 14.53
23.00 15.72
23.639 15.61
27.159 15.48
26.299 15.37
25.72 16.20
E( 1 )
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Table E.1 (Continued)
Government Thailand Import Export World
Purchase WPI Value Value WPI
(Millions of (1980=100) (Millions of (Millions of (1980=100) 
Baht) Baht) Baht)
28395 35.00 28569 22140 34.00
28935 35.10 28859 24527 35.40
29987 37.90 32632 30940 37.30
29463 46.50 44523 41317 42.50
26460 60.00 66884 60277 52.20
32072 62.20 69683 55695 57.00
40754 64.60 78673 70115 62.70
46024 69.70 102399 80532 68.80
53306 74.90 117721 97082 74.10
58769 83.30 163740 126150 85.00
63594 100.00 201180 159736 100.00
70546 109.50 229029 181325 113.00
69988 110.50 207282 192870 124.90
76182 112.80 251184 185222 138.90
82806 109.30 258557 216411 158.00
88699 109.20 274073 245251 176.40
85230 108.85 267148 290169 183.40
86503 115.30 354020 355118 189.80
E ( 2 )
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1 9 8 7
Table E.1 (Cont inued)
Import
Unit
Value
Export
Unit
Value
Import 
Tariff 
Rate (%)
Export 
Tariff 
Rate (%
24.68 33.43 20.01 5.74
29.76 30.04 19.73 2.40
29.62 33.35 18.17 1.81
32.72 50.06 16.37 3.23
53.68 69.86 13.06 10.04
56.95 65.91 12.76 3.19
60.06 64.10 13.03 2.24
64.59 65.52 13.23 2.37
69.65 70.80 13.48 2.34
80.53 84.60 11.83 2.79
100.00 100.00 10.32 2.54
118.15 103.00 10.10 1.84
121.12 95.71 10.27 1.12
114.35 97.09 11.84 1.79
116.02 96.20 12.11 1.06
126.21 98.81 12.24 0.56
118.80 102.90 12.89 0.35
126.60 108.00 11.96 0.26
E ( 3 )
Table E.1 (Continued)
Year World GDP (1980=100) Money Supply
1970 70.70 19447.50
1971 73.50 21445.70
1972 77.40 24830.90
1973 81.70 29936.50
1974 82.90 33207.90
1975 83.20 34982.50
1976 87.60 41572.30
1977 91.50 45651.80
1978 95.20 54677.70
1979 98.50 63548.60
1980 100.00 71594.80
;981 101.80 73922.50
1982 101.70 79946.10
1983 103.91 83724.10
1984 108.20 93340.00
1985 111.20 90094.40
1986 114.68 103426.8
1987 117.65 132395.7
Note : Data on terms of trade, exchange rate, import unit value, 
export unit value, and money supply are from Bank of 
Thailand, Monthly Bulletin, various issues. Data on 
Thailand WPI, world WPI, and world GDP are from IMF, 
International Financial Statistics, various issues. The 
rest of the data are from or constructed from National 
Economic and Social Development Board, National Income of 
Thailand, New Series 1970-1987. An average tax rate is 
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP at current prices. An 
import tariff rate is the ratio of import tax revenue to 
import values. An export tariff rate is the ratio of 
export tax revenue to export values.
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APPENDIX F
ABOUT NESDB AND BOI
The purpose of this appendix is to give a summary of the 
functions of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB) and the Board of Investment (BOI).
A publication of the Official Listings Thailand 1986 gives a good 
summary of the development, functions and responsibilities, structure 
and a list of senior officers at the NESDB. A copy of the summary is 
attached. However, the publication lists only senior officers of the 
BOI whose copy is also attached.
Additional information about the functions of the BOI came from a 
brochure of the Board of Investment entitled, "Thailand: The Climate
and Incentives for Investors."
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T he B oard  of Investm ent (BOI) is the govern m en t ag en cy  
responsible for the implementation of Thailand’s investm ent 
promotion policy. T he Board possesses broad discretionary  
pow ers, the m ost im portant of which is the granting of p ro­
moted status to a com pany. Both foreign and Thai investors 
are eligible to receive promotion benefits.
The 19 7 7  Investment Promotion Act is the legislative founda­
tion for the BO I’s current pow ers. It provides g u aran tees, 
tax exemptions, income tax relief and, if necessary, temporary 
tariff protection for com panies undertaking activities which  
the BOI d esign ates as eligible for p rom otion . A dditional 
incentives are prescribed for exp ort-orien ted  projects and  
those located in the country’s several industrial estates..
Projects con cern ed  with the agricultural, livestock, fisheries, 
mining m anufacturing and service sectors are eligible for 
investment incentives. However, under the BOI’s Guidelines 
for the Granting of Investment Promotion and for Providing 
T ax Privileges, the project characteristics which will a ttract  
the most generous incentive packages are :
— those p rojects which will generate a substantial 
increase in employment.
— those projects which are located outside Bangkok,
— those projects which have energy conservation or 
substitution for imported fuel as one element,
— those projects which are capable of producing foreign 
exchange earnings or savings, and
— th ose  p ro je c ts  which are co m p lim en tary  to the  
developm ent of basic industries.
These guidelines were developed to harmonize with Thailand’ s 
national d evelop m en t plans and to help investors identify 
. the most profitable investment opportunities, those in which 
Thailand offers an internationally competitive resource base.
In addition to its wide range of flexible investment incentives, 
the Board of Investment offers a large number of other services 
designed to help the foreign investor. T h ese services are  
available from the BO l’s headquarters in Bangkok and through 
fou r overseas offices located in Frankfurt, New York, Sydney  
and Tokyo.
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Office of the Prime Minister
Sub. Lt. Bamrer Tharraketta 
Tel. 282-3615 
Mrs. S u tth irar Chavasit 
Tel. 282-3602 
Sunand Nualchandrkul 
Tel. 282-3619 
Kasem Unahasuvan 
Tel. 282-3613 
Ushane Pheunthongkham 
Tel. 282-3610 
Suwan Darawongse 
Tel. 282-3600 
Itth i Sawankhathat 
Tel. 282-2695 
Mrs. Surat Chansue 
Tel. 282-3618 
Ar-rai Innt-havanich 
Tel. 282-3614 
Lt. Sopon Suwanruji 
Tel. 282-3617 
Bamroeng Srisomboon 
Tel. 282-4838 
Kamol Sandhikshetrin 
Tel. 282-3616
D irector, General A ffa irs  D ivision:
Charoon Pheungsap 
TEI. 281-1149 
D irector, Personnel D ivision:
Pirom Simasathian 
Tel. 281-0512 
D irector, Finance Division:
Mrs. Puanakasw Muanosiri 
Tel. 281-1129
D irector, Planning & Technical D iv is ion: 
Anothai Sinakalvanich 
Tel. 281-5322
D irector, Inspection & Investigation 
Division:
Mrs. Panit N ititanprapas 
Tel..282-3611 
D irec to i, Assessment & Research D iv is ion : 
Wattana Kanchana-akradej 
Tel. 281-1432
Chief, Central Assistance O ffice fo r 
Farmers and the Poor:
Mrs. Boonserm Prayongyam 
Tel. 281-0044
OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF 
IN V ES TM E N T
16th- 17th Floor, Thai Farmers Bank Bldg., 
400 Phaholyothin Road, Banakok 10400 
Tel. 270-1400, 270-1410, 270-1420 
Cable: INVEST Bangkok
Senior Officers
Secretary General:
Decha Boonchoochuay
Tel. 270-0660
Deputy Secretcries-General:
Chira Panupong 
Tel. 270-0659 
Stapom Kavitanon 
Tel. 270-0650 
Asst. Secretaries-General:
Miss Vanee Lertdum rikarn 
Chackchai Panichapat 
Secretary, O ffice of the Secretary':
Mrs. Premsri Katewongse 
Tel. 270-0651
D irector, Project Contro l D ivision:
Wicharn Kwanchandr 
Tel. 270-0652
D irector, Inform ation & Prom otion 
Services Division:
(Vacant)
Tel. 270-0653
Director, Planning Division:
Mrs. Prani Yasasindhu 
Tel. 2700654
D irector, Project Development D ivision: 
(Vacant)
Tel. 270-0655
Director, Project Analyses D ivision: 
Pongsak Anasupan 
Tel. 2700656
Director, Incentives Supervision D ivision: 
Dr. Pornchai Tulyathan 
Tel. 270-0657
Director, Investment Services Center: 
Chackrabhand Yasasindhu 
Tel. 270-0658 
F rankfu rt
Capt. Sompote Sudbanthad 
Economic Counsellor (Investment)
O ffice o f the Economic Counsellor 
(Investment)
Thai Trade and Investment Center
Bethmann Strasse 58
6000 Frankfurt Am M ain
Federal Republic of Germany
Tel. (0 6 9 )2 8 1 0 9 1 -2
Cable: THAICENTER F R A N K F U R T
Telex: 4189399 TTIC  D
New York
Mr. Sart Sirisinha
Economic C ounsellor (Investm ent) 
O ffice o f the Econom ic Counsellor 
(Investment)
Five W orld Trade Center, Suite 3443
New Y ork. N .Y. 10048
U.S./A
Tel. (718) 4 6 6 1 7 4 5 -6  
Cable: T H A IB O I NEW Y O R K  
Telex: 645690 T H A IC O M  N Y K
Sydney
Mr. Boonkul Changsirivathanatham rong 
Economic Counsellor (Investm ent) 
O ffice o f the Econom ic Counsellor 
(Investment)
Thailand Board o f Investment
12th F ioor, Royal Exchange Bu iid ing
56 P itt Street, Sydney N.S.W. 2000
Australia
Tel. 2 7 8 9 0 5 -6
Cable: T H A IB O I S Y D N E Y
Telex: T H A IT C  A A  23467
Tokyo
Mr. Somphong Wanaoha 
Econom ic C ounsellor (Investm ent) 
O ffice of the Econom ic Counsellor 
(Investment)
3rd  Flexor, Akasaka B righ ton  B u ild ing  
1-5-2 Akasaka, M inato -ku  
T o kyo  107 
Jaoan
Tel. (03) 5821806, 5820976 
Cable: T H A IB O I T O K Y O
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Office of the Prime Minister
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL  
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT BOARD
962 Krung Kasem Road. Banakok 10100 
Tel. 281-1233. 281-3525. 28K 3148 
2 8 2 -3 8 6 1 -9
NESDB, Past and Present
Early attem pts at development planning in 
Thailand started in 1950 when the National 
Economic Council (NEC) was established to  
unoertaKe econom ic studies and to advise 
the Thai Government on general financial and 
economic matters. This council consisted of 
no t more than 20 members according to  the 
cabinet's recom m endation and chaired by the 
Prime M inister. The Council divided w o rk  in­
to  5 sectors: agriculture, finance, commerce, 
industry and com m unication. The NEC was 
responsible in appointing members fo r each 
sector under the responsib ility of the Secre­
ta ry General.
To correct tne shortcomings resulting from  
lack of clear ana comprehensive national ob­
jectives. the W orld Bank was requested bv 
tne Government to  send a mission to Tha i­
land. The mission arriveo in 1957 to  study 
the econom ic s itua tion  of the country' and 
to  provide recommendations in the establish­
ment of national economic planning system. 
The Bank recommended the setting up of a 
central planning agency to  make a c o n tin u ­
ing study of the nation's economy and draw 
up plans fo r its development.
The Foundation of the NESDB
Follow ing the W orld Bank's recommenda­
tio n  the National Economic Development 
Board (NEDB) was established in 1959, the 
name was changed to  National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB) to 
emphasize the im portance of social develop­
m ent in the development process. The NESDB 
is essentially a central planning agency w hich 
undertakes a con tinu ing  study of the K ing­
dom 's economy and draw up plans fo r its 
development. Since its inception, the NESDB 
has already completed 5 Development Plans.
Functions and Responsibilities
According to  the National Economic Deve­
lopm ent Act of 1959, revised in 1960, the 
main responsibilities o f NESDB are as fo l­
low's :
— Analyzing and studying economic situa­
tio n  fo r presentation to  the National Deve­
lopment Board and fo r recommending eco­
nomic development and stab iliza tion p o li­
cies.
Appraising and coord inating the econom ic
development projects o f government agen­
cies and pub lic  enterprises and setting the 
overall econom ic development policy 
according to  the existing national resour­
ces and priorities.
— Studying the financial ava ilab ility  and re­
source po ten tia l in order to recommend 
to  the National Development Board.
— Coord inating w ith  other government agen­
cies and pub lic  enterprises in the prepa­
ra tion  o f developm ent programs and pro­
jects fo r the annual development budget, 
foreign loans and other sources o f finance.
— Investigating requested expenses fo r the 
maintenance o f fixed assets which are 
used in developm ent and recommending 
adjustments if necessary.
— Considering and coord inating requests fo r 
foreign grants and loans of government 
agencies and pub lic  enterprises ana recom­
mending add itiona l assistance if necessary.
— Evaluating and m on ito ring  the implemen­
ta tion  of econom ic and social develop­
ment projects o f government agencies and 
pub lic enterprises.
— Recommending suitable economic deve­
lopm ent strategies to  the National Deve­
lopm ent Board.
— A ny  other activities which are specified 
by the National Economic Development 
Council Act or the National Economic and 
Social Develooment Board Act.
The Structure of NESDB
The structure of NESDB is as fo llow s :
1. National Econom ic and Social Develop­
ment C om m ittee: This Com mittee chair­
ed by the senior and outstanding econo­
mist and comprises the governor o f the 
Bank o f Thailand, secretary general of Ci­
v il Service Commission, d irecto r of the 
Budget Bureau, d irec to r o f Economic Fi­
nance Bureau, secretary general o f NESDB 
and not more than 9 members appointed 
by the cabinet. National Economic and 
Social Development Com m ittee has autho­
r ity  to  supervise the w ork of the NESDB 
and recommending suitable economic and 
social development strategies to the cabi­
net. This com m ittee  also has the responsi­
b il ity  of screening and deliberating on the 
various plans, programs, projects and po li­
cies subm ined by the NESDB o ffice  and 
make recommendations to  the cabinet.
2. The O ffice  o f Nattonal Economic and So­
cial Development Board : The Secretary 
General is the head o f the o ffice  o f Na­
tiona l Economic and Social Development 
Board which w orks as the secretariat of 
the National Econom ic and Social Deve­
lopment C om m inee to  supply data and 
National Econom ic and Social Develop­
ment Plans fo r the ir consideration. Some­
times the cabinet assigns w ork d irec tly  to 
the Office of the National Econom ic and 
Social Development Board through the 
Secretary General w ho  is invited to par­
tic ipate in the cabinet meeting.
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Senior Officers
Secretary-General:
Dr. Snoh Unakul
Tel. 281-1102. 281-0947
D eputy Secretaries-General:
Prakorb Juanabhanich
Tel. 281-0946
Phisit Pakkasem
Tel. 282-5417
Asst. Secretaries-General:
Kos it Panpiemras 
Tel. 282-4840 
V ith ya  Siriponase 
Tel. 282-6853 
Sumeth Tantive jku l 
Tel. 282-0811
Secretary, O ffice of the Secretary :
Theeraoone Varanusupaku!
Tel. 281-3465
D irector, Overall Planning D ivision:
Pnayao P hyorm yon t 
Tel. 281-6127
D irector, Urban D eve loom ent C o-ooeraiion 
Div.: Pisaek Showchaiya 
Tel. 282-6853
D irector. Technology and Environm ent 
Planning Division:
V is it Boonyakesanond (A cting)
Tel. 282-6853. 282 -0838 
D irector, National Accounts D ivision:
W irat Watanasiritham 
Tel. 281-6634
D irector, Development Studies & In fo rm ation  
Div.: Somcnai Krusuansombax 
Tel. 281-6635
D irector, In frastructu re  Projects Div. : 
Anuparb Sunanania 
Tel. 282-9868
Director, Economic Projects D iv is ion:
Narona N itayaporn 
Tel. 282-0811
D irector, Social Projects D iv is ion :
Miss Thammarak K arnp is it
Tel. 281-6631, 282-9158
D irector, Rural D evelopm ent C oord ina tion
D iv.:Pa iro te  Suchinda
Tel. 282-5837
D irector, Econom ic Preparedness Planning 
Div.: Dr. Manoon M oo rp ra d it 
Tel. 281-6632
Director, Center fo r  In tegrated Plan o f 
O pera tions:
Savit B ho tiw ihok 
Tel. 281-1576
APPENDIX G
SELECTED CONDITIONS IN THE LOAN AGREEMENTS
The World Bank's first structural adjustment loan or SAL I (Loan 
Number 2097 TH) to Thailand was approved on March 2, signed on March 
15, and fully disbursed by July 19, 1982. The second structural
adjustment loan or SAL II (Loan Number 2256-TH) was approved on March 
31, signed on April 27, and fully disbursed by September 22, 1983.- 
Table G.l summarizes selected conditions of both loan agreements.
The loan amount for SAL I was $150 million and that for SAL II 
was $175.5 million, with a total of $325.5 million. All goods 
imported into Thailand with a few exceptions were eligible for 
financing under the loans. Those exceptions are (1) goods which are 
being otherwise financed by national or international financing 
institutions or any other agency, (2) goods intended for military or 
paramilitary use, and (3) goods for luxury consumption. A list of 
ineligible imports is contained in Schedule 1 of both Loan Agreements.
Both SAL I and SAL II required a commitment charge paid to the 
World Bank at 0.75% per annum on the principal amount of the loan not 
withdrawn from time to time. Unlike SAL I, SAL II also required a 
capitalized front-end fee of $437,656 paid to the World Bank.
The interest rate on SAL I was fixed at 11.60% per annum but 
that on SAL II was variable at 0.50% per annum above the World Bank’s 
cost of borrowings. Both SALs had a grace period for their principal 
for five years and a 20 year term. In practice, both loans have been 
fully paid back to the World Bank.
The Bank of Thailand was designated to be responsible for 
maintaining the loan account, the collection and coordination of the 
relevant letters of credit and supporting documentation and for the 
preparation and submission of withdrawal applications. The Minister 
of Finance was designated as representative of Thailand.
- See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1986), 
p. i; Loan Agreement (Structural Adjustment Loan) Number 2097 TH, 
Dated March 15, 1982; and Loan Agreement (Second Structural Adjustment 
Loan) Number 2256 TH, Dated April 27, 1983.
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Table G.l
Selected Conditions in the Loan Agreements
Selected Condition Loan Number 2097 TH (SAL I) Loan Number 2256 TH (SAL II)
Loan Amount $150 million $175.5 million
Withdrawal of 
proceeds
Financing imported goods 
with a few exceptions
Same
Fee paid to the WB^ None $437,656
Commitment charge 
paid to the WB
0.75% per annum on the 
principal amount of the loan 
not withdrawn from time to 
time.
Same
Interest rate on 
loan
11.60% per annum on the 
principal amount of the loan 
withdrawn and outstanding 
from time to time.
0.50% per annum above the 
WB’s cost of qualified 
borrowings^ on the principal 
amount of the loan withdrawn 
and outstanding from time to 
time.
Payment interval of 
interest and other 
charges
June 1 and December 1 in 
each year.
Same
Payment interval of
principal/each
payment
Each June 1 and December 1 
beginning December 1, 1987 
through June 1, 2002/
$5 million
Each June 1 and December 1 
beginning December 1, 1988 
through June 1, 2003/
$5.85 million
Notes:- Extracted from the Loan Agreements Number 2097 TH (Structural 
Adjustment Loan) and Number 2256 TH (Second Structural Adjustment Loan) 
between Kingdom of Thailand and International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, Dated March 15, 1982 and April 27, 1988 respectively.
* WB stands for the World Bank.
9 See the definition of cost of qualified borrowings in the Loan 
.Agreement Number 2256 TH cited above, pp. 3-4.
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